1de60d74fdb00a5f30ef6e4053b30d61355be811
5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Colin McDonnell
|
88f170e19a |
fix: 7 log-audit / run-audit findings (mega-PR) (#769)
* fix(#765): silence Clerk 400 (revoked OAuth) noise from getTokenForClerkId Branch on isClerkAPIResponseError + status<500 so the well-understood revoked-token redirect doesn't emit a level=error line in Better Stack on every request. Vercel maps console.warn -> error for non-streaming routes, so a downgrade to log.warn wouldn't help; only the unexpected shape (5xx, network) is worth surfacing. * fix(#742): stop logging input verbatim from yes.op retry-failure paths GitHub OAuth user tokens (ghu_...) were leaking to Better Stack on every yes.op retry-failure for any utils/github/get* helper that takes a token field — 38 leaks/7d in the most recent audit window. The leak path is console.log inside the yes package (its own log shim, not utils/log.ts). Drop input from the four log sites + the cache-key-derivation throw site. key (SHA-1 of input) is sufficient for retry correlation; error already carries request URL + status. Defense-in-depth comment so future contributors don't re-add the field. Operational follow-up (separate task): inventory ghu_... strings in Better Stack ingested in the last 90d, revoke matching Clerk grants, scrub cold-tier S3, rotate the BS source token. * fix(#759): handle GraphqlResponseError "Could not resolve to a node" as 404 When the stored planCommentNodeId references a comment that's been deleted on GitHub, octokit.graphql throws GraphqlResponseError before the existing `node === null` 404 branch is reached. Add a narrow isGraphqlNodeNotFound predicate in utils/errors.ts and a new catch branch in the plan-comment route. The action treats 404 as "no prior plan comment" and creates a fresh one, so behavior matches existing contract. * fix(#747): convert webhook GraphQL rate-limit 5xx into a Result<T> sentinel + 200 ack When GitHub's GraphQL responds with "API rate limit exceeded for installation ID N", _getReviewCommentsWithReplies threw, propagated through the bare yes.op wrapper (no rate-limit bail), out of the bare await in handleWebhook, and crashed /api/webhook/github with 500 — 77 webhook 500s/24h on the most recent audit window. GitHub redelivery plus R2 dedup also silently masked the legitimate handler from re-running once the rate-limit window cleared. Mirror the #658 / _getRepository pattern: detect GraphqlResponseError matching /rate limit (already )?exceeded/i, log.warn with the x-ratelimit-reset value (and [Installation N] prefix when available), return failure(...) with status 429. Webhook handler short-circuits the case with 200 + log.info so GitHub stops the redelivery storm against an exhausted budget, and the trigger page surfaces a clean ThrowClientError. Document the new pattern as a Tier 2 false-positive in wiki/log-audit.md so the next audit cron doesn't re-flag it. Note that returning [] silently (the issue's first suggestion) would have dropped @pullfrog mentions inline in review comments and dispatched an agent run that re-rate-limits — skip-the-whole-case is the correct semantics. Co-vulnerable getPullRequest / getWorkflow have zero occurrences in this window; per #737 policy, defer until they show up. NOTE: this commit and the bracket of touched files revert as a unit — the Result<T> shape change in getReviewCommentsWithReplies is breaking; partial revert breaks the type chain. * fix(#766): fold stderr+stdout into shell.ts errors + carve out merge-base --is-ancestor action/utils/shell.ts dropped stdout when constructing failure messages ($\{stderr || "Unknown error"\}), so git subcommands that write context-bearing diagnostics to stdout (merge conflicts, cherry-pick rejections, diff --exit-code, ls-files --error-unmatch) surfaced as "Command failed with exit code 1: Unknown error" through mcp__pullfrog__git. The agent burned an extra MCP round-trip calling git status to recover. Fold stderr + stdout into the thrown error message (stderr first, stdout fallback) so the agent always sees the real diagnostic. Plus a narrow carve-out for `git merge-base --is-ancestor` in action/mcp/git.ts: that subcommand uses exit code as data (0=ancestor, 1=not-an-ancestor, >1=error), so