Merge pull request #19 from pullfrog/custom-bash
Switch to custom Bash tool. Mask secrets from Bash subprocs.
This commit is contained in:
Colin McDonnell
+1
-1
@@ -46,4 +46,4 @@ examples
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.temp/
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dist
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.pnpm-store/
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.pnpm-store/
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+7
-12
@@ -21,28 +21,23 @@ export const claude = agent({
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const prompt = addInstructions({ payload, repo });
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log.group("Full prompt", () => log.info(prompt));
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// configure sandbox mode if enabled
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// SECURITY: For PUBLIC repos, Claude Code spawns subprocesses with full process.env, leaking API keys.
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// disable native Bash; agents use MCP bash tool which filters secrets.
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// for private repos, native Bash is allowed since secrets are less exposed.
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const disallowedTools = repo.isPublic ? ["Bash"] : [];
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const sandboxOptions: Options = payload.sandbox
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? {
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permissionMode: "default",
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disallowedTools: ["Bash", "WebSearch", "WebFetch", "Write"],
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async canUseTool(toolName, input, _options) {
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if (toolName.startsWith("mcp__gh_pullfrog__"))
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return {
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behavior: "allow",
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updatedInput: input,
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updatedPermissions: [],
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};
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console.error("can i use this tool?", toolName);
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return {
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behavior: "deny",
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message: "You are not allowed to use this tool.",
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};
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return { behavior: "allow", updatedInput: input, updatedPermissions: [] };
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return { behavior: "deny", message: "tool not allowed in sandbox mode" };
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},
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}
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: {
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permissionMode: "bypassPermissions" as const,
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disallowedTools,
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};
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if (payload.sandbox) {
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+57
-42
@@ -1,15 +1,55 @@
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import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
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import { mkdirSync } from "node:fs";
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import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
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import { join } from "node:path";
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import type { McpHttpServerConfig } from "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk";
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import { Codex, type CodexOptions, type ThreadEvent } from "@openai/codex-sdk";
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import { log } from "../utils/cli.ts";
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import { addInstructions } from "./instructions.ts";
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import {
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agent,
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type ConfigureMcpServersParams,
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installFromNpmTarball,
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setupProcessAgentEnv,
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} from "./shared.ts";
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import { agent, installFromNpmTarball, setupProcessAgentEnv } from "./shared.ts";
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interface WriteCodexConfigParams {
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tempHome: string;
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mcpServers: Record<string, McpHttpServerConfig>;
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isPublicRepo: boolean;
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}
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function writeCodexConfig({ tempHome, mcpServers, isPublicRepo }: WriteCodexConfigParams): string {
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const codexDir = join(tempHome, ".codex");
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mkdirSync(codexDir, { recursive: true });
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const configPath = join(codexDir, "config.toml");
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// build MCP servers section
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const mcpServerSections: string[] = [];
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for (const [name, config] of Object.entries(mcpServers)) {
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if (config.type !== "http") continue;
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log.info(`» Adding MCP server '${name}' at ${config.url}`);
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mcpServerSections.push(`[mcp_servers.${name}]\nurl = "${config.url}"`);
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}
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// SECURITY: for public repos, enforce env filtering via shell_environment_policy
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// this prevents vuln if user's ~/.codex/config.toml has ignore_default_excludes=true
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// for private repos, no filtering - agents use native shell with full env access
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const shellPolicy = isPublicRepo
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? `[shell_environment_policy]
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ignore_default_excludes = false`
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: "";
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writeFileSync(
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configPath,
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`# written by pullfrog
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${shellPolicy}
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${mcpServerSections.join("\n\n")}
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`.trim() + "\n"
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);
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if (isPublicRepo) {
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log.info(`» Codex config written to ${configPath} (env filtering: enabled)`);
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} else {
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log.info(`» Codex config written to ${configPath} (private repo: no env filtering)`);
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}
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return codexDir;
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}
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export const codex = agent({
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name: "codex",
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@@ -21,18 +61,24 @@ export const codex = agent({
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});
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},
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run: async ({ payload, mcpServers, apiKey, cliPath, repo }) => {
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// create config directory for codex before setting HOME
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const tempHome = process.env.PULLFROG_TEMP_DIR!;
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// create config directory for codex before setting HOME
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const configDir = join(tempHome, ".config", "codex");
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mkdirSync(configDir, { recursive: true });
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const codexDir = writeCodexConfig({
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tempHome,
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mcpServers,
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isPublicRepo: repo.isPublic,
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});
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setupProcessAgentEnv({
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OPENAI_API_KEY: apiKey,
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HOME: tempHome,
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CODEX_HOME: codexDir, // point Codex to our config directory
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});
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configureCodexMcpServers({ mcpServers, cliPath });
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// Configure Codex
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const codexOptions: CodexOptions = {
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apiKey,
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@@ -44,7 +90,6 @@ export const codex = agent({
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}
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const codex = new Codex(codexOptions);
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// valid sandbox modes: read-only, workspace-write, danger-full-access
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const thread = codex.startThread(
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payload.sandbox
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? {
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@@ -186,33 +231,3 @@ const messageHandlers: {
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log.error(`Error: ${event.message}`);
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},
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};
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/**
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* Configure MCP servers for Codex using the CLI.
