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shockbot/mcp/security.test.ts
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Colin McDonnell a7bd746f21 Restructure dash (#372)
* Restructure dash

* WIP

* WIP

* refactor trigger UI: extract PR summary card, add mentions section, rename labels

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* clean up console UI: remove info icons from section descriptions, rename mentions trigger

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix review feedback: layout, terminology, form scope

- extract console sidebar sections to module-level constant
- align three-column layout breakpoints to xl (match sidebar visibility)
- fix mixed shell/bash terminology in beta page
- scope FormProvider to trigger sections only, restore autoComplete="off"

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* Bump

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-02-23 23:34:29 +00:00

557 lines
17 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
// ─── git tool security tests ────────────────────────────────────────────
// re-create the validation logic from git.ts for unit testing
const AUTH_REQUIRED_REDIRECT: Record<string, string> = {
push: "Use push_branch tool instead.",
fetch: "Use git_fetch tool instead.",
pull: "Use git_fetch + git merge instead.",
clone: "Repository already cloned. Use checkout_pr for PR branches.",
};
// only blocked when shell is disabled — in restricted mode the agent has shell
// in a stripped sandbox so blocking these is redundant
const NOSHELL_BLOCKED_SUBCOMMANDS: Record<string, string> = {
config: "Blocked: git config can set up filter drivers or hooks that execute arbitrary code.",
submodule:
"Blocked: git submodule can reference malicious repositories and execute code on update.",
"update-index":
"Blocked: git update-index can modify index entries in ways that bypass file protections.",
"filter-branch": "Blocked: git filter-branch executes arbitrary code on repository history.",
replace: "Blocked: git replace can redirect object lookups.",
rebase: "Blocked: git rebase --exec can execute arbitrary shell commands.",
bisect: "Blocked: git bisect run can execute arbitrary shell commands.",
};
const NOSHELL_BLOCKED_ARGS = ["--exec", "--extcmd", "--upload-pack", "--receive-pack"];
type ShellPermission = "disabled" | "restricted" | "enabled";
type ValidateGitParams = {
subcommand: string;
args: string[];
shellPermission: ShellPermission;
};
// matches the arkregex pattern used in the Git schema
const SUBCOMMAND_PATTERN = /^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$/;
// mirrors the validation logic in GitTool.execute
function validateGitCommand(params: ValidateGitParams): string | null {
// schema-level regex validation — applies in ALL modes
if (!SUBCOMMAND_PATTERN.test(params.subcommand)) {
return `subcommand must be Git subcommand (was "${params.subcommand}")`;
}
const redirect = AUTH_REQUIRED_REDIRECT[params.subcommand];
if (redirect) {
return `git ${params.subcommand} requires authentication. ${redirect}`;
}
// subcommand and arg blocking only applies when shell is disabled
if (params.shellPermission === "disabled") {
const blocked = NOSHELL_BLOCKED_SUBCOMMANDS[params.subcommand];
if (blocked) {
return blocked;
}
for (const arg of params.args) {
const isBlocked = NOSHELL_BLOCKED_ARGS.some(
(flag) => arg === flag || arg.startsWith(flag + "=")
);
if (isBlocked) {
return `Blocked: '${arg}' flag can execute arbitrary code and is not allowed.`;
}
}
}
return null; // no error
}
describe("git tool security - subcommand regex validation", () => {
it("blocks -c flag as subcommand in ALL modes (alias injection)", () => {
const modes: ShellPermission[] = ["disabled", "restricted", "enabled"];
for (const mode of modes) {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "-c",
args: ["alias.x=!evil-command", "x"],
shellPermission: mode,
});
expect(error).toContain("Git subcommand");
}
});
it("blocks --exec-path as subcommand", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "--exec-path=/malicious",
args: ["status"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("Git subcommand");
});
it("blocks -C as subcommand (change directory)", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "-C",
args: ["/tmp", "init"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("Git subcommand");
});
it("blocks --config-env as subcommand", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "--config-env",
args: ["core.pager=PATH", "log"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("Git subcommand");
});
it("blocks all flags starting with - as subcommand", () => {
const flags = ["-c", "-C", "-p", "--paginate", "--git-dir", "--work-tree", "--bare"];
for (const flag of flags) {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: flag,
args: [],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("Git subcommand");
}
});
it("blocks uppercase subcommands", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "STATUS",
args: [],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("Git subcommand");
});
it("blocks subcommands with special characters", () => {
const bad = ["git;evil", "status$(cmd)", "log|cat", "diff&bg"];
for (const sub of bad) {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: sub,
args: [],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("Git subcommand");
}
});
it("allows valid subcommands", () => {
const safe = ["status", "log", "diff", "show", "branch", "tag", "stash", "blame"];
for (const sub of safe) {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: sub,
args: [],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
}
});