return { success: true, isAncestor } instead of throwing on exit 1. No caller in action/ string-matches on the old error format (verified). diff --exit-code and ls-files --error-unmatch are not carved out — both are zero-occurrence in the May audit window, and the stderr+stdout fold renders their output usefully anyway. * fix(#739): point customers at the actual fix when permissions: id-token: write is missing When a customer workflow runs in GitHub Actions but lacks permissions: id-token: write, ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL/_TOKEN aren't injected, isOIDCAvailable() is false, and acquireNewToken falls through to the local-dev-only acquireTokenViaGitHubApp path, which throws "GITHUB_APP_ID and GITHUB_PRIVATE_KEY must be set" — pointing at a self-hosted-app fix that doesn't apply. One affected customer burned 13 dispatches in 24h on this misleading error. Detect (GITHUB_ACTIONS=true) AND (no OIDC env vars) inside acquireNewToken before falling through to the local-dev branch, and throw an actionable message naming the missing permissions block, the exact YAML, and the docs anchor. The error surfaces via ##[error]action failed: ... in the workflow log (the only customer surface available before main()'s inner try opens). Local-dev path keeps the existing GITHUB_APP_ID message. * fix(#760): suspend activity watchdog across in-flight tool calls mcp__pullfrog__checkout_pr was hard-failing 6/24h on SenecaLabs/senecaWeb because git fetch+deepen on a large monorepo can take 4-5 min, the agent's stdout pipe goes silent the entire time (FastMCP is in-process HTTP, but Claude/opencode CLIs await the synchronous tools/call response), and both the spawn-level activity timer (300s in subprocess.ts) and the process-level activity monitor (300s in activity.ts) fire and kill the run. Re-introduce the bracket pattern that PR #634 removed: bracket suspendActivity()/resumeActivity() around tool_use -> tool_result in both agent harnesses, plumb isPausedExternally into spawn() so both timers suspend in lockstep. Bounded by MAX_TOOL_CALL_SUSPENSION_MS (15 min auto-resume) plus the outer 1h agent timeout — neither zombie-run avenue from #12 is reopened (subprocess.close still resolves on death; outer timeout is suspend-agnostic; suspends gated on explicit paired CLI events, not internal noise). opencode tool_use handler: gate suspendActivity() on non-terminal status (running/pending) so the bus_event re-dispatch path at line 915 — which only fires for completed/error subagent parts and never emits a paired tool_result — doesn't latch the watchdog into suspension until the 15min ceiling. Add a heuristic:activity-watchdog-ceiling classifier to scripts/analyze-logs.ts so a tool that genuinely hangs past MAX_TOOL_CALL_SUSPENSION_MS surfaces in run-audit instead of being bucketed into failure:unknown. NOTE: this commit and the bracket of touched files revert as a unit — activity.ts, subprocess.ts, and the two harnesses must move together or the bracketing breaks. * refactor(#747): swap Result<T> for InstallationRateLimitError typed throw The Result<T> shape from 3ebf6c4c was cargo-culted from the #658 _getRepository pattern, but _getReviewCommentsWithReplies has only one expected-error case (installation rate-limit) and two callers — Result imposes branching on the trigger-page caller that never cared about the rate-limit case specifically. A typed error class is lighter (~10 LoC vs ~33) and matches the actual need: - new InstallationRateLimitError(resetAt) thrown from _getReviewCommentsWithReplies; rate-limit log.warn unchanged. - handleWebhook catches it and breaks with log.info (unchanged semantics: 200 ack, no redelivery storm). - trigger page reverts to direct array access; any failure propagates to the page error boundary (the pre-#747-commit shape). - log-audit.md wording updated to match. |
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|
Colin McDonnell
|
3a7145db1a |
Scope installation token permissions in restricted mode (#226)
* Scope installation token permissions in restricted mode
In restricted/disabled bash mode, the installation token is now scoped
to match the workflow's permissions block. This preserves fork push
capability while limiting what the agent can do with the token.
