Colin McDonnell
b9f0938405
#723's revision pass cut four substantive strings along with the negative anchors. those strings address real, audit-observed failure modes and the positive examples don't carry them. restored: - push_branch: "if the response reports a timeout, the underlying push may have actually succeeded — verify with git log origin/<branch> before retrying" (was on the tool description) - create_pull_request_review commit_id .describe(): "must be the FULL 40-character SHA — abbreviated SHAs are rejected by GitHub with 422" - create_pull_request_review comments[].line .describe(): "must sit inside a `@@` hunk... dropped entries are reported under droppedComments in the response" - create_pull_request_review comments[].start_line .describe(): "both start_line and line must sit inside the same @@ hunk" also: get_commit_info example used a 31-character SHA (non-standard truncation). swapped to a 7-char short form, which is what git log --oneline emits and what agents see in practice. note that this tool accepts either full or abbreviated, unlike create_pull_request_review which requires full.
647 lines
30 KiB
TypeScript
647 lines
30 KiB
TypeScript
import { regex } from "arkregex";
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import { type } from "arktype";
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import type { StoredPushDest } from "../toolState.ts";
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import { log } from "../utils/cli.ts";
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import { $git } from "../utils/gitAuth.ts";
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import { executeLifecycleHook } from "../utils/lifecycle.ts";
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import { $ } from "../utils/shell.ts";
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import type { ToolContext } from "./server.ts";
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import { execute, tool } from "./shared.ts";
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type PushDestination = {
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remoteName: string;
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remoteBranch: string;
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url: string;
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};
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/**
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* get where git would actually push this branch.
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* prefers the stored destination from toolState (set by checkout_pr) when it
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* matches the current branch, because git config reads can silently fail in
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* certain environments causing pushes to the wrong remote branch.
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*
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* falls back to reading branch.X.pushRemote and branch.X.merge from git config,
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* and finally to origin/<branch> for branches created without checkout_pr.
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*/
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function getPushDestination(
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branch: string,
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storedDest: StoredPushDest | undefined
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): PushDestination {
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// prefer stored destination from checkout_pr when it matches the current branch
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if (storedDest && storedDest.localBranch === branch) {
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log.debug(`using stored push destination: ${storedDest.remoteName}/${storedDest.remoteBranch}`);
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const url = $("git", ["remote", "get-url", "--push", storedDest.remoteName], {
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log: false,
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}).trim();
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return { remoteName: storedDest.remoteName, remoteBranch: storedDest.remoteBranch, url };
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}
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// fall back to git config (for branches not created by checkout_pr)
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try {
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const pushRemote = $("git", ["config", `branch.${branch}.pushRemote`], { log: false }).trim();
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const merge = $("git", ["config", `branch.${branch}.merge`], { log: false }).trim();
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const remoteBranch = merge.replace(/^refs\/heads\//, "");
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const url = $("git", ["remote", "get-url", "--push", pushRemote], { log: false }).trim();
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return { remoteName: pushRemote, remoteBranch, url };
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} catch {
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// no push config - branch was created locally without checkout_pr
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log.debug(`no push config for ${branch}, falling back to origin/${branch}`);
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const url = $("git", ["remote", "get-url", "--push", "origin"], { log: false }).trim();
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return { remoteName: "origin", remoteBranch: branch, url };
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}
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}
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/**
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* normalize URL for comparison (handle .git suffix, case)
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*/
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function normalizeUrl(url: string): string {
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return url.replace(/\.git$/, "").toLowerCase();
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}
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// SECURITY: reject refs/branch names that begin with "-". git's parseopt
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// accepts options intermixed with positional args, so a ref like
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// "--upload-pack=evil" could be interpreted as a flag rather than a refspec.
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export function rejectIfLeadingDash(value: string, kind: string): void {
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if (value.startsWith("-")) {
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throw new Error(`Blocked: ${kind} '${value}' starts with '-' — git could parse it as a flag.`);
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}
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}
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// SECURITY: branch inputs to push/delete must be bare branch names. a branch
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// name like "refs/heads/main" bypasses the restricted-mode default-branch
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// check below (which does exact-string compare against "main"), and symbolic
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// refs (HEAD / FETCH_HEAD / ORIG_HEAD / MERGE_HEAD) would resolve to
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// whatever commit those refs point at — both routes let an agent push to
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// protected branches even under push: restricted. checkout_pr only ever
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// stores bare names like "pr-123", so nothing legitimate relies on the
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// refs/... form here.