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* For HTTP-based servers, use: codex mcp add <name> --url <url>
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*/
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function configureCodexMcpServers({ mcpServers, cliPath }: ConfigureMcpServersParams): void {
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for (const [serverName, serverConfig] of Object.entries(mcpServers)) {
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if (serverConfig.type === "http") {
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// HTTP-based MCP server - use --url flag
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const addArgs = ["mcp", "add", serverName, "--url", serverConfig.url];
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log.info(`Adding MCP server '${serverName}' at ${serverConfig.url}...`);
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const addResult = spawnSync("node", [cliPath, ...addArgs], {
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stdio: "pipe",
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encoding: "utf-8",
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});
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if (addResult.status !== 0) {
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throw new Error(
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`codex mcp add failed: ${addResult.stderr || addResult.stdout || "Unknown error"}`
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);
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}
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log.info(`✓ MCP server '${serverName}' configured`);
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} else {
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throw new Error(
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`Unsupported MCP server type for Codex: ${(serverConfig as any).type || "unknown"}`
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);
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}
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}
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}
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+26
-19
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ export const cursor = agent({
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},
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run: async ({ payload, apiKey, cliPath, mcpServers, repo }) => {
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configureCursorMcpServers({ mcpServers, cliPath });
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configureCursorSandbox({ sandbox: payload.sandbox ?? false });
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configureCursorSandbox({ sandbox: payload.sandbox ?? false, isPublicRepo: repo.isPublic });
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// track logged model_call_ids to avoid duplicates
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// cursor emits each assistant message twice: once without model_call_id, then again with it
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@@ -314,39 +314,46 @@ function configureCursorMcpServers({ mcpServers }: ConfigureMcpServersParams) {
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/**
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* Configure Cursor CLI sandbox mode via cli-config.json.
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* When sandbox is enabled, denies all file writes and shell commands.
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* In print mode without --force, writes are blocked by default, but we add
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* explicit deny rules as defense in depth.
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*
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* See: https://cursor.com/docs/cli/reference/permissions
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* SECURITY: For PUBLIC repos, Cursor spawns subprocesses with full process.env, leaking API keys.
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* We deny native Shell via Shell(*) rule, forcing use of MCP bash tool which
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* filters secrets. Note: Shell(**) does NOT work, must use Shell(*).
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* For private repos, native Shell is allowed.
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*
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* Config path: $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/cursor/ (not ~/.cursor/) because createAgentEnv
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* sets XDG_CONFIG_HOME=$HOME/.config. See issues/cursor-perms.md.
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*/
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function configureCursorSandbox({ sandbox }: { sandbox: boolean }): void {
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function configureCursorSandbox({
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sandbox,
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isPublicRepo,
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}: {
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sandbox: boolean;
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isPublicRepo: boolean;
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}): void {
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const realHome = homedir();
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const cursorConfigDir = join(realHome, ".cursor");
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const cursorConfigDir = join(realHome, ".config", "cursor");
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const cliConfigPath = join(cursorConfigDir, "cli-config.json");
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mkdirSync(cursorConfigDir, { recursive: true });
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// deny native shell for public repos to prevent secret leakage
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const denyShell = isPublicRepo ? ["Shell(*)"] : [];
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const config = sandbox
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? {
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// sandbox mode: deny all writes and shell commands
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permissions: {
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allow: [
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"Read(**)", // allow reading all files
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],
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deny: [
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"Write(**)", // deny all file writes
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"Shell(**)", // deny all shell commands
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],
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allow: ["Read(**)"],
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deny: ["Write(**)", ...denyShell],
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},
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}
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: {
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// normal mode: allow everything
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permissions: {
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allow: ["Read(**)", "Write(**)", "Shell(**)"],
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deny: [],
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allow: ["Read(**)", "Write(**)"],
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deny: denyShell,
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},
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};
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writeFileSync(cliConfigPath, JSON.stringify(config, null, 2), "utf-8");
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log.info(`» CLI config written to ${cliConfigPath} (sandbox: ${sandbox})`);
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log.info(
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`» CLI config written to ${cliConfigPath} (sandbox: ${sandbox}, isPublicRepo: ${isPublicRepo})`
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);
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}
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+40
-21
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ export const gemini = agent({
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});
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},
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run: async ({ payload, apiKey, mcpServers, cliPath, repo }) => {
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configureGeminiMcpServers({ mcpServers, cliPath });
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configureGeminiMcpServers({ mcpServers, isPublicRepo: repo.isPublic });
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if (!apiKey) {
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throw new Error("google_api_key or gemini_api_key is required for gemini agent");
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@@ -166,34 +166,41 @@ export const gemini = agent({
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const sessionPrompt = addInstructions({ payload, repo });
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log.group("Full prompt", () => log.info(sessionPrompt));
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// configure sandbox mode if enabled
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// --allowed-tools restricts which tools are available (removes others from registry entirely)
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// in sandbox mode: only read-only tools available (no write_file, run_shell_command, web_fetch)
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const args = payload.sandbox
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? [
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"--allowed-tools",
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"read_file,list_directory,search_file_content,glob,save_memory,write_todos",
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"--allowed-mcp-server-names",
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"gh_pullfrog",
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"--output-format=stream-json",
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"-p",
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sessionPrompt,
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]
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: ["--yolo", "--output-format=stream-json", "-p", sessionPrompt];
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// build CLI args based on sandbox mode
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// for public repos, native shell is disabled via excludeTools in settings.json
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let args: string[];
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if (payload.sandbox) {
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// sandbox mode: read-only tools only
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args = [
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"--allowed-tools",
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"read_file,list_directory,search_file_content,glob,save_memory,write_todos",
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"--allowed-mcp-server-names",
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"gh_pullfrog",
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"--output-format=stream-json",
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"-p",
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sessionPrompt,
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];
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} else {
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// normal mode: --yolo for auto-approval
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// for public repos, shell is excluded via settings.json excludeTools
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args = ["--yolo", "--output-format=stream-json", "-p", sessionPrompt];
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if (repo.isPublic) {
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log.info("🔒 public repo: native shell disabled via excludeTools, using MCP bash");
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}
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}
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|
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if (payload.sandbox) {
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log.info("🔒 sandbox mode enabled: restricting to read-only operations");
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}
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let finalOutput = "";
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let stdoutBuffer = ""; // buffer for incomplete lines across chunks
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let stdoutBuffer = "";
|
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try {
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const result = await spawn({
|
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cmd: "node",
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args: [cliPath, ...args],
|
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env: createAgentEnv({
|
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GEMINI_API_KEY: apiKey,
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}),
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env: createAgentEnv({ GEMINI_API_KEY: apiKey }),
|
||||
onStdout: async (chunk) => {
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const text = chunk.toString();
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finalOutput += text;
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@@ -266,12 +273,19 @@ export const gemini = agent({
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
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|
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type ConfigureGeminiParams = {
|
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mcpServers: ConfigureMcpServersParams["mcpServers"];
|
||||
isPublicRepo: boolean;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Configure MCP servers for Gemini by writing to settings.json.