- Read workflow permissions from pullfrog.yml at runtime
- Pass permissions to API when acquiring installation token
- Clear OIDC env vars in restricted mode to prevent token minting
- Simplify setupGit by moving token resolution to main.ts
* Address review feedback: fail closed with default permissions
- Add restrictive default permissions (contents:read, pull_requests:read,
issues:read) as fallback when workflow permissions can't be read
- Add support for job-level permissions via GITHUB_JOB env var
- Fix misleading comment about token resolution in restricted mode
- Add documentation about fork PR checkout behavior
* Simplify to separate git/MCP tokens without workflow permission scoping
- gitToken: minimal contents:write only (assumed exfiltratable)
- mcpToken: full installation token (not exfiltratable via MCP tools)
- Remove workflowPermissions.ts - security-conscious users can pass
their own token via GH_TOKEN or inputs.token
- Add type-safe InstallationTokenPermissions to github.ts and API route
* Rename `write` permission to `push` and remove vestigial tool blocking
The `write` permission was previously used to block local file write tools
in agents. This was security theater since bash can write files anyway.
Now `push` only controls the git token scope:
- push: enabled → contents:write (can push commits)
- push: disabled → contents:read (read-only, can't push)
Changes:
- Rename `write` to `push` in action.yml, Prisma schema, and all TS types
- Remove vestigial write tool blocking from all agents (claude, cursor,
gemini, opencode, codex)
- Add data-preserving Prisma migration using RENAME COLUMN
- Update UI: "Write files" → "Git push" with updated description
* add PID namespace isolation for bash sandbox
when running in CI, attempts to use unshare --pid to create a new PID
namespace for bash subprocesses. this prevents the /proc/$PPID/environ
attack where a malicious command could read secrets from the parent
process's environment.
the protection works by:
1. creating a new PID namespace (subprocess becomes PID 1)
2. mounting fresh /proc showing only sandbox PIDs
3. parent PIDs become invisible (PPID = 0, /proc/0 doesn't exist)
combined with filterEnv(), this provides complete protection against
/proc-based secret theft. falls back gracefully if namespaces aren't
available.
includes test script to verify the protection works.
* add PID namespace test to CI workflow
tests whether unshare --pid works on GHA runners out of the box,
and if not, whether enabling via sysctl helps. also runs the
pidNamespace.ts test to verify the full protection.
* fix pnpm setup and add procIsolation agent test
- fix pnpm/action-setup by specifying package_json_file path
- add procIsolation crossagent test that has agent attempt to
read secrets via /proc/$PPID/environ
- add procIsolation to CI test matrix
* add pid-namespace test job to main workflow
this job tests unshare --pid capabilities on GHA runners and runs
the pidNamespace.ts adhoc test to verify /proc isolation works
* test bubblewrap's sysctl approach for enabling namespaces
- write to /etc/sysctl.d/99-userns.conf and run sysctl --system
- try aa-complain on unshare binary
- more detailed diagnostics
* fix pidNamespace test and add sudo-unshare fallback for GHA
- fix reference error in pidNamespace.ts (renamed function but didn't update calls)
- add sudo-unshare as fallback method for GHA runners where unprivileged
namespaces are blocked but sudo is available
- update bash.ts to detect and use sudo unshare when unprivileged fails
* consolidate security docs and document PID namespace isolation
- update security.md with current implementation details
- document sudo unshare fallback for GHA runners
- add testing instructions for local Docker and CI
- add "Further Exploration" section with Landlock and path validation ideas
- delete bash-sandbox.md and landlock.md (consolidated into security.md)
* move procIsolation test to adhoc folder
the procIsolation test requires PID namespace capabilities that aren't
available in the Docker test environment. moved to adhoc/ so it's excluded
from default test runs and can be run explicitly when needed (e.g. via
the pid-namespace CI job or locally with --privileged docker).
* fix Docker test environment for PID namespace isolation
- add CI and GITHUB_ACTIONS to testEnvAllowList so sandbox detection runs
- add --privileged to Docker run for PID namespace support (unshare)
this fixes the test environment to properly test the sandbox. in production,
the action runs directly on GHA runner where sudo unshare works.