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const SYMBOLIC_REFS = new Set(["HEAD", "FETCH_HEAD", "ORIG_HEAD", "MERGE_HEAD"]);
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export function rejectSpecialRef(value: string, kind: string): void {
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rejectIfLeadingDash(value, kind);
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if (value.startsWith("refs/")) {
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throw new Error(
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`Blocked: ${kind} '${value}' is a fully-qualified ref path. Use a bare branch name (e.g. 'feature/foo' or 'main'), not a 'refs/heads/...' form.`
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);
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}
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if (SYMBOLIC_REFS.has(value)) {
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throw new Error(
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`Blocked: ${kind} '${value}' is a git symbolic ref, not a branch name. Pass the resolved branch name (e.g. 'main'), or omit branchName to push the current branch.`
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);
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}
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// SECURITY: git interprets ':' and leading '+' as refspec syntax, not as
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// part of a branch name. without this check, an agent under push:restricted
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// can smuggle a full refspec through branchName:
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// - "evil:refs/heads/main" → pushes local 'evil' to remote main
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// - ":refs/heads/main" → deletes remote main
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// - ":other" → deletes remote 'other' under push:restricted
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// - "+main" → force-push refspec
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// the default-branch guard downstream is an exact-string compare, so any
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// character that lets git parse the value as <src>:<dst> (or as a force
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// prefix) bypasses it. git's own check-ref-format forbids ':', '+', '^',
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// '~', '?', '*', '[', '\\', and whitespace in branch names, so rejecting
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// them here cannot false-positive against a legitimate branch name.
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const BAD = /[:+^~?*[\\\s]/;
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const badMatch = value.match(BAD);
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if (badMatch) {
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throw new Error(
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`Blocked: ${kind} '${value}' contains '${badMatch[0]}', which git interprets as refspec/revision syntax, not as part of a branch name.`
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);
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}
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}
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// SECURITY: validate tag names so the push_tags refspec can't be split into
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// a <src>:<dst> refspec that targets a non-tag ref. without this, a tag like
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// "foo:refs/heads/main" becomes "refs/tags/foo:refs/heads/main" and git
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// pushes the local tag's commit to remote main — a back door around the
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// branch-push rules in push_branch. keep the allow-list conservative (git's
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// own check-ref-format forbids far more, but we only need enough to block
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// refspec injection).
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export function validateTagName(tag: string): void {
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rejectIfLeadingDash(tag, "tag");
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if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$/.test(tag)) {
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throw new Error(
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`Blocked: tag '${tag}' contains characters that could be parsed as a refspec or flag. Tags must match [A-Za-z0-9._/-]+.`
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);
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}
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}
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/**
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* validate that the push destination matches expected URL.
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* pushUrl is set by setupGit (base repo) and updated by checkout_pr (fork repo).
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*/
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function validatePushDestination(ctx: ToolContext, branch: string): PushDestination {
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const pushUrl = ctx.toolState.pushUrl;
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if (!pushUrl) throw new Error("pushUrl not set - setupGit must run before push_branch");
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const dest = getPushDestination(branch, ctx.toolState.pushDest);
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if (normalizeUrl(dest.url) !== normalizeUrl(pushUrl)) {
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throw new Error(
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`Push blocked: destination does not match expected repository.\n` +
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`Expected: ${pushUrl}\n` +
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`Actual: ${dest.url}\n` +
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`Git configuration may have been tampered with.`
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);
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}
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return dest;
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}
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export const PushBranch = type({
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branchName: type.string
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.describe("The branch name to push (defaults to current branch)")
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.optional(),
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force: type.boolean.describe("Force push (use with caution)").default(false),
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});
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// classify an error from `$git("push", ...)` to decide retry vs. recovery
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// vs. rethrow. exported for tests.
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//
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// - `concurrent-push`: server-side compare-and-swap failed because the ref
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// advanced between fetch and push. recovery is fetch + integrate + retry.
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// matches both the client-side detection (`fetch first` /
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// `non-fast-forward`) and the server-side detection (`cannot lock ref`
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// with `is at <SHA1> but expected <SHA2>`).
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// - `transient`: network or upstream server hiccup (RPC failed mid-stream,
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// HTTP 5xx, early EOF, reset, timeout, dns flake). push is idempotent so
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// verbatim retry with backoff is safe.
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// - `unknown`: anything else (including auth/permission/protected-branch
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// rejections). retrying these wastes time; surface to the caller.
