Files
shockbot/external.ts
T
Colin McDonnell a78b1542da feat: pullfrog auth codex + fresh-branch (#757)
* feat: pullfrog auth codex + fresh-branch

Add `pullfrog auth codex` standalone command for minting Codex
(ChatGPT) subscription credentials and saving them as the
`CODEX_AUTH_JSON` Pullfrog secret.

Codex device-auth runs in a subprocess with an isolated `CODEX_HOME`
(temp dir) so the user's `~/.codex/auth.json` is never touched. The
spawned `codex login --device-auth` output is captured line-by-line,
ANSI-stripped, and re-rendered with a `$ codex login --device-auth`
header above dimmed sub-output on the @clack/prompts rail so the user
visually understands they're seeing a sub-process.

Companion `pnpm fresh-branch` script: from inside `.worktrees/<name>`,
creates a schema-only Neon branch named `dev/<git-branch>`, patches the
worktree's `.env` (DATABASE_URL, DATABASE_URL_UNPOOLED, NEON_DEV_BRANCH),
then runs `prisma migrate reset --force` so migrations apply cleanly
against a data-free copy. Refuses to run from the primary checkout or
on protected branch names.

Other:
- bump CLI/account/repo secret value limit 4096 -> 49152 chars (matches
  GitHub Actions' 48KB cap; auth.json is ~4-5KB)
- extract shared CLI helpers (gh/pullfrog API, secret save) into
  `action/commands/_shared.ts`

* fix(auth): address PR review + add CodexAuthCallout, default account scope

Review fixes:
- handle 'error' event from `codex` spawn (ENOENT) so missing PATH bails
  with an actionable "install codex CLI" message instead of an unhandled
  Node error
- escalate SIGTERM -> SIGKILL after 5s grace when killing a stuck codex
  child so the CLI can't get pinned indefinitely
- stop the spinner with a red "failed" glyph in the catch path before
  clearing activeSpin, mirroring `bail` (no orphan spinner above errors)
- enforce 48 KB secret value cap by *bytes* (Buffer.byteLength) not
  UTF-16 code units, across all 3 secret routes; matches GH Actions'
  byte-based limit
- preserve existing blank lines + comments when fresh-branch rewrites
  worktree .env (no more cosmetic reformat on every run)

Scope:
- default to `account` scope on org-owned repos too — never silently
  prompt for repo scope. Pullfrog has no per-GitHub-user secret store,
  so account is right for both user and org owners; `--scope repo` is
  the explicit opt-in for repo-only.

UI:
- new CodexAuthCallout (sibling to ClaudeCodeOAuthCallout); surfaces
  `pullfrog auth codex` for ChatGPT subscribers when an OpenAI provider
  model is selected. wired into AgentSettings.tsx (model-costs surface)
  and OnboardingCard.tsx (first-time setup). no paste button — the CLI
  handles minting + saving end-to-end.

* auth/codex: rename to neon-fresh-branch, address PR review

- rename `pnpm fresh-branch` → `pnpm neon-fresh-branch` (and the script
  file) to disambiguate from git branches.
- `--scope` help text now explains the default (account) and when to
  pass `repo`.
- move `_shared.ts` import up with the rest in `action/commands/auth.ts`
  and push the `stripAnsi` helper below the import block.
- `sanitizeBranchName` no longer slices: slicing after trim could
  reintroduce a trailing `-`/`/`. callers slice the raw input first,
  then sanitize.
- DRY the `start` branch of the codex progress callback (single
  header path, optional retry log).
- thread a `timedOut` flag from `runDeviceAuth` → `ProgressEvent.exit`
  so the retry prompt can say "device authorization timed out — retry?"
  instead of the generic "no auth.json was written" line when the
  per-attempt timeout fires.
- drop the redundant `mkdirSync` after `mkdtempSync` in `codexAuth.ts`.

* untrack .scratch/ (committed screenshot fixture by mistake)

* auth codex: prompt for scope on orgs (mirrors init)

* revert worktree.ts: out of scope for this PR

* anneal: trim _shared.ts dead exports, collapse CodexSpawnError, inline packageBin

* codex auth: wire end-to-end runtime consumer

CODEX_AUTH_JSON is now actually usable: the action runtime materializes
it as OpenCode's auth.json at the runner's real $HOME/.local/share/opencode,
OpenCode routes openai requests through the ChatGPT subscription via the
embedded CodexAuthPlugin, and a GitHub Actions post: hook detects any
refresh-chain rotation during the run and PUTs it back to Pullfrog via a
new JWT-authenticated PUT /api/runtime/secret endpoint.

