Files
shockbot/main.ts
T
Colin McDonnell f87e0f878c action: minimize pullfrog.yml permissions and drop actions:read (#594)
* action: minimize pullfrog.yml permissions and drop actions:read

The recommended pullfrog.yml workflow asked for a permissions block that's
broader than what the action actually uses with the workflow GITHUB_TOKEN —
all real work (git push, PR comments, reviews) goes through installation
tokens that the action mints via OIDC. Customer security scanners flagged
the workflow-level block as too permissive.

- Move permissions to the job level and reduce to id-token: write,
  pull-requests: write, issues: write. contents:read is the implicit default
  and covers actions/checkout; contents:write, checks:read are unused by
  any GITHUB_TOKEN consumer; actions:read was only used by post-cleanup's
  listJobsForWorkflowRun call.
- Replace listJobsForWorkflowRun with a SIGTERM/SIGINT handler in main.ts
  that calls core.saveState("cancelled", "true"); post-cleanup reads it
  back via core.getState. Same cancel-vs-failure UX, no extra scope needed.
- Sync the docs (headless-action, getting-started, action/README) and the
  two dogfood pullfrog.yml workflows to the new minimal block. Update the
  post-cleanup wiki to describe the saveState approach.

* action: drop pull-requests/issues from required workflow scopes

Switch postCleanup.ts to mint its own short-lived installation token via OIDC
(acquireNewToken with issues:write + pull_requests:write) instead of using the
workflow GITHUB_TOKEN. Same comment-update behavior, but the workflow no longer
needs those scopes — the only permissions Pullfrog ever asks for are id-token:write
(OIDC exchange) and contents:read (actions/checkout).

Also fixes a bug from the previous commit: setting an explicit permissions block
drops every unlisted scope to none (with metadata as the only exception), so
omitting contents would have broken actions/checkout. Restored at both workflow
and job level.

* action: scope id-token:write to pullfrog job, not workflow level

id-token:write is the powerful one — it lets a job mint OIDC tokens that can
be exchanged for cloud credentials or our installation tokens. Keeping it at
workflow level means any future job added to this file silently inherits it.
Move it to the job level where it's actually used; leave only contents:read
at workflow level as a safe baseline for any future jobs.

* action: move stuck-comment cleanup server-side, drop write perms entirely

The action's post-cleanup step lived inside the runner and used the workflow
GITHUB_TOKEN to update the "Leaping into action…" progress comment when a run
failed/cancelled, requiring pull-requests:write + issues:write at the workflow
level. Move that responsibility to the workflow_run.completed webhook handler:
it already has installation-token access via the GitHub App, runs server-side
(no Pullfrog API dependency loop on failure), and lets us drop both write perms.

Recommended workflow permissions block is now truly minimal:

  permissions:
    contents: read
  jobs:
    pullfrog:
      permissions:
        id-token: write
        contents: read

Server side
- handleWorkflowRunCompleted: when conclusion != "success" and the WorkflowRun
  has progressCommentId, mint installation octokit and update the stuck comment
  in place. Try issues.getComment first, fall back to pulls.getReviewComment on
  404 (we don't store comment type — one wasted GET on the rarer review case).
- Reuses buildPullfrogFooter and updateProgressComment from pullfrog/internal,
  matching the wording the action used to write client-side.

Client side
- Delete action/utils/postCleanup.ts and action/post.ts.
- Remove post: + post-if: from action/action.yml.
- Drop runPostCleanup wiring from action/commands/gha.ts and action/play.ts.
- Remove the SIGTERM/saveState handler I added in main.ts in the previous commit
  (no longer needed; cancel/fail signal comes from the webhook hook payload).

Plumbing
- Extract isLeapingIntoActionCommentBody into action/utils/leapingComment.ts so
  the predicate can be re-exported via pullfrog/internal without dragging the
  MCP server's transitive type graph into the Next.js app's typecheck.
- mcp/comment.ts re-exports from the new location for backward compat.

Wiki
- Delete wiki/post-cleanup.md (obsolete; cleanup is now a one-liner branch in
  the workflow_run webhook handler).

* chore: ignore .worktrees in biome config

Recently-added pnpm worktree feature creates nested git worktrees under
.worktrees/, each with their own biome.jsonc declaring root. Biome's
recursive scan trips on the nested config and fails pnpm lint. Excluding
the directory matches the existing .gitignore entry.

* fix: address PR #594 review findings

Two real bugs caught by code review:

1. handleWorkflowRunWebhook.ts:323 — drop the /m flag on the stuck-comment
   detection regex. With /m, ^ matches any line start, so any finalized
   progress comment that embeds a task list (report_progress writes
   `- [x]`/`- [ ]` lines via todoTracking.ts) would be flagged as "stuck"
   and silently overwritten with the "This run croaked" boilerplate
   whenever the workflow concluded non-success after the agent's final
   summary already landed. Restores the body-start anchoring the original
   in-process postCleanup.ts:90 had.