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//
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// kept conservative: a misclassification of `unknown` -> `transient` would
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// cause two extra round-trips on a permanently-failing push, while the
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// reverse (true transient labeled `unknown`) just falls back to current
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// behavior. so we only mark as transient when the error string is
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// unambiguously a network/server-side fault, not a refusal.
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export type PushErrorKind = "concurrent-push" | "transient" | "unknown";
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const CONCURRENT_PUSH_PATTERNS = ["fetch first", "non-fast-forward", "cannot lock ref"] as const;
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const TRANSIENT_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
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/RPC failed/i,
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/early EOF/,
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/the remote end hung up unexpectedly/,
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/Connection reset/i,
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/Could not resolve host/i,
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/Operation timed out/i,
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/HTTP\/2 stream \d+ was not closed cleanly/i,
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/unexpected disconnect while reading sideband packet/i,
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// libcurl HTTP 5xx surfaced by git over https. matches both the
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// libcurl-style "The requested URL returned error: 502" and the more
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// recent "HTTP 502" wording. most 4xx is intentionally excluded —
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// 401/403/404 indicate auth/permission problems that are not
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// retry-safe — but 429 (rate-limited / abuse detection) IS retry-safe
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// and GitHub occasionally surfaces it on git push, so it's included
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// explicitly below.
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/HTTP 5\d\d/,
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/returned error: 5\d\d/i,
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/HTTP 429/,
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/returned error: 429/i,
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];
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export function classifyPushError(msg: string): PushErrorKind {
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if (CONCURRENT_PUSH_PATTERNS.some((p) => msg.includes(p))) return "concurrent-push";
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if (TRANSIENT_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(msg))) return "transient";
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return "unknown";
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}
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// backoff delays before retry attempts 2 and 3. attempt 1 is the original
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// push. total worst-case added latency: ~7s. small enough that the agent
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// rarely notices, large enough to ride out most upstream hiccups.
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const TRANSIENT_RETRY_DELAYS_MS = [2000, 5000];
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export function PushBranchTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
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const defaultBranch = ctx.repo.data.default_branch || "main";
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const pushPermission = ctx.payload.push;
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return tool({
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name: "push_branch",
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description:
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"Push the current branch to the remote repository. Omit branchName to push the current branch (recommended). " +
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'Example: `push_branch({})` to push the current branch. Example: `push_branch({ branchName: "pr-1" })` to push a specific local branch. ' +
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"If specifying branchName, use the LOCAL branch name (e.g., 'pr-1'), not the remote branch name. " +
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"The correct remote and remote branch are determined automatically from branch config set by checkout_pr. " +
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"Requires a clean working tree. Runs the repository prepush hook (if configured) before the network push — hook failure means tests/lint or similar in that script failed, not necessarily a Pullfrog timeout. " +
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"Never force push unless explicitly requested. Pushes to the default branch are blocked in restricted mode. " +
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"If the response reports a timeout, the underlying push may have actually succeeded — verify with `git log origin/<branch>` (or this tool with command 'log') before retrying, otherwise you'll push a duplicate.",
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parameters: PushBranch,
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execute: execute(async ({ branchName, force }) => {
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// permission check
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if (pushPermission === "disabled") {
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throw new Error("Push is disabled. This repository is configured for read-only access.");
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}
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const branch = branchName || $("git", ["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], { log: false });
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// check the resolved branch too — rev-parse could surface a weird current
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// branch name that would otherwise bypass the user-facing check. use
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// rejectSpecialRef so "refs/heads/main" and symbolic refs like HEAD
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// can't slip past the default-branch guard below.
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rejectSpecialRef(branch, "branch");
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// reject push if working tree is dirty — forces agent to commit or discard before pushing
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const status = $("git", ["status", "--porcelain"], { log: false });
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if (status) {
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throw new Error(
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`push blocked: working tree is not clean (tracked changes and/or untracked files). commit, discard, or remove stray artifacts before pushing.\n\n` +
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`git status:\n${status}`
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);
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}
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// validate push destination matches expected URL
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const pushDest = validatePushDestination(ctx, branch);
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// block pushes to default branch in restricted mode
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if (pushPermission === "restricted" && pushDest.remoteBranch === defaultBranch) {
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throw new Error(
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`Push blocked: cannot push directly to default branch '${pushDest.remoteBranch}'. ` +
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`Create a feature branch and open a PR instead.`
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);
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}
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// use refspec when local and remote branch names differ
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const refspec =
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branch === pushDest.remoteBranch ? branch : `${branch}:${pushDest.remoteBranch}`;
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const pushArgs = force
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? ["--force", "-u", pushDest.remoteName, refspec]
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: ["-u", pushDest.remoteName, refspec];
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// prepush failure should block the push — a passing hook is the gate
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// that protects main from bad pushes.
