import { regex } from "arkregex";
import { type } from "arktype";
import { log } from "../utils/cli.ts";
import { $git } from "../utils/gitAuth.ts";
import { executeLifecycleHook } from "../utils/lifecycle.ts";
import { $ } from "../utils/shell.ts";
import type { StoredPushDest, ToolContext } from "./server.ts";
import { execute, tool } from "./shared.ts";

type PushDestination = {
  remoteName: string;
  remoteBranch: string;
  url: string;
};

/**
 * get where git would actually push this branch.
 * prefers the stored destination from toolState (set by checkout_pr) when it
 * matches the current branch, because git config reads can silently fail in
 * certain environments causing pushes to the wrong remote branch.
 *
 * falls back to reading branch.X.pushRemote and branch.X.merge from git config,
 * and finally to origin/<branch> for branches created without checkout_pr.
 */
function getPushDestination(
  branch: string,
  storedDest: StoredPushDest | undefined
): PushDestination {
  // prefer stored destination from checkout_pr when it matches the current branch
  if (storedDest && storedDest.localBranch === branch) {
    log.debug(`using stored push destination: ${storedDest.remoteName}/${storedDest.remoteBranch}`);
    const url = $("git", ["remote", "get-url", "--push", storedDest.remoteName], {
      log: false,
    }).trim();
    return { remoteName: storedDest.remoteName, remoteBranch: storedDest.remoteBranch, url };
  }

  // fall back to git config (for branches not created by checkout_pr)
  try {
    const pushRemote = $("git", ["config", `branch.${branch}.pushRemote`], { log: false }).trim();
    const merge = $("git", ["config", `branch.${branch}.merge`], { log: false }).trim();
    const remoteBranch = merge.replace(/^refs\/heads\//, "");
    const url = $("git", ["remote", "get-url", "--push", pushRemote], { log: false }).trim();
    return { remoteName: pushRemote, remoteBranch, url };
  } catch {
    // no push config - branch was created locally without checkout_pr
    log.debug(`no push config for ${branch}, falling back to origin/${branch}`);
    const url = $("git", ["remote", "get-url", "--push", "origin"], { log: false }).trim();
    return { remoteName: "origin", remoteBranch: branch, url };
  }
}

/**
 * normalize URL for comparison (handle .git suffix, case)
 */
function normalizeUrl(url: string): string {
  return url.replace(/\.git$/, "").toLowerCase();
}

// SECURITY: reject refs/branch names that begin with "-". git's parseopt
// accepts options intermixed with positional args, so a ref like
// "--upload-pack=evil" could be interpreted as a flag rather than a refspec.
export function rejectIfLeadingDash(value: string, kind: string): void {
  if (value.startsWith("-")) {
    throw new Error(`Blocked: ${kind} '${value}' starts with '-' — git could parse it as a flag.`);
  }
}

// SECURITY: branch inputs to push/delete must be bare branch names. a branch
// name like "refs/heads/main" bypasses the restricted-mode default-branch
// check below (which does exact-string compare against "main"), and symbolic
// refs (HEAD / FETCH_HEAD / ORIG_HEAD / MERGE_HEAD) would resolve to
// whatever commit those refs point at — both routes let an agent push to
// protected branches even under push: restricted. checkout_pr only ever
// stores bare names like "pr-123", so nothing legitimate relies on the
// refs/... form here.
const SYMBOLIC_REFS = new Set(["HEAD", "FETCH_HEAD", "ORIG_HEAD", "MERGE_HEAD"]);
export function rejectSpecialRef(value: string, kind: string): void {
  rejectIfLeadingDash(value, kind);
  if (value.startsWith("refs/")) {
    throw new Error(
      `Blocked: ${kind} '${value}' is a fully-qualified ref path. Use a bare branch name (e.g. 'feature/foo' or 'main'), not a 'refs/heads/...' form.`
    );
  }
  if (SYMBOLIC_REFS.has(value)) {
    throw new Error(
      `Blocked: ${kind} '${value}' is a git symbolic ref, not a branch name. Pass the resolved branch name (e.g. 'main'), or omit branchName to push the current branch.`
    );
  }
  // SECURITY: git interprets ':' and leading '+' as refspec syntax, not as
  // part of a branch name. without this check, an agent under push:restricted
  // can smuggle a full refspec through branchName:
  //   - "evil:refs/heads/main"  → pushes local 'evil' to remote main
  //   - ":refs/heads/main"      → deletes remote main
  //   - ":other"                → deletes remote 'other' under push:restricted
  //   - "+main"                 → force-push refspec
  // the default-branch guard downstream is an exact-string compare, so any
  // character that lets git parse the value as <src>:<dst> (or as a force
  // prefix) bypasses it. git's own check-ref-format forbids ':', '+', '^',
  // '~', '?', '*', '[', '\\', and whitespace in branch names, so rejecting
  // them here cannot false-positive against a legitimate branch name.
  const BAD = /[:+^~?*[\\\s]/;
  const badMatch = value.match(BAD);
  if (badMatch) {
    throw new Error(
      `Blocked: ${kind} '${value}' contains '${badMatch[0]}', which git interprets as refspec/revision syntax, not as part of a branch name.`
    );
  }
}