|
||||
* Gemini CLI uses `httpUrl` for HTTP/streamable transport, `url` for SSE transport.
|
||||
* See: https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/get-started/configuration.md
|
||||
*
|
||||
* For public repos, also configures excludeTools to disable native shell.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function configureGeminiMcpServers({ mcpServers }: ConfigureMcpServersParams): void {
|
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function configureGeminiMcpServers({ mcpServers, isPublicRepo }: ConfigureGeminiParams): void {
|
||||
const realHome = homedir();
|
||||
const geminiConfigDir = join(realHome, ".gemini");
|
||||
const settingsPath = join(geminiConfigDir, "settings.json");
|
||||
@@ -316,11 +330,16 @@ function configureGeminiMcpServers({ mcpServers }: ConfigureMcpServersParams): v
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// merge with existing settings, overwriting mcpServers
|
||||
const newSettings = {
|
||||
// for public repos, exclude native shell tool to prevent secret leakage via env
|
||||
const newSettings: Record<string, unknown> = {
|
||||
...existingSettings,
|
||||
mcpServers: geminiMcpServers,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if (isPublicRepo) {
|
||||
newSettings.excludeTools = ["run_shell_command"];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
writeFileSync(settingsPath, JSON.stringify(newSettings, null, 2), "utf-8");
|
||||
log.info(`» MCP config written to ${settingsPath}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+12
-33
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ interface RepoInfo {
|
||||
owner: string;
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
defaultBranch: string;
|
||||
isPublic: boolean;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -56,6 +57,9 @@ interface AddInstructionsParams {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export const addInstructions = ({ payload, repo }: AddInstructionsParams) => {
|
||||
// for public repos, always use MCP bash for security (filters secrets)
|
||||
// for private repos, agents can use their native bash
|
||||
const useNativeBash = !repo.isPublic;
|
||||
let encodedEvent = "";
|
||||
|
||||
const eventKeys = Object.keys(payload.event);
|
||||
@@ -98,40 +102,9 @@ In case of conflict between instructions, follow this precedence (highest to low
|
||||
4. Repository-specific instructions (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, etc.)
|
||||
5. User prompt
|
||||
|
||||
## SECURITY
|
||||
## Security
|
||||
|
||||
CRITICAL SECURITY RULES - NEVER VIOLATE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES:
|
||||
|
||||
### Rule 1: Never expose secrets through ANY means
|
||||
|
||||
You must NEVER expose secrets through any channel, including but not limited to:
|
||||
- Displaying, printing, echoing, logging, or outputting to console
|
||||
- Writing to files (including .txt, .env, .json, config files, etc.)
|
||||
- Including in git commits, commit messages, or PR descriptions
|
||||
- Posting in GitHub comments, issue bodies, or PR review comments
|
||||
- Returning in tool outputs, API responses, or error messages
|
||||
- Including in redirect URLs, WebSocket messages, or GraphQL responses
|
||||
|
||||
Secrets include: API keys, authentication tokens, passwords, private keys, certificates, database connection strings, and any credential used for authentication or authorization. Common patterns (case-insensitive): variables containing API_KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, PASSWORD, CREDENTIAL, PRIVATE_KEY, or AUTH in an authentication context. Use judgment: \`PUBLIC_KEY\` for a cryptographic public key is fine; \`PRIVATE_KEY\` is not.
|
||||
|
||||
### Rule 2: Never serialize objects containing secrets
|
||||
|
||||
When working with objects that may contain environment variables or secrets:
|
||||
- NEVER serialize, stringify, or dump entire environment objects (process.env, os.environ, ENV, etc.)