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const prepushHook = await executeLifecycleHook({
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event: "prepush",
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script: ctx.prepushScript,
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});
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if (prepushHook.warning) {
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throw new Error(prepushHook.warning);
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}
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// re-verify clean working tree after prepush. a hook that writes tracked
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// files (formatter, type generator, build artifacts) would leave those
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// changes uncommitted — pushing now would silently drop them, and the
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// agent would report a "successful push" of code the hook had expected
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// to be included.
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const postHookStatus = $("git", ["status", "--porcelain"], { log: false });
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if (postHookStatus) {
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throw new Error(
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`push blocked: the prepush hook modified the working tree. those changes are not included in the push. commit or discard them (or change the hook to not mutate tracked files) before retrying.\n\n` +
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`git status:\n${postHookStatus}`
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);
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}
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log.debug(`pushing ${branch} to ${pushDest.remoteName}/${pushDest.remoteBranch}`);
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if (force) {
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log.warning(`force pushing - this will overwrite remote history`);
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}
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// retry transient network/server errors (RPC failed, early EOF, 5xx,
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// connection reset, etc) with backoff. push is idempotent: if the remote
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// never received the pack, retry creates the ref; if it did, the retry
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// is a no-op fast-forward to the same SHA. concurrent-push rejections
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// and permission errors are NOT retried — they need user intervention.
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let lastErr: unknown;
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let pushed = false;
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for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= TRANSIENT_RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length; attempt++) {
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try {
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await $git("push", pushArgs, {
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token: ctx.gitToken,
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});
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if (attempt > 0) {
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log.info(`push succeeded on attempt ${attempt + 1}`);
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}
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pushed = true;
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break;
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} catch (err) {
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lastErr = err;
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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const kind = classifyPushError(msg);
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if (kind === "concurrent-push") {
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// git rebase is blocked through the MCP tool when shell is disabled
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// (rebase --exec can execute arbitrary code). merge always works and
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// integrates remote changes cleanly, so suggest it as the default.
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const integrateStep =
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ctx.payload.shell === "disabled"
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? `2. use the git tool to merge the remote branch into yours: git({ command: "merge", args: ["origin/${pushDest.remoteBranch}"] })`
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: `2. use the git tool to rebase or merge your changes on top: git({ command: "merge", args: ["origin/${pushDest.remoteBranch}"] }) (or 'rebase')`;
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throw new Error(
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`push rejected: the remote branch '${pushDest.remoteBranch}' has new commits you don't have locally (often a concurrent push to the same branch).\n\n` +
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`to resolve this:\n` +
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`1. use git_fetch to fetch the remote branch: git_fetch({ ref: "${pushDest.remoteBranch}" })\n` +
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`${integrateStep}\n` +
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`3. resolve any merge conflicts if needed\n` +
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`4. retry push_branch`
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);
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}
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if (kind === "transient" && attempt < TRANSIENT_RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length) {
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// jitter avoids lockstep retries when several agents are hit by the
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// same upstream blip simultaneously — without it, all retries land
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// on the same recovering server at the same instant.
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const baseDelay = TRANSIENT_RETRY_DELAYS_MS[attempt] ?? 5000;
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const delay = Math.round(baseDelay * (0.75 + Math.random() * 0.5));
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log.info(
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`push attempt ${attempt + 1} failed (transient), retrying in ${delay}ms: ${msg.slice(0, 300)}`
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);
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await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, delay));
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continue;
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}
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throw err;
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}
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}
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if (!pushed) {
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// safety net — loop should always either break with success or throw.
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throw lastErr instanceof Error ? lastErr : new Error(String(lastErr));
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}
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const pushedSha = $("git", ["rev-parse", "HEAD"], { log: false }).trim();
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log.info(
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`» pushed branch ${branch} to ${pushDest.remoteName}/${pushDest.remoteBranch} (sha ${pushedSha})`
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);
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return {
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success: true,
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branch,
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remoteBranch: pushDest.remoteBranch,
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remote: pushDest.remoteName,
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force,
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message: `successfully pushed ${branch} to ${pushDest.remoteName}/${pushDest.remoteBranch}`,
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};
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}),
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});
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}
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// commands that require authentication - redirect to dedicated tools.