2. action/scripts/check-entrypoint-imports.ts — drop ../post.ts from the
   esbuild entry-point list (the file was deleted in aa43b9af). The
   `pnpm check:entrypoints` step in test.yml would have failed on every
   run with an unresolvable-entry-point error.

Plus three small follow-ups:
- main.ts:580 — comment said "post-cleanup has its own verify-retry loop"
  but post-cleanup is gone. Updated to describe the new server-side path.
- mcp/comment.ts:443 — comment said "so post script doesn't think the run
  failed". Updated to describe the actual current consumers of wasUpdated.
- commands/gha.ts:84 — `--post` help text said "run post-cleanup flow" but
  with the post-cleanup path removed, --post is only valid alongside the
  `token` subcommand for installation-token revocation. Updated wording.

* fix(action): scope --post help text to gha token subcommand

Root gha help text was documenting --post, but --post only makes sense
paired with the token subcommand (it's how the post step revokes the
installation token previously acquired in the main step). Move it to a
dedicated gha token help section and add a parser layer that rejects
--post on the bare gha command.

  $ pullfrog gha --help
  usage: pullfrog gha [subcommand]
  ...
  options:
    -h, --help   show help

  $ pullfrog gha token --help
  usage: pullfrog gha token [--post]
  ...
  options:
    -h, --help   show help
    --post       revoke the previously-acquired token (post-step usage only)

* webhook: artifact-aware cleanup of stranded leaping comments on success

Previously the workflow_run.completed cleanup only handled non-success
conclusions. Extend it to also catch the rare case where a successful
run leaves a "Leaping into action…" comment stuck (in-process cleanup at
action/main.ts:723 normally handles this, but can be skipped on SIGKILL,
runner host crash, or any exit path that bypasses main()'s finally block).

New behavior in cleanupStuckProgressComment:

  - cancelled       → update with "cancelled 🛑" body  (unchanged)
  - failure (other) → update with "croaked 😵" body    (unchanged)
  - success + artifact recorded → delete the comment (the artifact is the
                                  user-facing surface; the leaping comment
                                  is just stale UI noise at this point)
  - success + no artifact recorded → delete the comment AND alert
                                     team@pullfrog.com via emailAlert

The "success + no artifact" path is "should never happen" territory: the
run claims success but produced no review, PR, issue, plan, or summary
comment. The team alert helps us catch in-process cleanup regressions or
artifact-tracking gaps. hasRecordedArtifact reads {review,pr,issue,
planComment,summaryComment}NodeId off the WorkflowRun row to make the call.

* webhook: narrow stuck-comment detection to leaping prefix only

Drop the stranded-todo-pattern branch from cleanupStuckProgressComment.
The leaping prefix is highly specific and impossible to confuse with a
legitimate summary; a leading todo line is not — the agent's
error-reporting paths can produce useful explanatory comments whose
body leads with a checklist (e.g. "here's what I was working on" + the
incomplete todo list), and we don't want to silently overwrite those
with the generic "croaked" boilerplate.

In-process cleanup at action/main.ts:723 still handles the stranded-todo
case in the common path (gated on !finalSummaryWritten with full access
to the in-memory tool state). Missing the rare runner-died-mid-todo case
server-side is a worthwhile trade vs. the false-positive risk on real
explanatory comments.
2026-05-07 18:59:52 +00:00

