Files
shockbot/mcp/checkout.ts
T
Colin McDonnell 3a7145db1a Scope installation token permissions in restricted mode (#226)
* Scope installation token permissions in restricted mode

In restricted/disabled bash mode, the installation token is now scoped
to match the workflow's permissions block. This preserves fork push
capability while limiting what the agent can do with the token.

- Read workflow permissions from pullfrog.yml at runtime
- Pass permissions to API when acquiring installation token
- Clear OIDC env vars in restricted mode to prevent token minting
- Simplify setupGit by moving token resolution to main.ts

* Address review feedback: fail closed with default permissions

- Add restrictive default permissions (contents:read, pull_requests:read,
  issues:read) as fallback when workflow permissions can't be read
- Add support for job-level permissions via GITHUB_JOB env var
- Fix misleading comment about token resolution in restricted mode
- Add documentation about fork PR checkout behavior

* Simplify to separate git/MCP tokens without workflow permission scoping

- gitToken: minimal contents:write only (assumed exfiltratable)
- mcpToken: full installation token (not exfiltratable via MCP tools)
- Remove workflowPermissions.ts - security-conscious users can pass
  their own token via GH_TOKEN or inputs.token
- Add type-safe InstallationTokenPermissions to github.ts and API route

* Rename `write` permission to `push` and remove vestigial tool blocking

The `write` permission was previously used to block local file write tools
in agents. This was security theater since bash can write files anyway.

Now `push` only controls the git token scope:
- push: enabled → contents:write (can push commits)
- push: disabled → contents:read (read-only, can't push)

Changes:
- Rename `write` to `push` in action.yml, Prisma schema, and all TS types
- Remove vestigial write tool blocking from all agents (claude, cursor,
  gemini, opencode, codex)
- Add data-preserving Prisma migration using RENAME COLUMN
- Update UI: "Write files" → "Git push" with updated description

* add PID namespace isolation for bash sandbox

when running in CI, attempts to use unshare --pid to create a new PID
namespace for bash subprocesses. this prevents the /proc/$PPID/environ
attack where a malicious command could read secrets from the parent
process's environment.

the protection works by:
1. creating a new PID namespace (subprocess becomes PID 1)
2. mounting fresh /proc showing only sandbox PIDs
3. parent PIDs become invisible (PPID = 0, /proc/0 doesn't exist)

combined with filterEnv(), this provides complete protection against
/proc-based secret theft. falls back gracefully if namespaces aren't
available.

includes test script to verify the protection works.

* add PID namespace test to CI workflow

tests whether unshare --pid works on GHA runners out of the box,
and if not, whether enabling via sysctl helps. also runs the
pidNamespace.ts test to verify the full protection.

* fix pnpm setup and add procIsolation agent test

- fix pnpm/action-setup by specifying package_json_file path
- add procIsolation crossagent test that has agent attempt to
  read secrets via /proc/$PPID/environ
- add procIsolation to CI test matrix

* add pid-namespace test job to main workflow

this job tests unshare --pid capabilities on GHA runners and runs
the pidNamespace.ts adhoc test to verify /proc isolation works

* test bubblewrap's sysctl approach for enabling namespaces

- write to /etc/sysctl.d/99-userns.conf and run sysctl --system
- try aa-complain on unshare binary
- more detailed diagnostics

* fix pidNamespace test and add sudo-unshare fallback for GHA

- fix reference error in pidNamespace.ts (renamed function but didn't update calls)
- add sudo-unshare as fallback method for GHA runners where unprivileged
  namespaces are blocked but sudo is available
- update bash.ts to detect and use sudo unshare when unprivileged fails

* consolidate security docs and document PID namespace isolation

- update security.md with current implementation details
  - document sudo unshare fallback for GHA runners
  - add testing instructions for local Docker and CI
  - add "Further Exploration" section with Landlock and path validation ideas
- delete bash-sandbox.md and landlock.md (consolidated into security.md)

* move procIsolation test to adhoc folder

the procIsolation test requires PID namespace capabilities that aren't
available in the Docker test environment. moved to adhoc/ so it's excluded
from default test runs and can be run explicitly when needed (e.g. via
the pid-namespace CI job or locally with --privileged docker).