* fix getJobToken() to work in test environment
add fallback to GH_TOKEN and GITHUB_TOKEN when INPUT_TOKEN is not set.
this allows tests to run without requiring workflow-level token input.
the token resolution order is:
1. INPUT_TOKEN (from workflow `with: token:`)
2. GH_TOKEN (external token override)
3. GITHUB_TOKEN (pre-acquired in tests or from GHA env)
* security: filter secrets from all subprocess environments
- extract filterEnv() to shared utils/secrets.ts
- make $() utility filter secrets by default (git, npm, etc. don't need them)
- disable git hooks via core.hooksPath to prevent hook-based exfiltration
- git auth uses token embedded in URL, not env vars
this prevents malicious git hooks, npm postinstall scripts, and other
code execution vectors from exfiltrating GITHUB_TOKEN and API keys.
* docs: clarify defense-in-depth security model
update security.md to explain why BOTH layers are required:
- filterEnv(): cleans child's own /proc/self/environ
- PID namespace: hides parent's /proc entries
PID namespace alone isn't sufficient - with --mount-proc, the child
becomes PID 1, so /proc/1/environ is the child's OWN environment.
without filterEnv(), secrets would still be accessible there.
* add procSandbox crossagent test for PID namespace security
- add crossagent/procSandbox.ts: security test that instructs agent to try
various /proc attack vectors and validates sandbox blocks them
- update wiki/security.md: document PID namespace isolation details, add
verification commands, explain why sudo inside sandbox doesn't break security
- update docker.ts: use node:24 with sudo for GHA-like test environment
- update instructions.ts: allow disabling security messaging for pentests
- clean up adhoc test files (procIsolation.ts, securityAudit.ts)
the procSandbox test sets SANDBOX_TEST_TOKEN (matches *_TOKEN filter), gives
the agent explicit hints about attack vectors (/proc, sudo, nsenter, etc.),
disables prompt-based mitigations, and validates the secret is never leaked.
* move procSandbox test to agnostic/ (runs with one agent)
* WIP
* docs: add agent testing guide (pnpm play, Docker, pentesting)
* docs: add CI details to agent testing guide
* docs: add interesting findings and gotchas from pentesting
* improve test fidelity: auto-set CI=true, verify sandbox active
- docker.ts: always set CI=true in container so sandbox activates
- docker.ts: skip sudo/user setup if already done (faster reruns)
- bash.ts: export getSandboxMethod() for diagnostics
- bash.ts: add debug log when sandbox disabled
- procSandbox.ts: add sandbox_was_active check to catch vacuous passes
the CI=true change is critical: without it, PID namespace isolation
is skipped and security tests pass without actually testing anything.
* docs: update agent-testing.md with CI=true auto-set note
* docs: clarify log format is agent-specific
* fix git auth, simplify MCP tools, add adversarial tests
- fix gitWithAuth to use Basic auth format (Bearer doesn't work with git's http.extraheader)
- fix token.ts: push:restricted now correctly gets contents:write
- fix github.ts: pass permissions when acquiring installation tokens locally
- remove commit_files and create_branch MCP tools (redundant, don't require credentials)
- remove containsSecrets() - trivially bypassable, not sound security
- add agnostic adversarial tests: pushDisabled, pushRestricted, tokenExfil
- update instructions.ts to clearly list available git MCP tools
- add wiki/git.md documenting credential isolation and push permission tiers
- update wiki/docker.md with custom image considerations
- update wiki/agent-testing.md with adversarial testing patterns
* fix type errors after rebase
- change ResolveTokensParams.push from ToolPermission to PushPermission
- use tags: ["agnostic"] instead of agnostic: true in test files
* fix cleanup permission error in sandbox tests
when sandbox isolation is enabled (CI=true), files created by the unshare
subprocess may have different ownership, causing rmSync to fail with EACCES.
this error in the finally block was overriding the test's success result.
fix: wrap cleanup in try-catch and fall back to sudo rm if rmSync fails.