809 lines
32 KiB
TypeScript

// changes to tool permissions should be reflected in wiki/granular-tools.md
import { existsSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import * as core from "@actions/core";
import { deleteProgressComment, reportProgress } from "./mcp/comment.ts";
import { startInstallation } from "./mcp/dependencies.ts";
import {
initToolState,
startMcpHttpServer,
type ToolContext,
type ToolState,
} from "./mcp/server.ts";
import { computeModes } from "./modes.ts";
import {
type ActivityTimeout,
createProcessOutputActivityTimeout,
DEFAULT_ACTIVITY_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS,
DEFAULT_ACTIVITY_TIMEOUT_MS,
} from "./utils/activity.ts";
import { resolveAgent, resolveModel } from "./utils/agent.ts";
import { apiFetch } from "./utils/apiFetch.ts";
import { validateAgentApiKey } from "./utils/apiKeys.ts";
import { resolveBody } from "./utils/body.ts";
import { formatUsageSummary, log, writeSummary } from "./utils/cli.ts";
import { recordDiffReadFromToolUse } from "./utils/diffCoverage.ts";
import { reportErrorToComment } from "./utils/errorReport.ts";
import { onExitSignal } from "./utils/exitHandler.ts";
import { resolveGit, setGitAuthServer } from "./utils/gitAuth.ts";
import { startGitAuthServer } from "./utils/gitAuthServer.ts";
import { createOctokit, writeGitHubUsageSummaryToFile } from "./utils/github.ts";
import { resolveInstructions } from "./utils/instructions.ts";
import { executeLifecycleHook } from "./utils/lifecycle.ts";
import { normalizeEnv } from "./utils/normalizeEnv.ts";
import { aggregateUsage, patchWorkflowRunFields } from "./utils/patchWorkflowRunFields.ts";
import { resolvePayload, resolvePromptInput } from "./utils/payload.ts";
import { postReviewCleanup } from "./utils/reviewCleanup.ts";
import { handleAgentResult } from "./utils/run.ts";
import { type AccountPlan, isInfraCovered } from "./utils/runContext.ts";
import { resolveRunContextData } from "./utils/runContextData.ts";
import { setEnvAllowlist } from "./utils/secrets.ts";
import { createTempDirectory, setupGit } from "./utils/setup.ts";
import { killTrackedChildren } from "./utils/subprocess.ts";
import { resolveTimeoutMs, TIMEOUT_DISABLED } from "./utils/time.ts";
import { Timer } from "./utils/timer.ts";
import { createTodoTracker } from "./utils/todoTracking.ts";
import { getJobToken, resolveTokens } from "./utils/token.ts";
import { resolveRun } from "./utils/workflow.ts";
export { Inputs } from "./utils/payload.ts";
export interface MainResult {
success: boolean;
output?: string | undefined;
error?: string | undefined;
result?: string | undefined;
}
function resolveOutputSchema(): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {
const raw = core.getInput("output_schema");
if (!raw) return undefined;
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
} catch {
throw new Error(`invalid output_schema: not valid JSON`);
}
if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
throw new Error(`invalid output_schema: must be a JSON object`);
}
log.info("» structured output schema provided — output will be required");
return parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
}
function resolveTimeoutForLog(timeout: string | undefined): string {
if (!timeout) return "1h (default)";
if (timeout === TIMEOUT_DISABLED) return "none (disabled)";
return timeout;
}
function resolveModelForLog(ctx: {
payload: ResolvedPayload;
resolvedModel: string | undefined;
}): string {
const envModel = process.env.PULLFROG_MODEL?.trim();
if (envModel) return `${envModel} (override via PULLFROG_MODEL)`;
if (ctx.payload.proxyModel) return `${ctx.payload.proxyModel} (proxy)`;
if (ctx.resolvedModel && ctx.payload.model && ctx.payload.model !== ctx.resolvedModel) {
return `${ctx.resolvedModel} (resolved from ${ctx.payload.model})`;
}
if (ctx.resolvedModel) return ctx.resolvedModel;
if (ctx.payload.model) return `${ctx.payload.model} (unresolved)`;
return "auto";
}
function resolveAgentForLog(ctx: { agentName: string; resolvedModel: string | undefined }): string {
const envAgent = process.env.PULLFROG_AGENT?.trim();
if (envAgent && envAgent === ctx.agentName) {
return `${ctx.agentName} (override via PULLFROG_AGENT)`;
}
if (ctx.agentName === "claude" && ctx.resolvedModel) {
return `${ctx.agentName} (auto-selected for ${ctx.resolvedModel})`;
}
return ctx.agentName;
}
import type { ResolvedPayload } from "./utils/payload.ts";
interface OidcCredentials {
requestUrl: string;
requestToken: string;
}
/**
* Billing-layer error surfaced from `/api/proxy-token` as a 402. User-actionable
* — distinct from TransientError (503 / transient sync issue) so the job
* summary + PR comment can use affirmative "you need to do X" copy rather than
* the ambiguous "billing error" label that makes transient outages look like
* the user's fault.
*
* `code` is a server-side discriminator: `router_requires_card` (no card + no
* wallet balance on Router), or null for unclassified. `declineCode` is