* fix Docker test environment for PID namespace isolation

- add CI and GITHUB_ACTIONS to testEnvAllowList so sandbox detection runs
- add --privileged to Docker run for PID namespace support (unshare)

this fixes the test environment to properly test the sandbox. in production,
the action runs directly on GHA runner where sudo unshare works.

* fix getJobToken() to work in test environment

add fallback to GH_TOKEN and GITHUB_TOKEN when INPUT_TOKEN is not set.
this allows tests to run without requiring workflow-level token input.

the token resolution order is:
1. INPUT_TOKEN (from workflow `with: token:`)
2. GH_TOKEN (external token override)
3. GITHUB_TOKEN (pre-acquired in tests or from GHA env)

* security: filter secrets from all subprocess environments

- extract filterEnv() to shared utils/secrets.ts
- make $() utility filter secrets by default (git, npm, etc. don't need them)
- disable git hooks via core.hooksPath to prevent hook-based exfiltration
- git auth uses token embedded in URL, not env vars

this prevents malicious git hooks, npm postinstall scripts, and other
code execution vectors from exfiltrating GITHUB_TOKEN and API keys.

* docs: clarify defense-in-depth security model

update security.md to explain why BOTH layers are required:
- filterEnv(): cleans child's own /proc/self/environ
- PID namespace: hides parent's /proc entries

PID namespace alone isn't sufficient - with --mount-proc, the child
becomes PID 1, so /proc/1/environ is the child's OWN environment.
without filterEnv(), secrets would still be accessible there.

* add procSandbox crossagent test for PID namespace security

- add crossagent/procSandbox.ts: security test that instructs agent to try
  various /proc attack vectors and validates sandbox blocks them
- update wiki/security.md: document PID namespace isolation details, add
  verification commands, explain why sudo inside sandbox doesn't break security
- update docker.ts: use node:24 with sudo for GHA-like test environment
- update instructions.ts: allow disabling security messaging for pentests
- clean up adhoc test files (procIsolation.ts, securityAudit.ts)

the procSandbox test sets SANDBOX_TEST_TOKEN (matches *_TOKEN filter), gives
the agent explicit hints about attack vectors (/proc, sudo, nsenter, etc.),
disables prompt-based mitigations, and validates the secret is never leaked.

* move procSandbox test to agnostic/ (runs with one agent)

* WIP

* docs: add agent testing guide (pnpm play, Docker, pentesting)

* docs: add CI details to agent testing guide

* docs: add interesting findings and gotchas from pentesting

* improve test fidelity: auto-set CI=true, verify sandbox active

- docker.ts: always set CI=true in container so sandbox activates
- docker.ts: skip sudo/user setup if already done (faster reruns)
- bash.ts: export getSandboxMethod() for diagnostics
- bash.ts: add debug log when sandbox disabled
- procSandbox.ts: add sandbox_was_active check to catch vacuous passes

the CI=true change is critical: without it, PID namespace isolation
is skipped and security tests pass without actually testing anything.

* docs: update agent-testing.md with CI=true auto-set note

* docs: clarify log format is agent-specific

* fix git auth, simplify MCP tools, add adversarial tests

- fix gitWithAuth to use Basic auth format (Bearer doesn't work with git's http.extraheader)
- fix token.ts: push:restricted now correctly gets contents:write
- fix github.ts: pass permissions when acquiring installation tokens locally
- remove commit_files and create_branch MCP tools (redundant, don't require credentials)
- remove containsSecrets() - trivially bypassable, not sound security
- add agnostic adversarial tests: pushDisabled, pushRestricted, tokenExfil
- update instructions.ts to clearly list available git MCP tools
- add wiki/git.md documenting credential isolation and push permission tiers
- update wiki/docker.md with custom image considerations
- update wiki/agent-testing.md with adversarial testing patterns

* fix type errors after rebase

- change ResolveTokensParams.push from ToolPermission to PushPermission
- use tags: ["agnostic"] instead of agnostic: true in test files

* fix cleanup permission error in sandbox tests

when sandbox isolation is enabled (CI=true), files created by the unshare
subprocess may have different ownership, causing rmSync to fail with EACCES.
this error in the finally block was overriding the test's success result.

fix: wrap cleanup in try-catch and fall back to sudo rm if rmSync fails.

