Agent & model refactor (#478)
* agent & model refactor with ASKPASS git auth, UI restructure, clerk v7 Made-with: Cursor * fix stale agent/effort refs, add tests for askpass + model resolution - reviewCleanup.ts: payload.agent -> payload.model, remove effort - selectMode.ts PlanEdit: remove delegation/subagent/effort references - pullfrog.yml.ts: update env vars (drop GOOGLE_API_KEY/CURSOR_API_KEY, add GOOGLE_GENERATIVE_AI_API_KEY/XAI_API_KEY/MOONSHOT_API_KEY/OPENCODE_API_KEY) - FlagsSettings/RepoInstructionsSection: remove stale effort/timeout copy - new: gitAuthServer.test.ts (10 tests — lifecycle, token delivery, tamper detection, script gen) - new: agent.test.ts (4 tests — default opentoad, AGENT_OVERRIDE, invalid override) - new: models.test.ts (19 tests — parseModel, resolution, registry invariants) - update models.dev snapshot Made-with: Cursor * fix changed-agents.sh to filter legacy agent files from CI matrix legacy agent files (claude.ts, codex.ts, etc.) are @ts-nocheck and not exported from index.ts. changed-agents.sh now reads index.ts imports to build the active agent set and treats changes to inactive files as non-agent changes (opentoad canary only). Made-with: Cursor * remove MCP file tools, old agent harnesses, and obsolete security tests ASKPASS-based git auth makes the old MCP file tool security layer unnecessary: - token never in subprocess env, so symlink/gitattributes/hook attacks can't exfiltrate it - agents now use native file tools (OpenCode builtin read/edit) deleted: - action/mcp/file.ts (file_read, file_write, file_edit, file_delete, list_directory) - action/mcp/index.ts (dead re-export) - agent harnesses: claude.ts, codex.ts, cursor.ts, gemini.ts, opencode.ts - opencode-runner.ts (inlined into opentoad.ts) - security tests that validated MCP file tool restrictions - commented-out three-step review flow (~300 lines) - sanitizeSchema/wrapSchema dead code from mcp/shared.ts - OPENCODE_MODEL_MINI/MAX env vars (effort-level model overrides removed) updated test prompts to use generic file ops instead of MCP tool names. restored pkg-json-scripts + requirements-txt-attack (test --ignore-scripts defense). Made-with: Cursor * bump actions/checkout v4 → v6 (node 24) node 20 actions deprecated june 2, 2026. Made-with: Cursor * temporarily disable fail-fast on agnostic tests to debug checkout@v6 Made-with: Cursor * re-enable fail-fast on agnostic tests Made-with: Cursor * fix test token mismatch: mint OIDC tokens scoped to target repo CI tests override GITHUB_REPOSITORY to pullfrog/test-repo but inherit the runner's GITHUB_TOKEN (scoped to pullfrog/app), causing 401s on every run-context fetch. Clear GITHUB_TOKEN in the test subprocess so ensureGitHubToken() mints a properly scoped token via OIDC. Also centralizes the default GITHUB_REPOSITORY in runAgentStreaming instead of repeating it in every test file, and fixes preview-cleanup to remove workers from all queues (not just name-matching ones). Made-with: Cursor * fix ensureGitHubToken to try OIDC when app credentials are absent ensureGitHubToken only attempted token minting when GITHUB_APP_ID and GITHUB_PRIVATE_KEY were set. In CI, OIDC is available but app creds aren't exposed — so the guard prevented minting entirely. Made-with: Cursor * dead code cleanup: remove remnants of deleted agents, file tools, effort system remove unused @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk and @openai/codex-sdk deps, orphaned file-tool security tests, dead GEMINI_MODEL passthrough, stale opencode-runner wiki refs, deleted test file references, and MCP file tool docs. rename docs/effort → docs/models. fix vitest setup: move dotenv to globalSetup (runs once before forks instead of per-file, 19s → 200ms). Made-with: Cursor * address review feedback: remove dead code, update stale references - remove AGENT_OVERRIDE (only opentoad exists) - remove shellToolName plumbing (always restricted shell) - bump action version to 0.0.179 - remove CURSOR_API_KEY from all workflows/configs - remove OPENCODE_MODEL_MINI/MAX from workflows/docs - delete wiki/effort.md, rewrite docs/effort.mdx as "Models" - rewrite wiki/modes.md: orchestrator/subagent → single agent - simplify flag system: drop builtin flag extraction (debug, effort, timeout, agent), keep custom flag replacement only - reserve all legacy flag names to prevent custom flag conflicts Made-with: Cursor * regenerate lockfile after removing claude-agent-sdk and codex-sdk Made-with: Cursor * fix import ordering, add lockfile check to pre-push hook Made-with: Cursor * remove dead debug payload field, stale packageExtensions Made-with: Cursor * merge proc-sandbox and token-exfil into a single test proc-sandbox and token-exfil were duplicative — both tested that SANDBOX_TEST_TOKEN couldn't be exfiltrated. consolidated into token-exfil with shell:restricted (which actually exercises filterEnv) and the /proc attack vector hints from proc-sandbox. Made-with: Cursor * fix wiki adversarial.md to match actual tokenExfil validator Made-with: Cursor
This commit is contained in:
Colin McDonnell
committed by
pullfrog[bot]
pullfrog[bot]
parent
5bcfae990a
commit
6d25adfd1a
@@ -407,133 +407,6 @@ describe("git tool security - auth redirect", () => {
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});
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});
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// ─── file tool security tests ───────────────────────────────────────────
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const GIT_INTERPRETED_FILES = [".gitattributes", ".gitmodules"];
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type ValidateWritePathResult = {
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allowed: boolean;
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error?: string;
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};
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// simplified path validation that mirrors the security checks in file.ts
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// without requiring real filesystem operations (for unit testing)
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function validateWritePathSecurity(
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relative: string,
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shellPermission: ShellPermission
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): ValidateWritePathResult {
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if (relative === ".git" || relative.startsWith(".git/")) {
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return { allowed: false, error: `writing to .git is not allowed: ${relative}` };
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}
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// only blocked when shell is disabled