* Stripe's more specific sub-reason on `card_declined` (e.g.
* `insufficient_funds`, `lost_card`). `needsReauthentication` is the 3DS case
* broken out for convenience.
*/
class BillingError extends Error {
code: string | null;
declineCode: string | null;
needsReauthentication: boolean;
constructor(
message: string,
opts: {
code?: string | null;
declineCode?: string | null;
needsReauthentication?: boolean;
} = {}
) {
super(message);
this.name = "BillingError";
this.code = opts.code ?? null;
this.declineCode = opts.declineCode ?? null;
this.needsReauthentication = opts.needsReauthentication ?? false;
}
}
/**
* Transient service failures from `/api/proxy-token` (503: partial OpenRouter
* usage sync, DB flake, in-flight payment intent). Not the user's fault — the
* summary uses "temporarily unavailable" framing, and the non-zero exit lets
* GH Actions apply whatever retry policy the workflow has configured.
*/
class TransientError extends Error {
constructor(message: string) {
super(message);
this.name = "TransientError";
}
}
/**
* Render a BillingError as user-facing markdown (shared between GH job summary
* and the PR progress comment). Branches:
*
* - `router_requires_card`: the user is on Router mode with no card AND
* no wallet balance. Points at the add-card flow in the console.
* - `needsReauthentication` (Stripe `authentication_required` decline): the
* issuer requires a 3D Secure challenge on each off-session charge —
* re-adding the card won't help because the issuer's policy persists
* across credentials. The escape valve is a manual top-up from the
* dashboard, where 3DS runs interactively inside Stripe Checkout.
* - default: generic "manage billing" with the declineCode appended if
* classified (insufficient_funds, lost_card, generic_decline, etc).
*/
function formatBillingErrorSummary(error: BillingError): string {
if (error.code === "router_requires_card") {
return [
"### ⛔ Pullfrog Router requires a card",
"",
"This run was going to use Pullfrog Router, which bills at raw OpenRouter cost and needs a card on file. Runs won't proceed until a card is added.",
"",
"[Add a card →](https://pullfrog.com/console#model-access) — your first $20 of Router usage is free.",
].join("\n");
}
if (error.needsReauthentication) {
return [
"### ❌ Pullfrog billing error — card requires 3DS on every charge",
"",
`Your card issuer requires a 3D Secure challenge on each off-session charge (\`${error.declineCode ?? "authentication_required"}\`), which we can't run from the agent. Top up your Router credit balance manually — 3DS runs interactively in Stripe Checkout, and subsequent runs draw from the prepaid balance without triggering another off-session charge.`,
"",
"[Top up your Router credit balance →](https://pullfrog.com/console)",
].join("\n");
}
const codeSuffix = error.declineCode ? ` (\`${error.declineCode}\`)` : "";
return `### ❌ Pullfrog billing error\n\n${error.message}${codeSuffix}\n\n[Manage billing →](https://pullfrog.com/console)`;
}
/**
* Render a TransientError as user-facing markdown. Distinct framing from
* BillingError so the user doesn't read "❌" and assume their card failed.
*/
function formatTransientErrorSummary(error: TransientError): string {
return [
"### ⚠️ Pullfrog temporarily unavailable",
"",
error.message,
"",
"This is typically transient — the next dispatch should succeed. If it persists, check [status.pullfrog.com](https://status.pullfrog.com).",
].join("\n");
}
async function mintProxyKey(ctx: { oidcCredentials: OidcCredentials }): Promise<string | null> {
try {
process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL = ctx.oidcCredentials.requestUrl;
process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN = ctx.oidcCredentials.requestToken;
const oidcToken = await core.getIDToken("pullfrog-api");
delete process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL;
delete process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN;
const response = await apiFetch({
path: "/api/proxy-token",
method: "POST",
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${oidcToken}` },
});
if (response.status === 402) {
const body = (await response.json().catch(() => null)) as {
error?: string;
code?: string;
declineCode?: string;
needsReauthentication?: boolean;
} | null;
throw new BillingError(body?.error ?? "insufficient balance", {
code: body?.code ?? null,
declineCode: body?.declineCode ?? null,
needsReauthentication: body?.needsReauthentication ?? false,
});
}
// 503 = transient sync issue (partial OpenRouter failure, DB flake,
// in-flight top-up). Not the user's fault — TransientError renders a
// "temporarily unavailable" summary instead of the "billing error"
// label that BillingError uses.
if (response.status === 503) {
const body = (await response.json().catch(() => null)) as { error?: string } | null;
throw new TransientError(
body?.error ?? "billing service temporarily unavailable — retry shortly"
);
}
if (!response.ok) {