* Add adhoc

* Handle git config/remote bypasses

* add git hooks protection and simplify ToolState

- disable git hooks in restricted mode via -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null
- add gitHooks adversarial test to verify hook protection works
- unify prNumber/issueNumber into single issueNumber field
- add pushUrl to ToolState for push validation
- add generateTestMarker() for simpler single-agent test markers
- export SENSITIVE_PATTERNS and isSensitiveEnvName from secrets.ts
- remove redundant pidNamespace.ts (duplicated by procSandbox.ts)
- update documentation

* harden $git() auth: subcommand whitelist, binary tamper detection

- rename gitWithAuth() to $git() with explicit subcommand first arg
- restrict to "fetch" | "push" at type level (filters don't run for these)
- resolve git binary path at startup via resolveGit(), sha256 fingerprint
- verify hash before each $git() call to detect binary replacement
- rename disableHooks to restricted for cleaner semantics
- document filter exfiltration attack and empirical verification in wiki

* remove redundant pid-namespace CI job

the PID namespace isolation testing is now handled by
action/test/agnostic/procSandbox.ts via pnpm runtest agnostic

* fix push_branch for new branches and improve token leak detection

- getPushDestination now falls back to origin/<branch> when @{push}
  is not configured (happens for new branches created locally)
- gitPerms validator now checks for actual token patterns instead
  of matching "x-access-token" string in test instructions

* use kebab-case for test names

* simplify shell env API: "restricted" | "inherit" | object

replace passFullEnv boolean with cleaner env option that accepts:
- "restricted" (default): filterEnv() to prevent secret leakage
- "inherit": full process.env
- object: custom env merged with restricted base

* share EnvMode and resolveEnv between shell.ts and bash.ts

move shared env resolution logic to secrets.ts

* add env option to bash tool (default: restricted)

* delete agent-testing.md (renamed to adversarial.md)

* Add checkout tests

* reframe githooks test prompt to avoid claude safety refusal

claude was refusing to execute the test because the prompt used words
like "malicious" and "security testing". reframed as a debugging task
with innocuous env var name (TESTING_DEBUG_TAG) per adversarial.md guidance.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* clean up verbose token acquisition logs

move logging responsibility to call sites which have better context
(git token vs MCP token). remove redundant intermediate OIDC logs
and unused "(permission-scoped)" suffix.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* isolate agnostic tests with matrix strategy, fix .pullfrog-env secret leak

- split action-agnostic into per-test matrix jobs for isolated logs and filesystems
- only write explicitly opted-in env vars to .pullfrog-env via fileAgentEnv
  (fixes token-exfil test where claude found SANDBOX_TEST_TOKEN on disk)
- mcpmerge test opts in via fileAgentEnv for cursor's repo-level MCP fallback

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* remove env parameter from bash tool to prevent agents bypassing filterEnv

the bash tool exposed an `env` parameter accepting "restricted" | "inherit"
which allowed agents to pass env: "inherit" and see all secrets including
SANDBOX_TEST_TOKEN, bypassing the restricted environment filtering entirely.
env mode is now determined internally (always restricted).

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* use pullfrog/test-repo for push tests to stop polluting main repo

push tests were creating branches and tags on pullfrog/app directly.
now all push tests (push-restricted, push-disabled, push-enabled,
git-permissions) target pullfrog/test-repo instead.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* use pullfrog/test-repo for all tests, not just push tests

no test should clone or operate on pullfrog/app directly.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix token scoping for test-repo and bash timeout defaults

- acquireTokenViaOIDC now includes GITHUB_REPOSITORY repo in token
  scope so push tests work against pullfrog/test-repo
- bash tool default timeout: 120s -> 30s, cap: 600s -> 120s
- activity timeout: 30s -> 60s
- prevents hung bash commands (e.g. find /) from killing the agent
  via activity timeout