// SECURITY: validate tag names so the push_tags refspec can't be split into
// a <src>:<dst> refspec that targets a non-tag ref. without this, a tag like
// "foo:refs/heads/main" becomes "refs/tags/foo:refs/heads/main" and git
// pushes the local tag's commit to remote main — a back door around the
// branch-push rules in push_branch. keep the allow-list conservative (git's
// own check-ref-format forbids far more, but we only need enough to block
// refspec injection).
export function validateTagName(tag: string): void {
  rejectIfLeadingDash(tag, "tag");
  if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$/.test(tag)) {
    throw new Error(
      `Blocked: tag '${tag}' contains characters that could be parsed as a refspec or flag. Tags must match [A-Za-z0-9._/-]+.`
    );
  }
}

/**
 * validate that the push destination matches expected URL.
 * pushUrl is set by setupGit (base repo) and updated by checkout_pr (fork repo).
 */
function validatePushDestination(ctx: ToolContext, branch: string): PushDestination {
  const pushUrl = ctx.toolState.pushUrl;
  if (!pushUrl) throw new Error("pushUrl not set - setupGit must run before push_branch");

  const dest = getPushDestination(branch, ctx.toolState.pushDest);

  if (normalizeUrl(dest.url) !== normalizeUrl(pushUrl)) {
    throw new Error(
      `Push blocked: destination does not match expected repository.\n` +
        `Expected: ${pushUrl}\n` +
        `Actual: ${dest.url}\n` +
        `Git configuration may have been tampered with.`
    );
  }

  return dest;
}

export const PushBranch = type({
  branchName: type.string
    .describe("The branch name to push (defaults to current branch)")
    .optional(),
  force: type.boolean.describe("Force push (use with caution)").default(false),
});

export function PushBranchTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
  const defaultBranch = ctx.repo.data.default_branch || "main";
  const pushPermission = ctx.payload.push;

  return tool({
    name: "push_branch",
    description:
      "Push the current branch to the remote repository. Omit branchName to push the current branch (recommended). " +
      "If specifying branchName, use the LOCAL branch name (e.g., 'pr-1'), not the remote branch name. " +
      "The correct remote and remote branch are determined automatically from branch config set by checkout_pr. " +
      "Requires a clean working tree. Runs the repository prepush hook (if configured) before the network push — hook failure means tests/lint or similar in that script failed, not necessarily a Pullfrog timeout. " +
      "Never force push unless explicitly requested. Pushes to the default branch are blocked in restricted mode.",
    parameters: PushBranch,
    execute: execute(async ({ branchName, force }) => {
      // permission check
      if (pushPermission === "disabled") {
        throw new Error("Push is disabled. This repository is configured for read-only access.");
      }

      const branch = branchName || $("git", ["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], { log: false });
      // check the resolved branch too — rev-parse could surface a weird current
      // branch name that would otherwise bypass the user-facing check. use
      // rejectSpecialRef so "refs/heads/main" and symbolic refs like HEAD
      // can't slip past the default-branch guard below.
      rejectSpecialRef(branch, "branch");

      // reject push if working tree is dirty — forces agent to commit or discard before pushing
      const status = $("git", ["status", "--porcelain"], { log: false });
      if (status) {
        throw new Error(
          `push blocked: working tree is not clean (tracked changes and/or untracked files). commit, discard, or remove stray artifacts before pushing.\n\n` +
            `git status:\n${status}`
        );
      }

      // validate push destination matches expected URL
      const pushDest = validatePushDestination(ctx, branch);