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// exported so tests can exercise the same table the runtime uses.
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//
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// note: the `pull` redirect intentionally does not mention `rebase` — under
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// shell=disabled rebase is itself blocked by NOSHELL_BLOCKED_SUBCOMMANDS, so
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// advertising it here would just send the agent into a second block. agents
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// under shell=restricted/enabled who prefer rebase can invoke it directly;
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// the redirect's job is to name the canonical alternative (merge), which
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// works in all modes.
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export const AUTH_REQUIRED_REDIRECT: Record<string, string> = {
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push: "use the push_branch tool instead — it handles authentication and permission checks.",
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fetch: "use the git_fetch tool instead — it handles authentication.",
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pull: "use git_fetch to fetch the remote ref, then call this git tool with command 'merge' locally.",
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clone: "the repository is already cloned. use checkout_pr for PR branches.",
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};
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// SECURITY: subcommands blocked when shell is disabled.
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// in disabled mode the agent has no shell access, so these subcommands are the
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// primary escape vectors for arbitrary code execution. in restricted mode the
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// agent already has shell in a stripped sandbox, so blocking these is redundant.
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// exported so tests stay in sync with the runtime table.
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export const NOSHELL_BLOCKED_SUBCOMMANDS: Record<string, string> = {
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config: "Blocked: git config can set up filter drivers or hooks that execute arbitrary code.",
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submodule:
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"Blocked: git submodule can reference malicious repositories and execute code on update.",
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"update-index":
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"Blocked: git update-index can modify index entries in ways that bypass file protections.",
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"filter-branch": "Blocked: git filter-branch executes arbitrary code on repository history.",
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replace: "Blocked: git replace can redirect object lookups.",
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// subcommands that accept --exec or similar flags for arbitrary code execution
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rebase:
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"Blocked: git rebase --exec can execute arbitrary shell commands. Use 'merge' instead to integrate remote changes.",
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bisect:
|
|
"Blocked: git bisect run can execute arbitrary shell commands. Bisect by hand (bisect start/good/bad/reset) is not available through this tool either — ask the user to run the bisect if needed.",
|
|
// difftool/mergetool exist to shell out to external diff/merge programs.
|
|
// both accept `--extcmd` / `-x` (difftool) or configured tool commands
|
|
// (mergetool) that run arbitrary code. NOSHELL_BLOCKED_ARGS catches the
|
|
// long `--extcmd` form, but not the `-x` short form — and globally blocking
|
|
// `-x` would false-positive on `git cherry-pick -x`. block the subcommands
|
|
// wholesale instead; neither has a meaningful use in an automated agent
|
|
// workflow (agents use `git diff` / `git show` for diffs and resolve
|
|
// conflicts via file edits, not a TUI merge tool).
|
|
difftool:
|
|
"Blocked: git difftool runs an external diff program via --extcmd/-x or configured tool and can execute arbitrary shell commands. Use 'diff' (or 'show' for single commits) to inspect changes — those output directly and don't invoke an external tool.",
|
|
mergetool:
|
|
"Blocked: git mergetool runs an external merge program configured via mergetool.<name>.cmd and can execute arbitrary shell commands. Resolve conflicts by editing the files directly (conflict markers are written into the working tree) and then commit.",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// SECURITY: subcommand-specific arg flags that execute code.
|
|
// only blocked when shell is disabled — in restricted mode the agent already
|
|
// has shell access in a stripped sandbox, so these provide no additional security.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: global git flags like -c and --config-env are NOT included here
|
|
// because they only work before the subcommand. in the MCP tool, the
|
|
// subcommand is always first, so -c in args is parsed as a subcommand flag
|
|
// (e.g., git log -c = combined diff format), not config injection.
|
|
// the subcommand check (rejecting "-" prefix) already blocks that attack.
|
|
//
|
|
// matched as: arg === flag OR arg starts with flag + "="
|
|
// (avoids false positives like --exclude matching --exec).
|
|
// exported so tests stay in sync with the runtime flag set.
|
|
export const NOSHELL_BLOCKED_ARGS = ["--exec", "--extcmd", "--upload-pack", "--receive-pack"];
|
|
|
|
const COLLAPSE_THRESHOLD = 200;
|
|
|
|
// SECURITY: subcommand must match [a-z][a-z0-9-]* to reject flags passed as the subcommand.