* Add adhoc
* Handle git config/remote bypasses
* add git hooks protection and simplify ToolState
- disable git hooks in restricted mode via -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null
- add gitHooks adversarial test to verify hook protection works
- unify prNumber/issueNumber into single issueNumber field
- add pushUrl to ToolState for push validation
- add generateTestMarker() for simpler single-agent test markers
- export SENSITIVE_PATTERNS and isSensitiveEnvName from secrets.ts
- remove redundant pidNamespace.ts (duplicated by procSandbox.ts)
- update documentation
* harden $git() auth: subcommand whitelist, binary tamper detection
- rename gitWithAuth() to $git() with explicit subcommand first arg
- restrict to "fetch" | "push" at type level (filters don't run for these)
- resolve git binary path at startup via resolveGit(), sha256 fingerprint
- verify hash before each $git() call to detect binary replacement
- rename disableHooks to restricted for cleaner semantics
- document filter exfiltration attack and empirical verification in wiki
* remove redundant pid-namespace CI job
the PID namespace isolation testing is now handled by
action/test/agnostic/procSandbox.ts via pnpm runtest agnostic
* fix push_branch for new branches and improve token leak detection
- getPushDestination now falls back to origin/<branch> when @{push}
is not configured (happens for new branches created locally)
- gitPerms validator now checks for actual token patterns instead
of matching "x-access-token" string in test instructions
* use kebab-case for test names
* simplify shell env API: "restricted" | "inherit" | object
replace passFullEnv boolean with cleaner env option that accepts:
- "restricted" (default): filterEnv() to prevent secret leakage
- "inherit": full process.env
- object: custom env merged with restricted base
* share EnvMode and resolveEnv between shell.ts and bash.ts
move shared env resolution logic to secrets.ts
* add env option to bash tool (default: restricted)
* delete agent-testing.md (renamed to adversarial.md)
* Add checkout tests
* reframe githooks test prompt to avoid claude safety refusal
claude was refusing to execute the test because the prompt used words
like "malicious" and "security testing". reframed as a debugging task
with innocuous env var name (TESTING_DEBUG_TAG) per adversarial.md guidance.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* clean up verbose token acquisition logs
move logging responsibility to call sites which have better context
(git token vs MCP token). remove redundant intermediate OIDC logs
and unused "(permission-scoped)" suffix.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* isolate agnostic tests with matrix strategy, fix .pullfrog-env secret leak
- split action-agnostic into per-test matrix jobs for isolated logs and filesystems
- only write explicitly opted-in env vars to .pullfrog-env via fileAgentEnv
(fixes token-exfil test where claude found SANDBOX_TEST_TOKEN on disk)
- mcpmerge test opts in via fileAgentEnv for cursor's repo-level MCP fallback
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* remove env parameter from bash tool to prevent agents bypassing filterEnv
the bash tool exposed an `env` parameter accepting "restricted" | "inherit"
which allowed agents to pass env: "inherit" and see all secrets including
SANDBOX_TEST_TOKEN, bypassing the restricted environment filtering entirely.
env mode is now determined internally (always restricted).
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* use pullfrog/test-repo for push tests to stop polluting main repo
push tests were creating branches and tags on pullfrog/app directly.
now all push tests (push-restricted, push-disabled, push-enabled,
git-permissions) target pullfrog/test-repo instead.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* use pullfrog/test-repo for all tests, not just push tests
no test should clone or operate on pullfrog/app directly.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix token scoping for test-repo and bash timeout defaults
- acquireTokenViaOIDC now includes GITHUB_REPOSITORY repo in token
scope so push tests work against pullfrog/test-repo
- bash tool default timeout: 120s -> 30s, cap: 600s -> 120s
- activity timeout: 30s -> 60s
- prevents hung bash commands (e.g. find /) from killing the agent
via activity timeout
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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Colin McDonnell
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a19ae49224 | Determinstically set up PR branch | ||
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Colin McDonnell
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4ff547f673 | add debug mcp tool for testing, fix transport issues | ||
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Colin McDonnell
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e5878de9e4 | Drop usage of execSync, switch to $ util |