      // block pushes to default branch in restricted mode
      if (pushPermission === "restricted" && pushDest.remoteBranch === defaultBranch) {
        throw new Error(
          `Push blocked: cannot push directly to default branch '${pushDest.remoteBranch}'. ` +
            `Create a feature branch and open a PR instead.`
        );
      }

      // use refspec when local and remote branch names differ
      const refspec =
        branch === pushDest.remoteBranch ? branch : `${branch}:${pushDest.remoteBranch}`;
      const pushArgs = force
        ? ["--force", "-u", pushDest.remoteName, refspec]
        : ["-u", pushDest.remoteName, refspec];

      // prepush failure should block the push — a passing hook is the gate
      // that protects main from bad pushes.
      const prepushHook = await executeLifecycleHook({
        event: "prepush",
        script: ctx.prepushScript,
      });
      if (prepushHook.warning) {
        throw new Error(prepushHook.warning);
      }

      // re-verify clean working tree after prepush. a hook that writes tracked
      // files (formatter, type generator, build artifacts) would leave those
      // changes uncommitted — pushing now would silently drop them, and the
      // agent would report a "successful push" of code the hook had expected
      // to be included.
      const postHookStatus = $("git", ["status", "--porcelain"], { log: false });
      if (postHookStatus) {
        throw new Error(
          `push blocked: the prepush hook modified the working tree. those changes are not included in the push. commit or discard them (or change the hook to not mutate tracked files) before retrying.\n\n` +
            `git status:\n${postHookStatus}`
        );
      }

      log.debug(`pushing ${branch} to ${pushDest.remoteName}/${pushDest.remoteBranch}`);
      if (force) {
        log.warning(`force pushing - this will overwrite remote history`);
      }

      try {
        await $git("push", pushArgs, {
          token: ctx.gitToken,
        });
      } catch (err) {
        const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
        if (msg.includes("fetch first") || msg.includes("non-fast-forward")) {
          // git rebase is blocked through the MCP tool when shell is disabled
          // (rebase --exec can execute arbitrary code). merge always works and
          // integrates remote changes cleanly, so suggest it as the default.
          const integrateStep =
            ctx.payload.shell === "disabled"
              ? `2. use the git tool to merge the remote branch into yours: git({ command: "merge", args: ["origin/${pushDest.remoteBranch}"] })`
              : `2. use the git tool to rebase or merge your changes on top: git({ command: "merge", args: ["origin/${pushDest.remoteBranch}"] }) (or 'rebase')`;
          throw new Error(
            `push rejected: the remote branch '${pushDest.remoteBranch}' has new commits you don't have locally.\n\n` +
              `to resolve this:\n` +
              `1. use git_fetch to fetch the remote branch: git_fetch({ ref: "${pushDest.remoteBranch}" })\n` +
              `${integrateStep}\n` +
              `3. resolve any merge conflicts if needed\n` +
              `4. retry push_branch`
          );
        }
        throw err;
      }

      return {
        success: true,
        branch,
        remoteBranch: pushDest.remoteBranch,
        remote: pushDest.remoteName,
        force,
        message: `successfully pushed ${branch} to ${pushDest.remoteName}/${pushDest.remoteBranch}`,
      };
    }),
  });
}

// commands that require authentication - redirect to dedicated tools.
// exported so tests can exercise the same table the runtime uses.
//
// note: the `pull` redirect intentionally does not mention `rebase` — under
// shell=disabled rebase is itself blocked by NOSHELL_BLOCKED_SUBCOMMANDS, so
// advertising it here would just send the agent into a second block. agents
// under shell=restricted/enabled who prefer rebase can invoke it directly;
// the redirect's job is to name the canonical alternative (merge), which
// works in all modes.
export const AUTH_REQUIRED_REDIRECT: Record<string, string> = {
  push: "use the push_branch tool instead — it handles authentication and permission checks.",
  fetch: "use the git_fetch tool instead — it handles authentication.",
  pull: "use git_fetch to fetch the remote ref, then call this git tool with command 'merge' locally.",
  clone: "the repository is already cloned. use checkout_pr for PR branches.",
};