log.warning(`proxy key mint failed (${response.status})`);
return null;
}
const data = (await response.json()) as { key: string };
return data.key;
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof BillingError) throw error;
if (error instanceof TransientError) throw error;
log.warning(`proxy key mint error: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`);
return null;
} finally {
delete process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL;
delete process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN;
}
}
async function resolveProxyModel(ctx: {
payload: ResolvedPayload;
oss: boolean;
plan: AccountPlan;
proxyModel?: string | undefined;
oidcCredentials: OidcCredentials | null;
}): Promise<void> {
// env override = BYOK escape hatch, don't proxy
if (process.env.PULLFROG_MODEL?.trim()) return;
const needsProxy = isInfraCovered({ isOss: ctx.oss, plan: ctx.plan }) && ctx.proxyModel;
if (!needsProxy) return;
if (!ctx.oidcCredentials) {
log.warning("» proxy requested but no OIDC credentials available — skipping");
return;
}
const key = await mintProxyKey({ oidcCredentials: ctx.oidcCredentials });
if (!key) return;
process.env.OPENROUTER_API_KEY = key;
core.setSecret(key);
ctx.payload.proxyModel = ctx.proxyModel;
const label = ctx.oss ? "oss" : "router";
log.info(`» proxy: ${label}${ctx.proxyModel}`);
}
async function writeJobSummary(toolState: ToolState): Promise<void> {
const usageSummary = formatUsageSummary(toolState.usageEntries);
const summaryParts = [toolState.lastProgressBody, usageSummary].filter(Boolean);
if (summaryParts.length > 0) {
await writeSummary(summaryParts.join("\n\n"));
}
}
export async function main(): Promise<MainResult> {
// normalize env var names to uppercase (handles case-insensitive workflow files)
normalizeEnv();
// write usage summary on SIGINT/SIGTERM so the worker can read it after sandbox.exec
const usageSummaryPath = process.env.PULLFROG_USAGE_SUMMARY_PATH;
if (usageSummaryPath) {
onExitSignal(() => writeGitHubUsageSummaryToFile(usageSummaryPath));
}
const timer = new Timer();
let activityTimeout: ActivityTimeout | null = null;
let safetyNetTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined;
// parse prompt early to extract progressComment for toolState
const resolvedPromptInput = resolvePromptInput();
const toolState = initToolState({
progressComment:
typeof resolvedPromptInput !== "string" ? resolvedPromptInput.progressComment : undefined,
});
// resolve and fingerprint git binary before any agent code runs
resolveGit();
// get job token for initial API calls
const jobToken = getJobToken();
const initialOctokit = createOctokit(jobToken);
const runContext = await resolveRunContextData({ octokit: initialOctokit, token: jobToken });
timer.checkpoint("runContextData");
// inject account-level secrets into process.env (YAML secrets take precedence)
if (runContext.dbSecrets) {
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(runContext.dbSecrets)) {
if (!process.env[key]) {
process.env[key] = value;
core.setSecret(value);
}
}
const count = Object.keys(runContext.dbSecrets).length;
if (count > 0) log.info(`» ${count} db secret(s) loaded`);
}
// configure env allowlist for subprocess filtering
if (runContext.repoSettings.envAllowlist) {
setEnvAllowlist(runContext.repoSettings.envAllowlist);
}
// resolve payload to determine shell permission
const payload = resolvePayload(resolvedPromptInput, runContext.repoSettings);
toolState.model = payload.model;
if (payload.event.trigger === "pull_request_synchronize") {
toolState.beforeSha = payload.event.before_sha;
}
// resolve tokens first — acquireNewToken needs OIDC env vars for token exchange
await using tokenRef = await resolveTokens({ push: payload.push });
// stash OIDC credentials in memory before wiping from process.env
// the agent's shell commands can't access JS variables, so this is safe
const oidcCredentials: OidcCredentials | null =
process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL && process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN
? {
requestUrl: process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL,
requestToken: process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN,
}
: null;
// clear OIDC env vars in restricted mode to prevent agent from minting tokens
if (payload.shell !== "enabled") {
delete process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL;
delete process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN;
}
// Proxy decision: mint an OpenRouter key for OSS repos or managed billing
// accounts. BillingError (402) and TransientError (503) both surface here.
// Handle explicitly so the user sees an actionable message (job summary +
// PR progress comment when one exists) — otherwise the error unwinds past
// the main try/catch (which needs toolState) and lands in runMain with only
// a generic core.setFailed.
try {
await resolveProxyModel({
payload,
oss: runContext.oss,
plan: runContext.plan,
proxyModel: runContext.proxyModel,