|
|
// this blocks injection of global git options like -c, -C, --exec-path, --config-env, etc.
|
|
//
|
|
// critical attack: git -c "alias.x=!evil-command" x
|
|
// -> sets alias "x" to a shell command via -c config injection, then runs it
|
|
// -> achieves arbitrary code execution even with shell=disabled
|
|
const subcommandPattern = regex("^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$");
|
|
|
|
const Git = type({
|
|
command: type(subcommandPattern).describe("Git command (e.g., 'status', 'log', 'diff')"),
|
|
args: type.string.array().describe("Additional arguments for the git command").optional(),
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
export function GitTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
|
|
return tool({
|
|
name: "git",
|
|
description:
|
|
"Run a git subcommand. `command` is a single subcommand; flags and positional args go in `args`. " +
|
|
'Example: `git({ command: "log", args: ["--oneline", "-n", "20"] })`. ' +
|
|
'Example: `git({ command: "diff", args: ["origin/main..HEAD"] })`. ' +
|
|
"For push/fetch, use the dedicated MCP tools (push_branch, git_fetch). " +
|
|
"git pull is not available — use git_fetch then this tool with command 'merge'.",
|
|
parameters: Git,
|
|
execute: execute(async (params) => {
|
|
const command = params.command;
|
|
const args = params.args ?? [];
|
|
|
|
const redirect = AUTH_REQUIRED_REDIRECT[command];
|
|
if (redirect) {
|
|
throw new Error(`git ${command} is not available through this tool — ${redirect}`);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SECURITY: block dangerous subcommands when shell is disabled.
|
|
// in restricted mode the agent has shell in a stripped sandbox, so blocking
|
|
// these through the MCP tool is redundant (agent can do it via shell).
|
|
if (ctx.payload.shell === "disabled") {
|
|
const blocked = NOSHELL_BLOCKED_SUBCOMMANDS[command];
|
|
if (blocked) {
|
|
throw new Error(blocked);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// block subcommand-specific flags that execute arbitrary code
|
|
for (const arg of args) {
|
|
const isBlocked = NOSHELL_BLOCKED_ARGS.some(
|
|
(flag) => arg === flag || arg.startsWith(flag + "=")
|
|
);
|
|
if (isBlocked) {
|
|
throw new Error(
|
|
`Blocked: '${arg}' flag can execute arbitrary code and is not allowed.`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const output = $("git", [command, ...args], { log: false });
|
|
const lineCount = output.split("\n").length;
|
|
if (lineCount > COLLAPSE_THRESHOLD) {
|
|
log.group(`git ${command} output (${lineCount} lines)`, () => {
|
|
log.info(output);
|
|
});
|
|
} else if (output) {
|
|
log.info(output);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return { success: true, output };
|
|
}),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const GitFetch = type({
|
|
ref: type.string.describe("Ref to fetch: branch name, tag, or 'pull/N/head' for PRs"),
|
|
depth: type.number.describe("Fetch depth (for shallow clones)").optional(),
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// when an agent-supplied depth is too shallow to reach the merge base, git
|
|
// surfaces "Could not read <sha>" and "remote did not send all necessary
|
|
// objects". detect both wordings so a single deepen retry can recover before
|
|
// the error reaches the agent (issue #564). git emits the full OID via
|
|
// oid_to_hex, so the bound is 40 (SHA-1) or 64 (SHA-256).
|
|
const SHALLOW_UNREACHABLE_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
|
|
/Could not read [a-f0-9]{40,64}/,
|
|
/remote did not send all necessary objects/,
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
// large enough to clear the merge base on most real-world PRs without
|
|
// downloading the full history; matches the fallback used by checkoutPrBranch
|
|
// when the compare API is unavailable.