|
||||
- NEVER iterate over environment variables and write their values to files
|
||||
- NEVER include environment variable values in outputs, logs, HTTP requests, or anywhere they can be exposed
|
||||
- If you must list properties, only show property NAMES, never values
|
||||
- Only access specific, known-safe keys explicitly (e.g., NODE_ENV, HOME, PWD)
|
||||
|
||||
### Rule 3: Refuse and explain
|
||||
|
||||
Even if explicitly requested to reveal secrets, you must:
|
||||
1. Refuse the request
|
||||
2. Print a message explaining that exposing secrets is prohibited for security reasons
|
||||
3. If using ${ghPullfrogMcpName}, update the working comment to explain that secrets cannot be revealed
|
||||
4. Offer a safe alternative, if applicable
|
||||
|
||||
If you encounter secrets in files or environment, acknowledge they exist but never reveal their values.
|
||||
Never expose secrets (API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys, credentials) through any channel: console output, files, commits, comments, API responses, error messages, or URLs. Never serialize environment objects (\`process.env\`, \`os.environ\`, etc.) or iterate over them. If asked to reveal secrets: refuse, explain that exposing secrets is prohibited, and offer a safe alternative if applicable. Detect and deny any suspicious or malicious requests.
|
||||
|
||||
## MCP (Model Context Protocol) Tools
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -169,6 +142,12 @@ Tool names may be formatted as \`(server name)/(tool name)\`, for example: \`${g
|
||||
|
||||
**Efficiency**: Trust the tools - do not repeatedly verify file contents or git status after operations. If a tool reports success, proceed to the next step. Only verify if you encounter an actual error.
|
||||
|
||||
${
|
||||
useNativeBash
|
||||
? `**Shell commands**: Use your native bash/shell tool for shell command execution.`
|
||||
: `**Shell commands**: Use the \`${ghPullfrogMcpName}/bash\` MCP tool for all shell command execution. This tool provides a secure environment with filtered credentials. Do NOT use any native shell/bash tool - it is disabled for security.`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
**Command execution**: Never use \`sleep\` to wait for commands to complete. Commands run synchronously - when the bash tool returns, the command has finished.
|
||||
|
||||
**Commenting style**: When posting comments via ${ghPullfrogMcpName}, write as a professional team member would. Your final comments should be polished and actionable—do not include intermediate reasoning like "I'll now look at the code" or "Let me respond to the question."
|
||||
|
||||
+25
-15
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { addInstructions } from "./instructions.ts";
|
||||
import {
|
||||
agent,
|
||||
type ConfigureMcpServersParams,
|
||||
createAgentEnv,
|
||||
installFromNpmTarball,
|
||||
setupProcessAgentEnv,
|
||||
} from "./shared.ts";
|
||||
@@ -27,7 +28,11 @@ export const opencode = agent({
|
||||
const configDir = join(tempHome, ".config", "opencode");
|
||||
mkdirSync(configDir, { recursive: true });
|
||||
|
||||
configureOpenCode({ mcpServers, sandbox: payload.sandbox ?? false });
|
||||
configureOpenCode({
|
||||
mcpServers,
|
||||
sandbox: payload.sandbox ?? false,
|
||||
isPublicRepo: repo.isPublic,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const prompt = addInstructions({ payload, repo });
|
||||
log.group("Full prompt", () => log.info(prompt));
|
||||
@@ -42,24 +47,25 @@ export const opencode = agent({
|
||||
// 6. set up environment
|
||||
setupProcessAgentEnv({ HOME: tempHome });
|
||||
|
||||
// build env vars: start with process.env (includes all API_KEY vars loaded by config())
|
||||
// exclude GITHUB_TOKEN - OpenCode should use MCP server for GitHub operations, not direct token
|
||||
// then override with apiKeys, HOME, and XDG_CONFIG_HOME
|
||||
// SECURITY: build env vars from whitelisted base env to prevent API key leakage
|
||||
// this prevents leaking other API keys (ANTHROPIC, GEMINI, etc.) to OpenCode subprocess
|
||||
// XDG_CONFIG_HOME must be set because GitHub Actions sets it to a different path,
|
||||
// and OpenCode follows XDG spec (checks XDG_CONFIG_HOME before falling back to $HOME/.config)
|
||||
const env: Record<string, string> = {
|
||||
...(Object.fromEntries(
|
||||
Object.entries(process.env).filter(
|
||||
([key, value]) => value !== undefined && key !== "GITHUB_TOKEN"
|
||||
)
|
||||
) as Record<string, string>),
|
||||
HOME: tempHome,
|
||||
...createAgentEnv({ HOME: tempHome }),
|
||||
XDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(tempHome, ".config"),
|
||||
};
|
||||
// OpenCode doesn't support GitHub App installation tokens
|
||||
delete env.GITHUB_TOKEN;
|
||||
|
||||
// add/override API keys from apiKeys object (uppercase keys)
|
||||
// add API keys from apiKeys object
|
||||
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(apiKeys || {})) {
|
||||
env[key.toUpperCase()] = value;
|
||||
const upperKey = key.toUpperCase();
|
||||
env[upperKey] = value;
|
||||
// also set GOOGLE_GENERATIVE_AI_API_KEY for Google provider compatibility
|
||||
if (upperKey === "GEMINI_API_KEY") {
|
||||
env.GOOGLE_GENERATIVE_AI_API_KEY = value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// run OpenCode in the repository directory (process.cwd() is set to GITHUB_WORKSPACE or repo dir)
|
||||
@@ -188,13 +194,14 @@ export const opencode = agent({
|
||||
interface ConfigureOpenCodeParams {
|
||||
mcpServers: ConfigureMcpServersParams["mcpServers"];
|
||||
sandbox: boolean;
|
||||
isPublicRepo: boolean;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Configure OpenCode via opencode.json config file.