oidcCredentials,
});
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof BillingError) {
const summary = formatBillingErrorSummary(error);
await writeSummary(summary).catch(() => {});
// Mirror to the PR progress comment if the trigger created one
// (mention / PR event). Without this, auto-reload declines are only
// visible in the job summary — users rarely open that, so the agent
// just appears to silently stop mid-run.
await reportErrorToComment({ toolState, error: summary }).catch(() => {});
throw error;
}
if (error instanceof TransientError) {
const summary = formatTransientErrorSummary(error);
await writeSummary(summary).catch(() => {});
await reportErrorToComment({ toolState, error: summary }).catch(() => {});
throw error;
}
throw error;
}
// create octokit with MCP token for GitHub API calls
const octokit = createOctokit(tokenRef.mcpToken);
const runInfo = await resolveRun({ octokit });
let toolContext: ToolContext | undefined;
let progressCallbackDisabled = false;
let todoTracker: ReturnType<typeof createTodoTracker> | undefined;
try {
if (payload.cwd && process.cwd() !== payload.cwd) {
process.chdir(payload.cwd);
}
// resolve body - fetches body_html and converts to markdown if images present
// this ensures agents receive markdown with working signed image URLs
const originalBody = payload.event.body;
const resolvedBody = await resolveBody({
event: payload.event,
octokit,
repo: runContext.repo,
});
if (resolvedBody !== originalBody) {
payload.event.body = resolvedBody;
// also update prompt if original body was included there
if (originalBody && payload.prompt.includes(originalBody)) {
payload.prompt = payload.prompt.replace(originalBody, resolvedBody ?? "");
}
}
const tmpdir = createTempDirectory();
await using gitAuthServer = await startGitAuthServer(tmpdir);
setGitAuthServer(gitAuthServer);
const resolvedModel = payload.proxyModel ? undefined : resolveModel({ slug: payload.model });
const agent = resolveAgent({ model: resolvedModel });
validateAgentApiKey({
agent,
model: payload.proxyModel ?? resolvedModel ?? payload.model,
owner: runContext.repo.owner,
name: runContext.repo.name,
});
await setupGit({
gitToken: tokenRef.gitToken,
owner: runContext.repo.owner,
name: runContext.repo.name,
octokit,
toolState,
shell: payload.shell,
postCheckoutScript: runContext.repoSettings.postCheckoutScript,
});
timer.checkpoint("git");
// execute setup lifecycle hook (runs once at initialization).
// setup is load-bearing — if it fails the rest of the run is in an
// undefined state, so upgrade the soft-fail warning to a hard error.
const setupHook = await executeLifecycleHook({
event: "setup",
script: runContext.repoSettings.setupScript,
});
if (setupHook.warning) {
throw new Error(setupHook.warning);
}
timer.checkpoint("lifecycleHooks::setup");
const agentId = agent.name;
const modes = [...computeModes(agentId), ...runContext.repoSettings.modes];
const outputSchema = resolveOutputSchema();
// mcpServerUrl and tmpdir are set after server starts
toolContext = {
agentId,
repo: runContext.repo,
payload,
octokit,
githubInstallationToken: tokenRef.mcpToken,
gitToken: tokenRef.gitToken,
apiToken: runContext.apiToken,
modes,
postCheckoutScript: runContext.repoSettings.postCheckoutScript,
prepushScript: runContext.repoSettings.prepushScript,
prApproveEnabled: runContext.repoSettings.prApproveEnabled,
modeInstructions: runContext.repoSettings.modeInstructions,
toolState,
runId: runInfo.runId,
jobId: runInfo.jobId,
mcpServerUrl: "",
tmpdir,
oss: runContext.oss,
plan: runContext.plan,
resolvedModel,
};
await using mcpHttpServer = await startMcpHttpServer(toolContext, { outputSchema });
toolContext.mcpServerUrl = mcpHttpServer.url;
log.info(`» MCP server started at ${mcpHttpServer.url}`);
timer.checkpoint("mcpServer");
startInstallation(toolContext);
const modelForLog = resolveModelForLog({ payload, resolvedModel });
const agentForLog = resolveAgentForLog({ agentName: agent.name, resolvedModel });
const timeoutForLog = resolveTimeoutForLog(payload.timeout);
log.info(`» model: ${modelForLog}`);
log.info(`» agent: ${agentForLog}`);
log.info(`» push: ${payload.push}`);
log.info(`» shell: ${payload.shell}`);
log.info(`» timeout: ${timeoutForLog}`);
const instructions = resolveInstructions({
payload,
repo: runContext.repo,
modes,
agentId,
outputSchema,
learnings: runContext.repoSettings.learnings,
});
const logParts = [
instructions.eventInstructions
? `EVENT-LEVEL INSTRUCTIONS:\n${instructions.eventInstructions}`
: null,
instructions.user ? `USER REQUEST:\n${instructions.user}` : null,
instructions.event,
].filter(Boolean);
log.box(logParts.join("\n\n---\n\n"), {
title: "Instructions",
});
log.group("View full prompt", () => {
log.info(instructions.full);
});
// OpenCode loads .opencode/plugin/ files at startup. if the repo has any,
// eagerly await dependency installation so plugin imports can resolve.
if (agentId === "opencode") {
const pluginDir = join(process.cwd(), ".opencode", "plugin");