it("allows hyphenated subcommands", () => {
const safe = ["filter-branch", "update-index", "ls-remote", "ls-files", "rev-parse"];
for (const sub of safe) {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: sub,
args: [],
shellPermission: "enabled",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
}
});
});
describe("git tool security - blocked subcommands (disabled mode only)", () => {
it("blocks config in disabled mode", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "config",
args: ["core.hooksPath", "./hooks"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("git config");
});
it("allows config in restricted mode (agent has shell)", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "config",
args: ["filter.evil.clean", "bash -c 'evil'"],
shellPermission: "restricted",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
});
it("blocks submodule in disabled mode", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "submodule",
args: ["add", "https://evil.com/repo.git"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("submodule");
});
it("allows submodule in restricted mode", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "submodule",
args: ["add", "https://example.com/repo.git"],
shellPermission: "restricted",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
});
it("blocks rebase in disabled mode", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "rebase",
args: ["--exec", "evil-command", "HEAD~1"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("rebase");
});
it("allows rebase in restricted mode", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "rebase",
args: ["main"],
shellPermission: "restricted",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
});
it("blocks bisect in disabled mode", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "bisect",
args: ["run", "evil-command"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("bisect");
});
it("blocks filter-branch in disabled mode", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "filter-branch",
args: ["--tree-filter", "evil-command", "HEAD"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("filter-branch");
});
it("allows blocked subcommands in enabled mode", () => {
const blocked = ["config", "submodule", "rebase", "bisect", "filter-branch"];
for (const sub of blocked) {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: sub,
args: [],
shellPermission: "enabled",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
}
});
it("allows blocked subcommands in restricted mode (stripped env is security boundary)", () => {
const blocked = ["config", "submodule", "rebase", "bisect", "filter-branch"];
for (const sub of blocked) {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: sub,
args: [],
shellPermission: "restricted",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
}
});
});
describe("git tool security - blocked arg flags (disabled mode only)", () => {
it("blocks --exec in args (disabled)", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "log",
args: ["--exec", "evil-command"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("arbitrary code");
});
it("blocks --exec= in args (disabled)", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "log",
args: ["--exec=evil-command"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("arbitrary code");
});
it("blocks --extcmd in args (disabled)", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "difftool",
args: ["--extcmd=evil-command", "HEAD~1"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("arbitrary code");
});
it("blocks --upload-pack in args (disabled)", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "ls-remote",
args: ["--upload-pack=evil"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("arbitrary code");
});
it("allows --exec in restricted mode (agent has shell)", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "rebase",
args: ["--exec", "npm test", "HEAD~1"],
shellPermission: "restricted",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
});
it("allows --extcmd in restricted mode", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "difftool",
args: ["--extcmd=less"],
shellPermission: "restricted",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
});
it("allows blocked args in enabled mode", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "difftool",
args: ["--extcmd=less"],
shellPermission: "enabled",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
});
it("allows normal args in disabled mode", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "log",
args: ["--oneline", "-10", "--format=%H %s"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
});
it("does not false-positive on --exclude-standard (not --exec)", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "ls-files",
args: ["--exclude-standard"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
});
it("does not false-positive on --execute (not --exec=)", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "log",
args: ["--execute-something"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
});
it("does not false-positive on -c (combined diff format for git log)", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "log",
args: ["-c", "--oneline"],
shellPermission: "disabled",
});
expect(error).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("git tool security - auth redirect", () => {
it("redirects push in all modes", () => {
const modes: ShellPermission[] = ["disabled", "restricted", "enabled"];
for (const mode of modes) {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "push",
args: [],
shellPermission: mode,
});
expect(error).toContain("authentication");
}
});