Key decisions:

- Write to the real $HOME (not the per-run tmpdir-redirected HOME) so the
  file lives outside OpenCode's `/tmp/*` permission allow zone — its
  existing deny-default protects it without any new permission rule.
- Materialization gated on agent === opencode (Codex auth is OpenAI-only,
  Claude never sees the file).
- Defense-in-depth on Claude: deny Read/Grep/Edit/Glob + sandbox.denyRead
  for ~/.local/share/opencode/auth.json in managedSettings (covers Bash
  file-reading commands too per Claude Code permissions docs).
- New `provider.managedCredentials` field on the provider config — CLI-only
  credentials authored via `pullfrog auth <provider>`. Counted for
  hasAnyKey/log-redaction but never surfaced as a paste option in init.
  CODEX_AUTH_JSON is the first member; OPENAI_API_KEY stays in envVars.
- Eager refresh on `pullfrog auth codex`: one OAuth round-trip before
  setPullfrogSecret so Pullfrog's copy is the freshest in the chain
  (avoids the user's laptop refreshing first and stranding our copy).
- Post-hook approach for write-back so it survives cancellation, timeouts,
  and unhandled errors in the main step. State is ferried via
  core.saveState since apiToken is run-scoped and not in env.
- Server-side write-back endpoint is allowlist-gated to CODEX_AUTH_JSON
  only — never a generic secret-write surface. Looks up the secret at
  repo scope first, falls back to account scope. 404s on create
  (refresh-only, never auto-provision).

* codex auth: documentation + wiki cross-links

* debug: log dbSecrets keys + CODEX_AUTH_JSON presence (temporary)

* debug: surface install path + parse failure preview

* remove debug log lines (E2E verified)

* hide CodexAuthCallout until opencode-ai bump (1.1.56's allowed-models set excludes gpt-5.5)
2026-05-16 05:06:24 +00:00