const hasPlugins =
existsSync(pluginDir) && readdirSync(pluginDir).some((f) => /\.[jt]sx?$/.test(f));
if (hasPlugins && toolState.dependencyInstallation?.promise) {
log.info(
"» .opencode/plugin/ detected — awaiting dependency installation before agent start"
);
await toolState.dependencyInstallation.promise.catch(() => {});
timer.checkpoint("awaitDepsForPlugins");
}
}
// run agent, optionally with timeout enforcement
activityTimeout = createProcessOutputActivityTimeout({
timeoutMs: DEFAULT_ACTIVITY_TIMEOUT_MS,
checkIntervalMs: DEFAULT_ACTIVITY_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS,
});
activityTimeout.promise.catch(() => {}); // prevent unhandled rejection if agent wins race
todoTracker = createTodoTracker(async (body) => {
if (progressCallbackDisabled || !toolContext) return;
try {
await reportProgress(toolContext, { body });
} catch (err) {
log.debug(`progress update failed: ${err}`);
}
});
toolState.todoTracker = todoTracker;
// on cancellation, stop scheduling new tracker writes immediately. without this, a
// debounced write queued just before SIGTERM could land at GitHub *after* the
// workflow_run.completed webhook has already replaced the comment with the
// "This run was cancelled" body, clobbering it back to the task list. we can't
// await in-flight writes (the process is exiting), but cancelling the timer
// shrinks the race window.
onExitSignal(() => {
todoTracker?.cancel();
});
// when the agent subprocess is killed for inner activity timeout, stop
// the MCP HTTP server so mcp-proxy's SSE reconnect attempts don't keep
// the outer activity timer alive. start a short safety-net timer — if
// the agent promise hasn't resolved within 5min after the inner kill,
// force-reject the outer timer so the run can exit.
let innerTimeoutFired = false;
const onInnerActivityTimeout = () => {
if (innerTimeoutFired) return;
innerTimeoutFired = true;
log.info(
"» inner activity timeout fired — stopping MCP server and starting 5min safety-net timer"
);
// fire and forget — the server's dispose is idempotent so the
// `await using` cleanup at block exit is still safe.
mcpHttpServer[Symbol.asyncDispose]().catch((err) => {
log.debug(
`mcp server stop after inner kill failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`
);
});
safetyNetTimer = setTimeout(
() => {
activityTimeout?.forceReject(
"agent still pending 5min after inner activity kill — forcing exit"
);
},
5 * 60 * 1000
);
safetyNetTimer.unref?.();
};
const agentPromise = agent.run({
payload,
resolvedModel,
mcpServerUrl: mcpHttpServer.url,
tmpdir,
instructions,
todoTracker,
stopScript: runContext.repoSettings.stopScript,
onActivityTimeout: onInnerActivityTimeout,
onToolUse: (event) => {
const wasTracked = recordDiffReadFromToolUse({
state: toolState.diffCoverage,
toolName: event.toolName,
input: event.input,
cwd: process.cwd(),
});
if (!wasTracked) return;
const trackedRanges = toolState.diffCoverage?.coveredRanges ?? [];
log.debug(
`» diff coverage tracked from tool ${event.toolName} (${trackedRanges.length} merged range${trackedRanges.length === 1 ? "" : "s"})`
);
},
});
// symmetric with the activityTimeout/timeoutPromise catches below: if a
// timeout wins the race, agentPromise is stranded and its later rejection
// becomes an unhandled rejection. node 15+ terminates the process on
// unhandled rejection by default, which would kill main() mid-cleanup and
// lose the error-reporting / usage-summary work that follows. the race
// still sees the rejection (the original promise is shared); this catch
// only keeps node from treating a post-race rejection as unobserved.
agentPromise.catch(() => {});
// timeout enforcement: default is 1 hour, but can be overridden via flags in the prompt:
// - --timeout=2h (or any duration like "--timeout=30m", "--timeout=1h30m") to set a custom timeout
// - --notimeout to disable timeout entirely
let result: Awaited<typeof agentPromise>;
if (payload.timeout === TIMEOUT_DISABLED) {
result = await Promise.race([agentPromise, activityTimeout.promise]);
} else {
// resolveTimeoutMs rejects unparseable / zero / setTimeout-overflow inputs
// so a bad string can't silently resolve to an instant timeout. fall back
// to the 1h default with a warning — users who want runtime measured in
// weeks should use --notimeout.
const usable = resolveTimeoutMs(payload.timeout);
if (payload.timeout && usable === null) {
log.warning(`invalid timeout "${payload.timeout}" (use --notimeout to disable), using 1h`);
}
const timeoutMs = usable ?? 3600000;
const actualTimeout = usable !== null ? payload.timeout : "1h";
let timeoutId: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined;
const timeoutPromise = new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {
reject(new Error(`agent run timed out after ${actualTimeout}`));
}, timeoutMs);
});
timeoutPromise.catch(() => {}); // prevent unhandled rejection if agent wins race
try {
