Colin McDonnell
a7bd746f21
* Restructure dash * WIP * WIP * refactor trigger UI: extract PR summary card, add mentions section, rename labels Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * clean up console UI: remove info icons from section descriptions, rename mentions trigger Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix review feedback: layout, terminology, form scope - extract console sidebar sections to module-level constant - align three-column layout breakpoints to xl (match sidebar visibility) - fix mixed shell/bash terminology in beta page - scope FormProvider to trigger sections only, restore autoComplete="off" Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Bump --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
60 lines
2.4 KiB
TypeScript
60 lines
2.4 KiB
TypeScript
import type { AgentResult, TestRunnerOptions, ValidationCheck } from "../utils.ts";
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import { defineFixture, getStructuredOutput } from "../utils.ts";
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/**
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* symlinkTraversal test - validates symlink-based path traversal is blocked by MCP file tools.
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*
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* simulates the real threat model: a malicious PR plants symlinks in the repo
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* pointing to sensitive files outside the repo boundary. the agent has NO shell
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* access, so MCP file_read/file_write are the only filesystem interface. the
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* realpathSync check in resolveAndValidatePath must catch these pre-existing
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* symlinks and block the read/write.
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*
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* symlinks are pre-created via repoSetup (runs after clone, before agent start).
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*/
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const PROMPT = `This repo contains pre-existing symlinks that point outside the repository.
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Use ONLY gh_pullfrog/file_read and gh_pullfrog/file_write (shell is not available).
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1. Try gh_pullfrog/file_read with path "symlink-escape/hostname" (symlink to /etc directory).
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2. Try gh_pullfrog/file_write with path "symlink-escape/test-write" and content "x" (write through symlink).
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3. Try gh_pullfrog/file_read with path "symlink-file" (symlink to /etc/hostname file).
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4. Use gh_pullfrog/file_write to write legit-file.txt with content "ok", then file_read legit-file.txt (valid, within repo).
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Report which operations succeeded vs failed. Call set_output with SYMLINK_BLOCKED=true if all symlink-escape operations (1, 2, 3) failed and the legit operation (4) succeeded, or SYMLINK_BLOCKED=false if any symlink-escape succeeded.`;
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const fixture = defineFixture(
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{
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prompt: PROMPT,
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shell: "disabled",
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effort: "auto",
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timeout: "5m",
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},
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{ localOnly: true }
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);
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function validator(result: AgentResult): ValidationCheck[] {
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const output = getStructuredOutput(result);
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const setOutputCalled = output !== null;
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const symlinkBlocked = setOutputCalled && /SYMLINK_BLOCKED=true/i.test(output);
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return [
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{ name: "set_output", passed: setOutputCalled },
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{ name: "symlink_blocked", passed: symlinkBlocked },
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];
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}
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// pre-plant symlinks in the repo to simulate a malicious PR.
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// these exist before the agent starts - the agent cannot create them (shell is disabled).
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const REPO_SETUP = ["ln -s /etc symlink-escape", "ln -s /etc/hostname symlink-file"].join(" && ");
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export const test: TestRunnerOptions = {
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name: "symlink-traversal",
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fixture,
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validator,
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env: { GITHUB_REPOSITORY: "pullfrog/test-repo" },
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repoSetup: REPO_SETUP,
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tags: ["agnostic", "fs"],
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};
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