|
||||
* Builds complete config with MCP servers and permissions in a single write to avoid race conditions.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function configureOpenCode({ mcpServers, sandbox }: ConfigureOpenCodeParams): void {
|
||||
function configureOpenCode({ mcpServers, sandbox, isPublicRepo }: ConfigureOpenCodeParams): void {
|
||||
const tempHome = process.env.PULLFROG_TEMP_DIR!;
|
||||
const configDir = join(tempHome, ".config", "opencode");
|
||||
mkdirSync(configDir, { recursive: true });
|
||||
@@ -218,7 +225,10 @@ function configureOpenCode({ mcpServers, sandbox }: ConfigureOpenCodeParams): vo
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// build permissions config
|
||||
// SECURITY: For PUBLIC repos, OpenCode spawns subprocesses with full process.env, leaking API keys.
|
||||
// disable native bash; agents use MCP bash tool which filters secrets.
|
||||
// for private repos, native bash is allowed.
|
||||
const bashPermission = isPublicRepo ? "deny" : "allow";
|
||||
const permission = sandbox
|
||||
? {
|
||||
edit: "deny",
|
||||
@@ -229,7 +239,7 @@ function configureOpenCode({ mcpServers, sandbox }: ConfigureOpenCodeParams): vo
|
||||
}
|
||||
: {
|
||||
edit: "allow",
|
||||
bash: "allow",
|
||||
bash: bashPermission,
|
||||
webfetch: "allow",
|
||||
doom_loop: "allow",
|
||||
external_directory: "allow",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ export interface RepoInfo {
|
||||
owner: string;
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
defaultBranch: string;
|
||||
isPublic: boolean;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
||||
# Docker Testing Environment
|
||||
|
||||
`play.ts` runs in Docker by default for realistic testing (Linux, clean $HOME, matches CI).
|
||||
|
||||
## Usage
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
pnpm play bash-test.ts # runs in Docker (default)
|
||||
pnpm play --local bash-test.ts # runs on macOS (fast iteration)
|
||||
PLAY_LOCAL=1 pnpm play ... # same as --local
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Why Docker by Default?
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Matches CI** - Linux environment like GitHub Actions
|
||||
2. **Clean $HOME** - No agent config pollution from `~/.claude`, `~/.cursor`
|
||||
3. **Tests unshare** - Verifies PID namespace sandbox works
|
||||
4. **Reproducible** - Same environment every run
|
||||
|
||||
## Performance
|
||||
|
||||
| Mode | Overhead |
|
||||
|------|----------|
|
||||
| Docker (cached deps) | ~1.5s |
|
||||
| Local (macOS) | ~0s |
|
||||
|
||||
For agent runs taking 30-120s, the 1.5s overhead is negligible.
|
||||
|
||||
## How It Works
|
||||
|
||||
1. `play.ts` runs on host, loads `.env`
|
||||
2. Spawns Docker container with:
|
||||
- Volume-mounted `action/` code
|
||||
- Named volume for Linux node_modules (persists between runs)
|
||||
- SSH agent forwarding for git clone
|
||||
- Env vars passed via `-e` flags
|
||||
3. Inside Docker, `play.ts` runs again (detects `/.dockerenv` file)
|
||||
4. Clones `GITHUB_REPOSITORY`, runs agent
|
||||
|
||||
## Troubleshooting
|
||||
|
||||
**Docker not running:**
|
||||
```
|
||||
Cannot connect to the Docker daemon
|
||||
```
|
||||
→ Start Docker Desktop
|
||||
|
||||
**SSH clone fails:**
|
||||
```
|
||||
Permission denied (publickey)
|
||||
```
|
||||
→ Ensure SSH agent is running: `ssh-add -l`
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
|
||||
# Bash Tool Security
|
||||
|
||||
> **Note**: Security measures described here apply to **PUBLIC repositories only**. For private repos, agents can use native bash with full environment access.
|
||||
|
||||
## Architecture (Public Repos)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ GitHub Actions Runner │
|
||||
│ (has secrets: ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.) │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
|
||||
│ │ Pullfrog Action (Node.js) │ │
|
||||
│ │ - process.env contains all secrets │ │
|
||||
│ │ - spawns agent CLI as child process │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ Agent CLI (Claude/Cursor/OpenCode/etc.) │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ - receives filtered env (only API key it needs) │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ - has built-in Bash tool (DISABLED for public) │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ - connects to MCP server for tools │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ MCP Bash Tool (our code) │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ - agent calls this for shell commands │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ - spawns bash with filtered env │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ - uses PID namespace isolation │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ │ Bash subprocess │ │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ │ - runs user-controlled commands │ │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ │ - MUST NOT access secrets │ │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ └─────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ └───────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │
|
||||
│ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
|
||||
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Key insight**: For **public repos**, the Pullfrog Action process has all secrets in `process.env`. Agent CLIs have built-in Bash tools that we can't trust since malicious actors can submit PRs with prompt injections. We disable those and provide our own MCP Bash tool that spawns subprocesses securely.
|
||||
|
||||
For **private repos**, the threat model is different — only trusted collaborators can trigger workflows, so we allow native bash with full environment access for better performance and compatibility.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Public vs Private Repos
|
||||
|
||||
| Repo Visibility | Native Bash | Env Filtering | PID Isolation |
|
||||
|-----------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
|
||||
| **Public** | Disabled | Yes | Yes (in CI) |
|
||||
| **Private** | Enabled | No | No |
|
||||
|
||||
**Rationale**: Public repos are at risk from prompt injection attacks via pull requests from untrusted contributors. Private repos only allow trusted collaborators, so the attack surface is much smaller.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Threat Model (Public Repos)
|
||||
|
||||
A prompt-injected agent could run malicious bash commands to exfiltrate API keys.