// SECURITY: subcommands blocked when shell is disabled.
// in disabled mode the agent has no shell access, so these subcommands are the
// primary escape vectors for arbitrary code execution. in restricted mode the
// agent already has shell in a stripped sandbox, so blocking these is redundant.
// exported so tests stay in sync with the runtime table.
export const NOSHELL_BLOCKED_SUBCOMMANDS: Record<string, string> = {
  config: "Blocked: git config can set up filter drivers or hooks that execute arbitrary code.",
  submodule:
    "Blocked: git submodule can reference malicious repositories and execute code on update.",
  "update-index":
    "Blocked: git update-index can modify index entries in ways that bypass file protections.",
  "filter-branch": "Blocked: git filter-branch executes arbitrary code on repository history.",
  replace: "Blocked: git replace can redirect object lookups.",
  // subcommands that accept --exec or similar flags for arbitrary code execution
  rebase:
    "Blocked: git rebase --exec can execute arbitrary shell commands. Use 'merge' instead to integrate remote changes.",
  bisect:
    "Blocked: git bisect run can execute arbitrary shell commands. Bisect by hand (bisect start/good/bad/reset) is not available through this tool either — ask the user to run the bisect if needed.",
  // difftool/mergetool exist to shell out to external diff/merge programs.
  // both accept `--extcmd` / `-x` (difftool) or configured tool commands
  // (mergetool) that run arbitrary code. NOSHELL_BLOCKED_ARGS catches the
  // long `--extcmd` form, but not the `-x` short form — and globally blocking
  // `-x` would false-positive on `git cherry-pick -x`. block the subcommands
  // wholesale instead; neither has a meaningful use in an automated agent
  // workflow (agents use `git diff` / `git show` for diffs and resolve
  // conflicts via file edits, not a TUI merge tool).
  difftool:
    "Blocked: git difftool runs an external diff program via --extcmd/-x or configured tool and can execute arbitrary shell commands. Use 'diff' (or 'show' for single commits) to inspect changes — those output directly and don't invoke an external tool.",
  mergetool:
    "Blocked: git mergetool runs an external merge program configured via mergetool.<name>.cmd and can execute arbitrary shell commands. Resolve conflicts by editing the files directly (conflict markers are written into the working tree) and then commit.",
};

// SECURITY: subcommand-specific arg flags that execute code.
// only blocked when shell is disabled — in restricted mode the agent already
// has shell access in a stripped sandbox, so these provide no additional security.
//
// NOTE: global git flags like -c and --config-env are NOT included here
// because they only work before the subcommand. in the MCP tool, the
// subcommand is always first, so -c in args is parsed as a subcommand flag
// (e.g., git log -c = combined diff format), not config injection.
// the subcommand check (rejecting "-" prefix) already blocks that attack.
//
// matched as: arg === flag OR arg starts with flag + "="
// (avoids false positives like --exclude matching --exec).
// exported so tests stay in sync with the runtime flag set.
export const NOSHELL_BLOCKED_ARGS = ["--exec", "--extcmd", "--upload-pack", "--receive-pack"];

const COLLAPSE_THRESHOLD = 200;

// SECURITY: subcommand must match [a-z][a-z0-9-]* to reject flags passed as the subcommand.
// this blocks injection of global git options like -c, -C, --exec-path, --config-env, etc.
//
// critical attack: git -c "alias.x=!evil-command" x
//   -> sets alias "x" to a shell command via -c config injection, then runs it
//   -> achieves arbitrary code execution even with shell=disabled
const subcommandPattern = regex("^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$");

const Git = type({
  command: type(subcommandPattern).describe("Git command (e.g., 'status', 'log', 'diff')"),
  args: type.string.array().describe("Additional arguments for the git command").optional(),
});

export function GitTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
  return tool({
    name: "git",
    description:
      "Run git commands. For push/fetch, use the dedicated MCP tools (push_branch, git_fetch). " +
      "git pull is not available — use git_fetch then this tool with command 'merge'.",
    parameters: Git,
    execute: execute(async (params) => {
      const command = params.command;
      const args = params.args ?? [];

      const redirect = AUTH_REQUIRED_REDIRECT[command];
      if (redirect) {
        throw new Error(`git ${command} is not available through this tool — ${redirect}`);
      }

      // SECURITY: block dangerous subcommands when shell is disabled.
      // in restricted mode the agent has shell in a stripped sandbox, so blocking
      // these through the MCP tool is redundant (agent can do it via shell).
      if (ctx.payload.shell === "disabled") {
        const blocked = NOSHELL_BLOCKED_SUBCOMMANDS[command];
        if (blocked) {
          throw new Error(blocked);
        }