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-02-06 06:26:26 +00:00

368 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript

import { writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import type { Octokit, RestEndpointMethodTypes } from "@octokit/rest";
import { type } from "arktype";
import { log } from "../utils/cli.ts";
import { $git } from "../utils/gitAuth.ts";
import { $ } from "../utils/shell.ts";
import type { ToolContext, ToolState } from "./server.ts";
import { execute, tool } from "./shared.ts";
type PullFile = RestEndpointMethodTypes["pulls"]["listFiles"]["response"]["data"][number];
export type FormatFilesResult = {
content: string;
toc: string;
};
/**
* formats PR files with explicit line numbers for each code line.
* preserves all original diff info (file headers, hunk headers) and adds:
* | OLD | NEW | TYPE | code
* returns both the formatted content and a TOC with line ranges per file.
*/
export function formatFilesWithLineNumbers(files: PullFile[]): FormatFilesResult {
const output: string[] = [];
const tocEntries: Array<{ filename: string; startLine: number; endLine: number }> = [];
// calculate TOC header size: "## Files (N)\n" + N entries + "\n---\n\n"
const tocHeaderSize = 1 + files.length + 2;
let currentLine = tocHeaderSize + 1;
for (const file of files) {
const fileStartLine = currentLine;
// file header
output.push(`diff --git a/${file.filename} b/${file.filename}`);
output.push(`--- a/${file.filename}`);
output.push(`+++ b/${file.filename}`);
currentLine += 3;
if (!file.patch) {
output.push("(binary file or no changes)");
output.push("");
currentLine += 2;
tocEntries.push({
filename: file.filename,
startLine: fileStartLine,
endLine: currentLine - 1,
});
continue;
}
// parse and format the patch with line numbers
const lines = file.patch.split("\n");
let oldLine = 0;
let newLine = 0;
for (const line of lines) {
// hunk header: @@ -OLD,COUNT +NEW,COUNT @@ optional context
const hunkMatch = line.match(/^@@ -(\d+)(?:,\d+)? \+(\d+)(?:,\d+)? @@/);
if (hunkMatch) {
oldLine = parseInt(hunkMatch[1], 10);
newLine = parseInt(hunkMatch[2], 10);
output.push(line); // pass through unchanged
currentLine++;
continue;
}
// code lines within hunks
const changeType = line[0] || " ";
const code = line.slice(1);
if (changeType === "-") {
// removed line: show old line number, no new line number
output.push(`| ${padNum(oldLine)} | | - | ${code}`);
oldLine++;
} else if (changeType === "+") {
// added line: no old line number, show new line number
output.push(`| | ${padNum(newLine)} | + | ${code}`);
newLine++;
} else if (changeType === " " || changeType === "\\") {
// context line or "\ No newline at end of file"
if (changeType === "\\") {
output.push(line); // pass through as-is
} else {
output.push(`| ${padNum(oldLine)} | ${padNum(newLine)} | | ${code}`);
oldLine++;
newLine++;
}
} else {
// unknown line type, pass through
output.push(line);
}
currentLine++;
}
output.push(""); // blank line between files
currentLine++;
tocEntries.push({
filename: file.filename,
startLine: fileStartLine,
endLine: currentLine - 1,
});
}
// build TOC
const tocLines = [`## Files (${files.length})`];
for (const entry of tocEntries) {
tocLines.push(`- ${entry.filename} → lines ${entry.startLine}-${entry.endLine}`);
}
tocLines.push("");
tocLines.push("---");
tocLines.push("");
const toc = tocLines.join("\n");
const content = toc + output.join("\n");
return { content, toc };
}
function padNum(n: number): string {
return n.toString().padStart(4, " ");
}
export const CheckoutPr = type({
pull_number: type.number.describe("the pull request number to checkout"),
});
export type CheckoutPrResult = {
success: true;
number: number;
title: string;
base: string;
head: string;
isFork: boolean;
maintainerCanModify: boolean;
url: string;
headRepo: string;
diffPath: string;
toc: string;
instructions: string;
};
type FetchPrDiffParams = {