|
||||
|
||||
**Attack vectors:**
|
||||
|
||||
| Vector | Example | Mitigation |
|
||||
|--------|---------|------------|
|
||||
| Direct env access | `env \| grep KEY` | Filter env vars before spawn |
|
||||
| Echo variable | `echo $ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` | Filter env vars before spawn |
|
||||
| `/proc/$PPID/environ` | `cat /proc/$PPID/environ` | PID namespace isolation |
|
||||
|
||||
The first two are solved by passing filtered env to subprocess. The third requires special handling on Linux.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Attack: /proc/$PPID/environ (Public Repos)
|
||||
|
||||
On Linux, any process can read its parent's environment via `/proc/$PPID/environ`. Even if we spawn bash with a clean environment, the bash process can:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# read parent's (Node.js) environment - contains all secrets!
|
||||
tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$PPID/environ | grep KEY
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This bypasses environment filtering because we're reading the parent process's memory, not our own env.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why this matters:**
|
||||
- Pullfrog Action (Node.js) has `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `OPENAI_API_KEY`, etc. in `process.env`
|
||||
- We spawn agent CLI with filtered env (only its own API key)
|
||||
- Agent CLI spawns MCP Bash tool
|
||||
- MCP Bash tool spawns bash with filtered env (no secrets)
|
||||
- BUT bash can read `/proc/$PPID/environ` → gets Node.js process's full env
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Solution: PID Namespace Isolation (Public Repos)
|
||||
|
||||
We use Linux PID namespaces to hide the parent process:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
unshare --pid --fork --mount-proc bash -c "$CMD"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Flag | Purpose |
|
||||
|------|---------|
|
||||
| `--pid` | Create new PID namespace |
|
||||
| `--fork` | Fork so child is actually in new namespace |
|
||||
| `--mount-proc` | Mount fresh `/proc` for new namespace |
|
||||
|
||||
**Result:**
|
||||
- Child sees itself as PID 1
|
||||
- Child's PPID is 0 (doesn't exist)
|
||||
- `/proc` only shows processes in child's namespace
|
||||
- Parent's PID is invisible → `/proc/$PPID/environ` fails
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementation
|
||||
|
||||
### mcp/bash.ts
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
|
||||
|
||||
// filter sensitive env vars (only for public repos)
|
||||
function filterEnv(isPublicRepo: boolean): Record<string, string> {
|
||||
const SENSITIVE = [/_KEY$/i, /_SECRET$/i, /_TOKEN$/i, /_PASSWORD$/i, /_CREDENTIAL$/i];
|
||||
const filtered: Record<string, string> = {};
|
||||
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
|
||||
if (value === undefined) continue;
|
||||
// only filter sensitive vars for public repos
|
||||
if (isPublicRepo && SENSITIVE.some(p => p.test(key))) continue;
|
||||
filtered[key] = value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return filtered;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// spawn with PID namespace in CI for public repos, plain spawn otherwise
|
||||
function spawnSandboxed(command: string, options: { env, cwd, isPublicRepo }): ChildProcess {
|
||||
const useNamespaceIsolation = process.env.CI === "true" && options.isPublicRepo;
|
||||
if (useNamespaceIsolation) {
|
||||
return spawn("unshare", ["--pid", "--fork", "--mount-proc", "bash", "-c", command], options);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return spawn("bash", ["-c", command], options);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BashTool uses ctx.repo.private to determine visibility
|
||||
export function BashTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
|
||||
const isPublicRepo = !ctx.repo.private;
|
||||
// ... spawns with filterEnv(isPublicRepo) and isPublicRepo flag
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Defense in depth (public repos only):**
|
||||
1. `filterEnv(true)` - prevents `env` and `echo $VAR` attacks
|
||||
2. `unshare` - prevents `/proc/$PPID/environ` attack
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Disabling Native Bash Tools (Public Repos)
|
||||
|
||||
For **public repos**, each agent's built-in Bash/Shell tools are disabled. Agents use our MCP Bash tool which filters secrets:
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// Claude - conditional based on repo.isPublic
|
||||
const disallowedTools = repo.isPublic ? ["Bash"] : [];
|
||||
{ permissionMode: "bypassPermissions", disallowedTools }
|
||||
|
||||
// Cursor - conditional shell denial
|
||||
const denyShell = isPublicRepo ? ["Shell(*)"] : [];
|
||||
{ permissions: { allow: ["Read(**)", "Write(**)"], deny: denyShell } }
|
||||
|
||||
// OpenCode - conditional bash denial
|
||||
const bashPermission = isPublicRepo ? "deny" : "allow";
|
||||
{ permission: { edit: "allow", bash: bashPermission, ... } }
|
||||
|
||||
// Gemini - uses excludeTools in ~/.gemini/settings.json
|
||||
newSettings.excludeTools = ["run_shell_command"];
|
||||
|
||||
// Codex - CLI internally scrubs env before spawning shell
|
||||
// No SDK-level config needed; Codex handles this automatically
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
For **private repos**, native bash is allowed for all agents.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Testing (Public Repo Scenario)
|
||||
|
||||
Run the vulnerability test in Docker to verify protection for public repos:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# from action/ directory