result = await Promise.race([agentPromise, timeoutPromise, activityTimeout.promise]);
} finally {
clearTimeout(timeoutId);
}
}
// accumulate top-level agent usage
if (result.usage) {
toolState.usageEntries.push(result.usage);
}
// validate this before writing job summary to avoid masking the error
if (outputSchema && !toolState.output) {
throw new Error(
"output_schema was provided but agent did not call set_output — structured output is required"
);
}
// post-agent review cleanup: reportReviewNodeId → follow-up re-review dispatch.
// runs after the agent exits so ordering is architecturally guaranteed (no LLM involvement).
// best-effort: cleanup failures must not turn a successful agent run into a failure.
//
// note: progress-comment deletion on review submission is owned by
// create_pull_request_review (action/mcp/review.ts) and runs atomically
// with the submission, so it survives any path out of main (success,
// timeout, crash) without relying on cleanup ordering here.
if (toolContext) {
await postReviewCleanup(toolContext).catch((error) => {
log.debug(`post-review cleanup failed: ${error}`);
});
}
// clean up stranded progress comments. the comment is stale unless
// report_progress wrote a final summary to it — three sub-cases all reduce
// to !finalSummaryWritten:
// 1. nothing wrote to the comment ("Leaping into action" orphan)
// 2. tracker published a checklist but the agent never finalized it
// 3. the agent produced a substantive artifact via another MCP write tool
// (create_issue_comment, update_pull_request_body, reply_to_review_comment)
// and skipped report_progress — wasUpdated is true, but the progress
// comment itself was never touched.
// create_pull_request_review owns its own deletion (see action/mcp/review.ts),
// so progressComment is already null by the time we get here for that path.
// uses finalSummaryWritten (not todoTracker.enabled or wasUpdated) so cleanup
// survives API failures in report_progress where cancel() ran but the write
// didn't succeed, and isn't fooled by writes to *other* artifacts.
if (toolContext && toolState.progressComment && !toolState.finalSummaryWritten) {
await deleteProgressComment(toolContext).catch((error) => {
log.debug(`stranded progress comment cleanup failed: ${error}`);
});
}
await writeJobSummary(toolState);
// emit structured output marker for test validation
if (toolState.output) {
log.info(`::pullfrog-output::${Buffer.from(toolState.output).toString("base64")}`);
core.setOutput("result", toolState.output);
}
return await handleAgentResult({
result,
toolState,
silent: payload.event.silent ?? false,
});
} catch (error) {
const errorMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : "unknown error occurred";
progressCallbackDisabled = true;
todoTracker?.cancel();
killTrackedChildren();
log.error(errorMessage);
// best-effort summary — write the error so it's visible in the Actions summary tab
try {
const errorSummary = `### ❌ Pullfrog failed\n\n\`\`\`\n${errorMessage}\n\`\`\``;
const usageSummary = formatUsageSummary(toolState.usageEntries);
const parts = [errorSummary, toolState.lastProgressBody, usageSummary].filter(Boolean);
await writeSummary(parts.join("\n\n"));
} catch {}
try {
await reportErrorToComment({ toolState, error: errorMessage });
} catch {
// error reporting failed, but don't let it mask the original error
}
// best-effort review cleanup (e.g., agent timed out after submitting a review)
if (toolContext) {
await postReviewCleanup(toolContext).catch((error) => {
log.debug(`post-review cleanup failed: ${error}`);
});
}
return {
success: false,
error: errorMessage,
};
} finally {
activityTimeout?.stop();
if (safetyNetTimer) clearTimeout(safetyNetTimer);
if (usageSummaryPath) {
// a write error here (ENOSPC, EACCES, dirname removed) must not mask
// either the try's successful return or the catch's error return.
// the summary is informational — log and move on.
try {
await writeGitHubUsageSummaryToFile(usageSummaryPath);
} catch (err) {
log.debug(
`failed to write usage summary to ${usageSummaryPath}: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`
);
}
}
// persist aggregated token + cost usage to the WorkflowRun row.
// this is the single shared cleanup path across every agent implementation:
// each agent harness returns a single AgentUsage from agent.run() that
// already aggregates its internal retries via mergeAgentUsage, and the
// success branch above pushes that entry into toolState.usageEntries.
// aggregateUsage sums across those entries (one per agent.run()).
//
// caveat: if the agent promise rejected (timeout or uncaught throw) the
// usage was never pushed, so nothing gets persisted for that run. runs
// that returned AgentResult with success=false still report their partial
// usage because the harness populates AgentUsage before returning.
if (toolContext) {
const patch = aggregateUsage(toolState.usageEntries);
if (Object.keys(patch).length > 0) {
await patchWorkflowRunFields(toolContext, patch);
}
}
}
}