|
|
const DEEPEN_RETRY_DEPTH = 1000;
|
|
|
|
export function GitFetchTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
|
|
return tool({
|
|
name: "git_fetch",
|
|
description:
|
|
"Fetch refs from remote repository. Use this instead of git fetch directly. " +
|
|
'Example: `git_fetch({ ref: "main" })`. With depth: `git_fetch({ ref: "pull/1234/head", depth: 1 })`.',
|
|
parameters: GitFetch,
|
|
execute: execute(async (params) => {
|
|
rejectIfLeadingDash(params.ref, "ref");
|
|
const fetchArgs = ["--no-tags", "origin", params.ref];
|
|
if (params.depth !== undefined) {
|
|
fetchArgs.push(`--depth=${params.depth}`);
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
await $git("fetch", fetchArgs, { token: ctx.gitToken });
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
const isShallowUnreachable = SHALLOW_UNREACHABLE_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(msg));
|
|
const isShallow =
|
|
isShallowUnreachable &&
|
|
$("git", ["rev-parse", "--is-shallow-repository"], { log: false }).trim() === "true";
|
|
if (!isShallow) throw err;
|
|
log.info(
|
|
`» git_fetch hit shallow-unreachable error, retrying with --deepen=${DEEPEN_RETRY_DEPTH}`
|
|
);
|
|
await $git("fetch", [`--deepen=${DEEPEN_RETRY_DEPTH}`, "--no-tags", "origin", params.ref], {
|
|
token: ctx.gitToken,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
return { success: true, ref: params.ref };
|
|
}),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const DeleteBranch = type({
|
|
branchName: type.string.describe("Remote branch to delete"),
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
export function DeleteBranchTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
|
|
const pushPermission = ctx.payload.push;
|
|
const defaultBranch = ctx.repo.data.default_branch || "main";
|
|
|
|
return tool({
|
|
name: "delete_branch",
|
|
description:
|
|
"Delete a remote branch. Requires push: enabled permission. " +
|
|
"Deletion of the repository's default branch is always blocked regardless of permission mode.",
|
|
parameters: DeleteBranch,
|
|
execute: execute(async (params) => {
|
|
if (pushPermission !== "enabled") {
|
|
throw new Error(
|
|
"Branch deletion requires push: enabled permission. " +
|
|
"Current mode only allows pushing to non-protected branches."
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// delete_branch is already gated on push: enabled, but also block the
|
|
// refs/heads/... and symbolic-ref forms so this tool can't be tricked
|
|
// into deleting a protected ref that wouldn't match a bare-name check.
|
|
rejectSpecialRef(params.branchName, "branchName");
|
|
|
|
// defense-in-depth: deleting the default branch is catastrophic and
|
|
// unlike pushing to main it has no easy revert path (GitHub retains
|
|
// refs for 30 days but restoring requires the reflog or a direct SHA).
|
|
// push: enabled authorizes pushes, not wholesale removal of the
|
|
// repository's primary branch. block it locally even if GitHub branch
|
|
// protection would also reject — some repos disable protection on
|
|
// default branches and we should not rely on that config for safety.
|
|
if (params.branchName === defaultBranch) {
|
|
throw new Error(
|
|
`Blocked: cannot delete the default branch '${defaultBranch}'. ` +
|
|
`If you really need to delete or rename it, do it manually via the repository settings.`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// use refs/heads/<name> explicitly so a same-named tag can't be deleted
|
|
// by accident. `push --delete <bare-name>` resolves against both remote
|
|
// branches and tags; a tag-only match would silently remove the tag.
|
|
// rejectSpecialRef guarantees branchName is a bare name, so the
|
|
// branchName construction here can't collide with user-supplied refs.
|
|
await $git("push", ["origin", "--delete", `refs/heads/${params.branchName}`], {
|
|
token: ctx.gitToken,
|
|
});
|
|
log.info(`» deleted branch ${params.branchName}`);
|
|
return { success: true, deleted: params.branchName };
|
|
}),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const PushTags = type({
|
|
tag: type.string.describe("Tag name to push"),
|
|
force: type.boolean.describe("Force push the tag").default(false),
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
export function PushTagsTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
|
|
const pushPermission = ctx.payload.push;
|
|
|
|
return tool({
|
|
name: "push_tags",
|
|
description: "Push a tag to remote. Requires push: enabled permission.",
|
|
parameters: PushTags,
|
|
execute: execute(async (params) => {
|
|
if (pushPermission !== "enabled") {
|
|
throw new Error(
|
|
"Tag pushing requires push: enabled permission. " +
|
|
"Current mode only allows pushing branches."
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
validateTagName(params.tag);
|
|
const pushArgs = [...(params.force ? ["-f"] : []), "origin", `refs/tags/${params.tag}`];
|
|
await $git("push", pushArgs, {
|
|
token: ctx.gitToken,
|
|
});
|
|
log.info(`» pushed tag ${params.tag}`);
|
|
return { success: true, tag: params.tag };
|
|
}),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|