octokit: Octokit;
owner: string;
repo: string;
pullNumber: number;
};
/**
* fetches PR files from GitHub and formats them with line numbers and TOC.
* this is the core diff formatting logic, extracted for testability.
*/
export async function fetchAndFormatPrDiff(params: FetchPrDiffParams): Promise<FormatFilesResult> {
const filesResponse = await params.octokit.rest.pulls.listFiles({
owner: params.owner,
repo: params.repo,
pull_number: params.pullNumber,
per_page: 100,
});
return formatFilesWithLineNumbers(filesResponse.data);
}
interface CheckoutPrBranchParams {
octokit: Octokit;
owner: string;
name: string;
gitToken: string;
pullNumber: number;
toolState: ToolState;
// restricted bash mode: disables git hooks to prevent token exfiltration
restricted: boolean;
}
interface CheckoutPrBranchResult {
prNumber: number;
isFork: boolean;
forkUrl?: string | undefined; // only set when isFork is true
}
/**
* Shared helper to checkout a PR branch and configure fork remotes.
* Assumes origin remote is already configured with authentication.
* Updates toolState.issueNumber and toolState.pushUrl (for fork PRs).
*/
export async function checkoutPrBranch(
params: CheckoutPrBranchParams
): Promise<CheckoutPrBranchResult> {
const { octokit, owner, name, gitToken, pullNumber, toolState, restricted } = params;
log.info(`» checking out PR #${pullNumber}...`);
// fetch PR metadata
const pr = await octokit.rest.pulls.get({
owner,
repo: name,
pull_number: pullNumber,
});
const headRepo = pr.data.head.repo;
if (!headRepo) {
throw new Error(`PR #${pullNumber} source repository was deleted`);
}
const isFork = headRepo.full_name !== pr.data.base.repo.full_name;
const baseBranch = pr.data.base.ref;
const headBranch = pr.data.head.ref;
// always use pr-{number} as local branch name for consistency
// this avoids naming conflicts and makes push config simpler
const localBranch = `pr-${pullNumber}`;
// check if we're already on the correct commit (not just branch name)
// this handles fork PRs where head branch name might match base branch name
const currentSha = $("git", ["rev-parse", "HEAD"], { log: false }).trim();
const alreadyOnBranch = currentSha === pr.data.head.sha;
if (alreadyOnBranch) {
log.debug(`already on PR branch ${localBranch}, skipping checkout`);
} else {
// fetch base branch so origin/<base> exists for diff operations
log.debug(`» fetching base branch (${baseBranch})...`);
$git("fetch", ["--no-tags", "origin", baseBranch], { token: gitToken, restricted });
// checkout base branch first to avoid "refusing to fetch into current branch" error
// -B creates or resets the branch to match origin/baseBranch
$("git", ["checkout", "-B", baseBranch, `origin/${baseBranch}`]);
// fetch PR branch using pull/{n}/head refspec (works for both fork and same-repo PRs)
log.debug(`» fetching PR #${pullNumber} (${localBranch})...`);
$git("fetch", ["--no-tags", "origin", `pull/${pullNumber}/head:${localBranch}`], {
token: gitToken,
restricted,
});
// checkout the branch
$("git", ["checkout", localBranch]);
log.debug(`» checked out PR #${pullNumber}`);
}
// ensure base branch is fetched (needed for diff operations)
// fetch if we skipped checkout (already on branch) - otherwise already fetched above
if (alreadyOnBranch) {
log.debug(`» fetching base branch (${baseBranch})...`);
$git("fetch", ["--no-tags", "origin", baseBranch], { token: gitToken, restricted });
}
// configure push remote for this branch
// NOTE: This always runs regardless of alreadyOnBranch, because setupGit doesn't configure
// fork remotes. This ensures fork PRs can push even when checkout_pr is called after setupGit.
if (isFork) {
const remoteName = `pr-${pullNumber}`;
// SECURITY: fork URL without token - auth is injected via GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS in $git()
const forkUrl = `https://github.com/${headRepo.full_name}.git`;