|
||||
docker run --rm \
|
||||
-v "$(pwd):/app/action:cached" \
|
||||
-v "pullfrog-action-node-modules:/app/action/node_modules" \
|
||||
-w /app/action \
|
||||
-e GITHUB_ACTIONS=true \
|
||||
-e TEST_SECRET_KEY=test-secret \
|
||||
-e ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-test \
|
||||
--cap-add SYS_ADMIN \
|
||||
--security-opt seccomp:unconfined \
|
||||
node:22 bash -c "corepack enable pnpm && pnpm install --frozen-lockfile && node test/proc-environ-vuln.ts"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Expected output:
|
||||
```
|
||||
1. UNPROTECTED (filterEnv only):
|
||||
Leaked: YES ❌
|
||||
|
||||
2. PROTECTED (unshare --pid --fork --mount-proc):
|
||||
Leaked: NO ✓
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Platform Notes
|
||||
|
||||
| Environment | Repo | Our approach |
|
||||
|-------------|------|--------------|
|
||||
| GitHub Actions (Linux) | Public | filterEnv + unshare + disable native bash |
|
||||
| GitHub Actions (Linux) | Private | Full env + native bash allowed |
|
||||
| Local dev (any OS) | Any | No filtering (local dev assumed trusted) |
|
||||
|
||||
We check `process.env.CI === "true"` (set by GitHub Actions) combined with `ctx.repo.private` to determine the security posture:
|
||||
- **CI + Public repo**: Full protection with PID namespace isolation
|
||||
- **CI + Private repo**: No protection (trusted collaborators only)
|
||||
- **Local**: No protection (developer's own machine)
|
||||
|
||||
GitHub Actions uses Ubuntu runners where `unshare` works without root.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## What This Does NOT Protect Against (Public Repos)
|
||||
|
||||
Even with protections enabled, bash subprocesses can still:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Network exfiltration**: Child has full network access
|
||||
- **File access**: Child can read any file the runner can (same UID)
|
||||
- **Resource exhaustion**: No cgroup limits
|
||||
|
||||
For those, you'd need `bwrap` with `--unshare-net`, `--ro-bind`, etc. But for the stated goal—preventing secret exfiltration via env—this is sufficient.
|
||||
|
||||
For **private repos**, none of these protections apply since we trust collaborators.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Agent-Specific Notes
|
||||
|
||||
### Claude, Cursor, OpenCode (Public Repos)
|
||||
|
||||
These agents have their native Bash disabled via configuration. They use our `gh_pullfrog` MCP server's `bash` tool which implements `filterEnv()` + `unshare`.
|
||||
|
||||
For private repos, native bash is enabled for these agents.
|
||||
|
||||
### Gemini (Public Repos)
|
||||
|
||||
Gemini CLI supports `excludeTools` in its user-level settings file (`~/.gemini/settings.json`). For public repos, we exclude the native shell tool:
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// written to ~/.gemini/settings.json
|
||||
newSettings.excludeTools = ["run_shell_command"];
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This is a blocklist approach which explicitly excludes the shell tool while allowing all other tools.
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally, Gemini has built-in CI detection that filters shell env when `GITHUB_SHA` is set.
|
||||
|
||||
### Codex
|
||||
|
||||
Codex CLI filters out env vars matching `KEY`, `SECRET`, or `TOKEN` (case-insensitive) by default via `shell_environment_policy.ignore_default_excludes = false`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Vulnerability**: If a user's `~/.codex/config.toml` has `ignore_default_excludes = true`, secrets will leak to shell commands.
|
||||
|
||||
**Our mitigation**: We set `CODEX_HOME` to a temp directory and write our own `config.toml` with `ignore_default_excludes = false` to enforce filtering regardless of what config exists in the user's `~/.codex/`.
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// set CODEX_HOME to override user's config
|
||||
setupProcessAgentEnv({ CODEX_HOME: codexDir });
|
||||
|
||||
// write secure config to $CODEX_HOME/config.toml
|
||||
writeFileSync(join(codexDir, "config.toml"), `
|
||||
[shell_environment_policy]
|
||||
ignore_default_excludes = false
|
||||
`);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
See [GitHub Issue #3064](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/3064) and [config docs](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/docs/config.md#shell_environment_policy).
|
||||
|
||||
**Verified behavior** (tested via `pnpm play codex-env-test.ts`):
|
||||
- Default (no config): ✅ secrets filtered
|
||||
- `ignore_default_excludes = false`: ✅ secrets filtered
|
||||
- `ignore_default_excludes = true`: ❌ secrets leak
|
||||
|
||||
Example output when running `env | grep TEST` with our config:
|
||||
```
|
||||
TEST_SAFE_VAR=VISIBLE-SAFE-VALUE
|
||||
# FAKE_SECRET_KEY and TEST_API_TOKEN are NOT visible (filtered)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Summary by Agent
|
||||
|
||||
| Agent | Public Repo | Private Repo |
|
||||
|-------|-------------|--------------|
|
||||
| Claude | Native bash **disabled** | Native bash allowed |
|
||||
| Cursor | Native shell **disabled** | Native shell allowed |
|
||||
| OpenCode | Native bash **disabled** | Native bash allowed |
|
||||
| Gemini | Native shell **disabled** (via excludeTools) | Native bash allowed |
|
||||
| Codex | Native shell allowed (CLI scrubs env internally) | Native bash allowed |
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
import type { Payload } from "../external.ts";
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* test fixture: verifies agents use MCP bash tool for shell commands.