298 lines
9.0 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* ⚠️ LIMITED IMPORTS - this file is imported by Next.js and must avoid pulling in backend code.
* All shared constants, types, and data used by both the Next.js app and the action runtime live here.
* Other files in action/ re-export from this file for backward compatibility.
*/
// mcp name constant
export const pullfrogMcpName = "pullfrog";
/** @see {@link file://./agents/shared.ts} Agent interface that uses this type */
export type AgentId = "claude" | "opencode";
/**
* format a tool name the way each agent's MCP client presents it to the model.
* claude code: mcp__pullfrog__select_mode
* opencode: pullfrog_select_mode
*/
export function formatMcpToolRef(agentId: AgentId, toolName: string): string {
switch (agentId) {
case "claude":
return `mcp__${pullfrogMcpName}__${toolName}`;
case "opencode":
return `${pullfrogMcpName}_${toolName}`;
default:
return agentId satisfies never;
}
}
// model alias registry lives in models.ts — re-exported here for shared access
export type { ModelAlias, ModelProvider, ProviderConfig } from "./models.ts";
export {
getModelEnvVars,
getModelManagedCredentials,
getModelProvider,
getProviderDisplayName,
modelAliases,
parseModel,
providers,
resolveCliModel,
resolveDisplayAlias,
resolveModelSlug,
resolveOpenRouterModel,
} from "./models.ts";
// tool permission types shared with server dispatch
export type ToolPermission = "disabled" | "enabled";
export type ShellPermission = "disabled" | "restricted" | "enabled";
export type PushPermission = "disabled" | "restricted" | "enabled";
// workflow yml permissions for GITHUB_TOKEN
export type WorkflowPermissionValue = "read" | "write" | "none";
export type WorkflowIdTokenPermissionValue = "write" | "none";
export interface WorkflowPermissions {
actions?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
attestations?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
checks?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
contents?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
deployments?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
discussions?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
"id-token"?: WorkflowIdTokenPermissionValue;
issues?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
models?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
packages?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
pages?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
"pull-requests"?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
"repository-projects"?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
"security-events"?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
statuses?: WorkflowPermissionValue;
}
// permission level for the author who triggered the event
// matches GitHub's permission levels: admin > write > maintain > triage > read > none
export type AuthorPermission = "admin" | "maintain" | "write" | "triage" | "read" | "none";
// base interface for common payload event fields
interface BasePayloadEvent {
issue_number?: number;
is_pr?: boolean;
branch?: string;
/** title of the issue/PR (or contextual title for comments) */
title?: string;
/** primary content for this trigger (issue body, PR body, comment body, review body, etc.) */
body?: string | null;
comment_id?: number;
review_id?: number;
review_state?: string;
thread?: any;
pull_request?: any;
check_suite?: {
id: number;
head_sha: string;
head_branch: string | null;
status: string | null;
conclusion: string | null;
url: string;
};
comment_ids?: number[] | "all";
/** permission level of the user who triggered this event */
authorPermission?: AuthorPermission;
/** when true, runs silently without progress comments (e.g., auto-labeling) */
silent?: boolean;
[key: string]: any;
}
interface PullRequestOpenedEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "pull_request_opened";
issue_number: number;
is_pr: true;
title: string;
body: string | null;
branch: string;
}
interface PullRequestReadyForReviewEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "pull_request_ready_for_review";
issue_number: number;
is_pr: true;
title: string;
body: string | null;
branch: string;
}
interface PullRequestReviewRequestedEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "pull_request_review_requested";
issue_number: number;
is_pr: true;
title: string;
body: string | null;
branch: string;
}
interface PullRequestReviewSubmittedEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "pull_request_review_submitted";
issue_number: number;
is_pr: true;
review_id: number;
/** review body is the primary content */
body: string | null;
review_state: string;
branch: string;
}
interface PullRequestReviewCommentCreatedEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "pull_request_review_comment_created";
issue_number: number;
is_pr: true;
title: string;
comment_id: number;
/** comment body is the primary content (null if already in prompt) */
body: string | null;
thread?: any;
branch: string;
}
interface IssuesOpenedEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "issues_opened";
issue_number: number;
title: string;
body: string | null;
}
interface IssuesAssignedEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "issues_assigned";
issue_number: number;
title: string;
body: string | null;
}
interface IssuesLabeledEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "issues_labeled";
issue_number: number;
title: string;
body: string | null;
}
interface IssueCommentCreatedEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "issue_comment_created";
comment_id: number;
/** distinguishes this from PR review comments (which use pull_request_review_comment_created) */
comment_type: "issue";
/** comment body is the primary content (null if already in prompt) */
body: string | null;
issue_number: number;
// PR-specific fields (only present when is_pr is true)
is_pr?: true;
branch?: string;
title?: string;
}
interface CheckSuiteCompletedEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "check_suite_completed";
issue_number: number;
is_pr: true;
title: string;
body: string | null;
pull_request: any;
branch: string;
check_suite: {
id: number;
head_sha: string;
head_branch: string | null;
status: string | null;
conclusion: string | null;
url: string;
};
}
interface WorkflowDispatchEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "workflow_dispatch";
}
interface FixReviewEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "fix_review";
issue_number: number;
is_pr: true;
review_id: number;
/** when true, only address comments the triggerer approved with 👍 (vs all comments) */
approved_only?: boolean | undefined;
}
interface ImplementPlanEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "implement_plan";
issue_number: number;
plan_comment_id: number;
/** plan content is the primary content (null if already in prompt) */
body: string | null;
}
interface PullRequestSynchronizeEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "pull_request_synchronize";
issue_number: number;
is_pr: true;
title: string;
body: string | null;
branch: string;
/** SHA before the push -- used to compute incremental range-diff between PR versions */
before_sha: string;
}
interface UnknownEvent extends BasePayloadEvent {
trigger: "unknown";
}
// discriminated union for payload event based on trigger
// note: all events use issue_number for consistency (PRs are issues in GitHub's API)
export type PayloadEvent =
| PullRequestOpenedEvent
| PullRequestReadyForReviewEvent
| PullRequestSynchronizeEvent
| PullRequestReviewRequestedEvent
| PullRequestReviewSubmittedEvent
| PullRequestReviewCommentCreatedEvent
| IssuesOpenedEvent
| IssuesAssignedEvent
| IssuesLabeledEvent
| IssueCommentCreatedEvent
| CheckSuiteCompletedEvent
| WorkflowDispatchEvent
| FixReviewEvent
| ImplementPlanEvent
| UnknownEvent;
// writeable payload type for building payloads
export interface WriteablePayload {
"~pullfrog": true;
/** semantic version of the payload to ensure compatibility */
version: string;
/** provider/model slug (e.g. "anthropic/claude-opus") */
model?: string | undefined;
/** the user's actual request (body if @pullfrog tagged) */
prompt: string;
/** github username of the human who triggered this workflow run */
triggerer?: string | undefined;
/** event-level instructions for this trigger type (flag-expanded server-side) */
eventInstructions?: string | undefined;
/**
* system-injected note about prior superseded runs (e.g. when the
* triggering @pullfrog comment is edited). rendered alongside the user's
* prompt rather than via eventInstructions so it survives user-prompt
* precedence.
*/
previousRunsNote?: string | undefined;
/** event data from webhook payload - discriminated union based on trigger field */
event: PayloadEvent;
/** timeout for agent run (e.g., "10m", "1h30m") - defaults to "1h" */
timeout?: string | undefined;
/** working directory for the agent */
cwd?: string | undefined;
/** pre-created progress comment (ID + type) for updating status */
progressComment?: { id: string; type: "issue" | "review" } | undefined;
/** when true, seed the PR summary tmpfile + persist edits at run end */
generateSummary?: boolean | undefined;
}
// immutable payload type for agent execution
export type Payload = Readonly<WriteablePayload>;