        // block subcommand-specific flags that execute arbitrary code
        for (const arg of args) {
          const isBlocked = NOSHELL_BLOCKED_ARGS.some(
            (flag) => arg === flag || arg.startsWith(flag + "=")
          );
          if (isBlocked) {
            throw new Error(
              `Blocked: '${arg}' flag can execute arbitrary code and is not allowed.`
            );
          }
        }
      }

      const output = $("git", [command, ...args], { log: false });
      const lineCount = output.split("\n").length;
      if (lineCount > COLLAPSE_THRESHOLD) {
        log.group(`git ${command} output (${lineCount} lines)`, () => {
          log.info(output);
        });
      } else if (output) {
        log.info(output);
      }

      return { success: true, output };
    }),
  });
}

const GitFetch = type({
  ref: type.string.describe("Ref to fetch: branch name, tag, or 'pull/N/head' for PRs"),
  depth: type.number.describe("Fetch depth (for shallow clones)").optional(),
});

export function GitFetchTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
  return tool({
    name: "git_fetch",
    description: "Fetch refs from remote repository. Use this instead of git fetch directly.",
    parameters: GitFetch,
    execute: execute(async (params) => {
      rejectIfLeadingDash(params.ref, "ref");
      const fetchArgs = ["--no-tags", "origin", params.ref];
      if (params.depth !== undefined) {
        fetchArgs.push(`--depth=${params.depth}`);
      }
      await $git("fetch", fetchArgs, {
        token: ctx.gitToken,
      });
      return { success: true, ref: params.ref };
    }),
  });
}

const DeleteBranch = type({
  branchName: type.string.describe("Remote branch to delete"),
});

export function DeleteBranchTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
  const pushPermission = ctx.payload.push;
  const defaultBranch = ctx.repo.data.default_branch || "main";

  return tool({
    name: "delete_branch",
    description:
      "Delete a remote branch. Requires push: enabled permission. " +
      "Deletion of the repository's default branch is always blocked regardless of permission mode.",
    parameters: DeleteBranch,
    execute: execute(async (params) => {
      if (pushPermission !== "enabled") {
        throw new Error(
          "Branch deletion requires push: enabled permission. " +
            "Current mode only allows pushing to non-protected branches."
        );
      }

      // delete_branch is already gated on push: enabled, but also block the
      // refs/heads/... and symbolic-ref forms so this tool can't be tricked
      // into deleting a protected ref that wouldn't match a bare-name check.
      rejectSpecialRef(params.branchName, "branchName");

      // defense-in-depth: deleting the default branch is catastrophic and
      // unlike pushing to main it has no easy revert path (GitHub retains
      // refs for 30 days but restoring requires the reflog or a direct SHA).
      // push: enabled authorizes pushes, not wholesale removal of the
      // repository's primary branch. block it locally even if GitHub branch
      // protection would also reject — some repos disable protection on
      // default branches and we should not rely on that config for safety.
      if (params.branchName === defaultBranch) {
        throw new Error(
          `Blocked: cannot delete the default branch '${defaultBranch}'. ` +
            `If you really need to delete or rename it, do it manually via the repository settings.`
        );
      }

      // use refs/heads/<name> explicitly so a same-named tag can't be deleted
      // by accident. `push --delete <bare-name>` resolves against both remote
      // branches and tags; a tag-only match would silently remove the tag.
      // rejectSpecialRef guarantees branchName is a bare name, so the
      // branchName construction here can't collide with user-supplied refs.
      await $git("push", ["origin", "--delete", `refs/heads/${params.branchName}`], {
        token: ctx.gitToken,
      });
      return { success: true, deleted: params.branchName };
    }),
  });
}

const PushTags = type({
  tag: type.string.describe("Tag name to push"),
  force: type.boolean.describe("Force push the tag").default(false),
});

export function PushTagsTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
  const pushPermission = ctx.payload.push;

  return tool({
    name: "push_tags",
    description: "Push a tag to remote. Requires push: enabled permission.",
    parameters: PushTags,
    execute: execute(async (params) => {
      if (pushPermission !== "enabled") {
        throw new Error(
          "Tag pushing requires push: enabled permission. " +
            "Current mode only allows pushing branches."
        );
      }

      validateTagName(params.tag);
      const pushArgs = [...(params.force ? ["-f"] : []), "origin", `refs/tags/${params.tag}`];
      await $git("push", pushArgs, {
        token: ctx.gitToken,
      });
      return { success: true, tag: params.tag };
    }),
  });
}