// add fork as a named remote (suppress logging to avoid "error: remote already exists" spam)
try {
$("git", ["remote", "add", remoteName, forkUrl], { log: false });
log.debug(`» added remote '${remoteName}' for fork ${headRepo.full_name}`);
} catch {
// remote already exists, update its URL
$("git", ["remote", "set-url", remoteName, forkUrl], { log: false });
log.debug(`» updated remote '${remoteName}' for fork ${headRepo.full_name}`);
}
// set branch push config so `git push` knows where to push
$("git", ["config", `branch.${localBranch}.pushRemote`, remoteName]);
// set merge ref so git knows the remote branch name (may differ from local)
$("git", ["config", `branch.${localBranch}.merge`, `refs/heads/${headBranch}`]);
log.debug(`» configured branch '${localBranch}' to push to '${remoteName}/${headBranch}'`);
// warn if maintainer can't modify (push will likely fail)
if (!pr.data.maintainer_can_modify) {
log.warning(
`» fork PR has maintainer_can_modify=false - push operations will fail. ` +
`ask the PR author to enable "Allow edits from maintainers" or the fork may be owned by an organization.`
);
}
} else {
// for same-repo PRs, push to origin
$("git", ["config", `branch.${localBranch}.pushRemote`, "origin"]);
$("git", ["config", `branch.${localBranch}.merge`, `refs/heads/${headBranch}`]);
}
// update toolState
toolState.issueNumber = pullNumber;
if (isFork) {
toolState.pushUrl = `https://github.com/${headRepo.full_name}.git`;
}
return {
prNumber: pullNumber,
isFork,
forkUrl: isFork ? `https://github.com/${headRepo.full_name}.git` : undefined,
};
}
export function CheckoutPrTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
return tool({
name: "checkout_pr",
description:
"Checkout a pull request branch locally. This fetches the PR branch and sets up push configuration for fork PRs. " +
"Returns diffPath pointing to the formatted diff file.",
parameters: CheckoutPr,
execute: execute(async ({ pull_number }) => {
const result = await checkoutPrBranch({
octokit: ctx.octokit,
owner: ctx.repo.owner,
name: ctx.repo.name,
gitToken: ctx.gitToken,
pullNumber: pull_number,
toolState: ctx.toolState,
restricted: ctx.payload.bash === "restricted",
});
// fetch PR metadata to return result
const pr = await ctx.octokit.rest.pulls.get({
owner: ctx.repo.owner,
repo: ctx.repo.name,
pull_number,
});
const headRepo = pr.data.head.repo;
if (!headRepo) {
throw new Error(`PR #${pull_number} source repository was deleted`);
}
// fetch PR files and format with line numbers
const formatResult = await fetchAndFormatPrDiff({
octokit: ctx.octokit,
owner: ctx.repo.owner,
repo: ctx.repo.name,
pullNumber: pull_number,
});
const diffPreview = formatResult.content.split("\n").slice(0, 100).join("\n");
log.debug(`formatted diff preview (first 100 lines):\n${diffPreview}`);
const tempDir = process.env.PULLFROG_TEMP_DIR;
if (!tempDir) {
throw new Error(
"PULLFROG_TEMP_DIR not set - checkout_pr must run in pullfrog action context"
);
}
const diffPath = join(tempDir, `pr-${pull_number}.diff`);
writeFileSync(diffPath, formatResult.content);
log.debug(`wrote diff to ${diffPath} (${formatResult.content.length} bytes)`);
return {
success: true,
number: pr.data.number,
title: pr.data.title,
base: pr.data.base.ref,
head: pr.data.head.ref,
isFork: headRepo.full_name !== pr.data.base.repo.full_name,
maintainerCanModify: pr.data.maintainer_can_modify,
url: pr.data.html_url,
headRepo: headRepo.full_name,
diffPath,
toc: formatResult.toc,
instructions:
`the diff file at diffPath contains a table of contents (TOC) at the top listing every changed file with its line range. ` +
`use the line ranges to read specific files from the diff instead of reading the entire file. ` +
`for example, if the TOC says "src/foo.ts → lines 5-42", read lines 5-42 from diffPath to see that file's changes. ` +
`review files selectively based on relevance rather than reading everything sequentially.`,
} satisfies CheckoutPrResult;
}),
});
}