it("redirects fetch", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "fetch",
args: [],
shellPermission: "enabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("authentication");
});
it("redirects pull", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "pull",
args: [],
shellPermission: "enabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("authentication");
});
it("redirects clone", () => {
const error = validateGitCommand({
subcommand: "clone",
args: [],
shellPermission: "enabled",
});
expect(error).toContain("authentication");
});
});
// ─── file tool security tests ───────────────────────────────────────────
const GIT_INTERPRETED_FILES = [".gitattributes", ".gitmodules"];
type ValidateWritePathResult = {
allowed: boolean;
error?: string;
};
// simplified path validation that mirrors the security checks in file.ts
// without requiring real filesystem operations (for unit testing)
function validateWritePathSecurity(
relative: string,
shellPermission: ShellPermission
): ValidateWritePathResult {
if (relative === ".git" || relative.startsWith(".git/")) {
return { allowed: false, error: `writing to .git is not allowed: ${relative}` };
}
// only blocked when shell is disabled
if (shellPermission === "disabled") {
const basename = relative.split("/").pop() || "";
if (GIT_INTERPRETED_FILES.includes(basename)) {
return {
allowed: false,
error: `writing to ${basename} is not allowed when shell is ${shellPermission}`,
};
}
}
return { allowed: true };
}
describe("file tool security - .git protection", () => {
it("blocks .git directory in all modes", () => {
const modes: ShellPermission[] = ["disabled", "restricted", "enabled"];
for (const mode of modes) {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".git", mode);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
}
});
it("blocks .git/config", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".git/config", "enabled");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
});
it("blocks .git/hooks/pre-commit", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".git/hooks/pre-commit", "enabled");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
});
it("blocks deeply nested .git paths", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".git/objects/ab/cd1234", "enabled");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("file tool security - git-interpreted files (disabled mode only)", () => {
it("blocks .gitattributes in disabled mode", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitattributes", "disabled");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.error).toContain(".gitattributes");
});
it("allows .gitattributes in restricted mode (agent has shell)", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitattributes", "restricted");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
});
it("allows .gitattributes in enabled mode", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitattributes", "enabled");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
});
it("blocks .gitmodules in disabled mode", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitmodules", "disabled");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
});
it("allows .gitmodules in restricted mode", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitmodules", "restricted");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
});
it("allows .gitmodules in enabled mode", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitmodules", "enabled");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
});
it("blocks subdirectory .gitattributes in disabled mode", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity("src/.gitattributes", "disabled");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
});
it("blocks deeply nested .gitattributes in disabled mode", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity("a/b/c/.gitattributes", "disabled");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
});
it("allows subdirectory .gitattributes in restricted mode", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity("src/.gitattributes", "restricted");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
});
it("allows normal files in all modes", () => {
const files = ["README.md", "src/index.ts", "package.json", ".env", ".gitignore"];
const modes: ShellPermission[] = ["disabled", "restricted", "enabled"];
for (const file of files) {
for (const mode of modes) {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity(file, mode);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
}
}
});
it("does not block .gitignore (not a code execution vector)", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity(".gitignore", "disabled");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
});
it("does not block .gitkeep (not a code execution vector)", () => {
const result = validateWritePathSecurity("dir/.gitkeep", "disabled");
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
});
});
// ─── dependency install security tests ──────────────────────────────────
// mirrors the logic in dependencies.ts startInstallation()
function shouldIgnoreScripts(shellPermission: ShellPermission): boolean {
return shellPermission === "disabled";
}
describe("dependency install - ignore-scripts logic", () => {
it("ignoreScripts is true when shell is disabled", () => {
expect(shouldIgnoreScripts("disabled")).toBe(true);
});
it("ignoreScripts is false when shell is restricted (scripts run in stripped env)", () => {
expect(shouldIgnoreScripts("restricted")).toBe(false);
});
it("ignoreScripts is false when shell is enabled", () => {
expect(shouldIgnoreScripts("enabled")).toBe(false);
});
});