Restructure dash (#372)
* Restructure dash * WIP * WIP * refactor trigger UI: extract PR summary card, add mentions section, rename labels Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * clean up console UI: remove info icons from section descriptions, rename mentions trigger Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix review feedback: layout, terminology, form scope - extract console sidebar sections to module-level constant - align three-column layout breakpoints to xl (match sidebar visibility) - fix mixed shell/bash terminology in beta page - scope FormProvider to trigger sections only, restore autoComplete="off" Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Bump --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
pullfrog[bot]
parent
b8a0d799ee
commit
a7bd746f21
+9
-9
@@ -77,11 +77,11 @@ function writeCodexConfig(ctx: AgentRunContext): string {
|
||||
const mcpServerSections = [`[mcp_servers.${ghPullfrogMcpName}]\nurl = "${ctx.mcpServerUrl}"`];
|
||||
|
||||
// build features section for tool control
|
||||
// disable native shell if bash is "disabled" or "restricted"
|
||||
// when "restricted", agent uses MCP bash tool which filters secrets
|
||||
const bash = ctx.payload.bash;
|
||||
// disable native shell if shell is "disabled" or "restricted"
|
||||
// when "restricted", agent uses MCP shell tool which filters secrets
|
||||
const shell = ctx.payload.shell;
|
||||
const features: string[] = [];
|
||||
if (bash !== "enabled") {
|
||||
if (shell !== "enabled") {
|
||||
features.push("shell_tool = false");
|
||||
features.push("unified_exec = false");
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ ${mcpServerSections.join("\n\n")}
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
log.info(
|
||||
`» Codex config written to ${configPath} (shell: ${bash === "enabled" ? "enabled" : "disabled"}, project trusted: ${cwd})`
|
||||
`» Codex config written to ${configPath} (shell: ${shell === "enabled" ? "enabled" : "disabled"}, project trusted: ${cwd})`
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
return codexDir;
|
||||
@@ -210,13 +210,13 @@ export const codex = agent({
|
||||
const commandExecutionIds = new Set<string>();
|
||||
const thinkingTimer = new ThinkingTimer();
|
||||
|
||||
// when bash is restricted/disabled, filter sensitive env vars from the codex process.
|
||||
// when shell is restricted/disabled, filter sensitive env vars from the codex process.
|
||||
// defense-in-depth: codex 0.99.0's shell_command_tool feature flag is unreliable,
|
||||
// so native shell commands may still run. filtering the process env ensures secrets
|
||||
// (matching *_TOKEN, *_KEY, *_SECRET, etc.) are not accessible even if native shell
|
||||
// bypasses the MCP bash tool's filterEnv.
|
||||
// bypasses the MCP shell tool's filterEnv.
|
||||
// API key is explicitly re-added since codex needs it for API calls.
|
||||
const baseEnv = ctx.payload.bash === "enabled" ? process.env : filterEnv();
|
||||
const baseEnv = ctx.payload.shell === "enabled" ? process.env : filterEnv();
|
||||
const env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = {
|
||||
...baseEnv,
|
||||
CODEX_HOME: codexDir,
|
||||
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ function createMessageHandlers(): {
|
||||
const isTracked = commandExecutionIds.has(item.id);
|
||||
if (isTracked) {
|
||||
thinkingTimer.markToolResult();
|
||||
log.startGroup(`bash output`);
|
||||
log.startGroup(`shell output`);
|
||||
if (item.status === "failed" || (item.exit_code !== undefined && item.exit_code !== 0)) {
|
||||
log.info(item.aggregated_output || "Command failed");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user