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if (shellPermission === "disabled") {
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const basename = relative.split("/").pop() || "";
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if (GIT_INTERPRETED_FILES.includes(basename)) {
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return {
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allowed: false,
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error: `writing to ${basename} is not allowed when shell is ${shellPermission}`,
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};
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}
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}
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return { allowed: true };
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}
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describe("file tool security - .git protection", () => {
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it("blocks .git directory in all modes", () => {
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const modes: ShellPermission[] = ["disabled", "restricted", "enabled"];
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for (const mode of modes) {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".git", mode);
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
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}
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});
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it("blocks .git/config", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".git/config", "enabled");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
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});
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it("blocks .git/hooks/pre-commit", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".git/hooks/pre-commit", "enabled");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
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});
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it("blocks deeply nested .git paths", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".git/objects/ab/cd1234", "enabled");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe("file tool security - git-interpreted files (disabled mode only)", () => {
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it("blocks .gitattributes in disabled mode", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitattributes", "disabled");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
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expect(result.error).toContain(".gitattributes");
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});
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it("allows .gitattributes in restricted mode (agent has shell)", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitattributes", "restricted");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
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});
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it("allows .gitattributes in enabled mode", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitattributes", "enabled");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
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});
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it("blocks .gitmodules in disabled mode", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitmodules", "disabled");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
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});
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it("allows .gitmodules in restricted mode", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitmodules", "restricted");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
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});
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it("allows .gitmodules in enabled mode", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitmodules", "enabled");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
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});
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it("blocks subdirectory .gitattributes in disabled mode", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity("src/.gitattributes", "disabled");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
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});
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it("blocks deeply nested .gitattributes in disabled mode", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity("a/b/c/.gitattributes", "disabled");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
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});
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it("allows subdirectory .gitattributes in restricted mode", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity("src/.gitattributes", "restricted");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
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});
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it("allows normal files in all modes", () => {
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const files = ["README.md", "src/index.ts", "package.json", ".env", ".gitignore"];
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const modes: ShellPermission[] = ["disabled", "restricted", "enabled"];
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for (const file of files) {
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for (const mode of modes) {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity(file, mode);
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
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}
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}
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});
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it("does not block .gitignore (not a code execution vector)", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitignore", "disabled");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
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});
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it("does not block .gitkeep (not a code execution vector)", () => {
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const result = validateWritePathSecurity("dir/.gitkeep", "disabled");
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expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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// ─── dependency install security tests ──────────────────────────────────
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// mirrors the logic in dependencies.ts startInstallation()
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