|
||||
* creates a simple test file and runs it with node.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* for insecure agents (claude, cursor, opencode): native bash is disabled,
|
||||
* so they MUST use gh_pullfrog/bash MCP tool to run shell commands.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* for secure agents (codex, gemini): native bash is safe, but this test
|
||||
* still verifies shell execution works.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* run with: AGENT_OVERRIDE=<agent> pnpm play bash-test.ts
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export default {
|
||||
"~pullfrog": true,
|
||||
agent: null,
|
||||
prompt: `Create a file called test-runner.js with the following content:
|
||||
|
||||
\`\`\`javascript
|
||||
const assert = require('assert');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(2 + 2, 4, 'math should work');
|
||||
console.log('TEST PASSED: basic arithmetic works');
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
|
||||
Then run it with: node test-runner.js
|
||||
|
||||
Finally, delete the test file.
|
||||
|
||||
This tests that you can execute shell commands properly.`,
|
||||
event: {
|
||||
trigger: "workflow_dispatch",
|
||||
},
|
||||
modes: [],
|
||||
} satisfies Payload;
|
||||
+9
-6
@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
|
||||
import type { Inputs } from "../main.ts";
|
||||
import type { Payload } from "../external.ts";
|
||||
|
||||
const testParams = {
|
||||
export default {
|
||||
"~pullfrog": true,
|
||||
agent: null,
|
||||
prompt:
|
||||
"List all files in the current directory, then create a file called dynamic-test.txt with the content 'This was loaded from a TypeScript file!', then delete it.",
|
||||
anthropic_api_key: "sk-test-key",
|
||||
} satisfies Inputs;
|
||||
|
||||
export default testParams;
|
||||
event: {
|
||||
trigger: "workflow_dispatch",
|
||||
},
|
||||
modes: [],
|
||||
} satisfies Payload;
|
||||
|
||||
+3
-5
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ import type { Payload } from "../external.ts";
|
||||
*
|
||||
* run with: AGENT_OVERRIDE=claude pnpm play sandbox.ts
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const payload: Payload = {
|
||||
export default {
|
||||
"~pullfrog": true,
|
||||
agent: null, // let AGENT_OVERRIDE control this for testing different agents
|
||||
agent: null,
|
||||
prompt: `Please do the following three things:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Fetch the content from https://httpbin.org/json and tell me what it says
|
||||
@@ -24,6 +24,4 @@ All three of these actions should fail because you are running in sandbox mode w
|
||||
},
|
||||
modes: [],
|
||||
sandbox: true,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export default JSON.stringify(payload);
|
||||
} satisfies Payload;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { mkdtemp } from "node:fs/promises";
|
||||
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
|
||||
import { join } from "node:path";
|
||||
import { flatMorph } from "@ark/util";
|
||||
import { Octokit } from "@octokit/rest";
|
||||
import type { Octokit } from "@octokit/rest";
|
||||
import { encode as toonEncode } from "@toon-format/toon";
|
||||
import { type } from "arktype";
|
||||
import { type Agent, agents } from "./agents/index.ts";
|
||||
@@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ function resolveAgent({
|
||||
repoSettings: RepoSettings;
|
||||
}): Agent {
|
||||
const agentOverride = process.env.AGENT_OVERRIDE as AgentName | undefined;
|
||||
log.debug(`» determineAgent: agentOverride=${agentOverride}, payload.agent=${payload.agent}, repoSettings.defaultAgent=${repoSettings.defaultAgent}`);
|
||||
const configuredAgentName = agentOverride || payload.agent || repoSettings.defaultAgent || null;
|
||||
|
||||
if (configuredAgentName) {
|
||||
@@ -513,6 +514,7 @@ async function runAgent(ctx: AgentContext): Promise<AgentResult> {
|
||||
owner: ctx.owner,
|
||||
name: ctx.name,
|
||||
defaultBranch: ctx.repo.default_branch,
|
||||
isPublic: !ctx.repo.private,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+129
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
|
||||
import { type ChildProcess, spawn } from "node:child_process";
|
||||
import { type } from "arktype";
|
||||
import type { ToolContext } from "../main.ts";
|
||||
import { execute, tool } from "./shared.ts";
|
||||
|
||||
export const BashParams = type({
|
||||
command: "string",
|
||||
description: "string",
|
||||
"timeout?": "number",
|
||||
"working_directory?": "string",
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// patterns for sensitive env vars: suffixes (_KEY, _SECRET, _TOKEN) plus AI provider prefixes
|
||||
const SENSITIVE_PATTERNS = [/_KEY$/i, /_SECRET$/i, /_TOKEN$/i, /_PASSWORD$/i, /_CREDENTIAL$/i];
|
||||
|
||||
function isSensitive(key: string): boolean {
|
||||
return SENSITIVE_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(key));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** filter env vars, removing sensitive values (only for public repos) */
|
||||
function filterEnv(isPublicRepo: boolean): Record<string, string> {
|
||||
const filtered: Record<string, string> = {};
|
||||
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
|
||||
if (value === undefined) continue;
|
||||
// only filter sensitive vars for public repos
|
||||
if (isPublicRepo && isSensitive(key)) continue;
|
||||
filtered[key] = value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return filtered;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* spawn command with filtered env. in CI, also use PID namespace isolation
|
||||
* to prevent child from reading /proc/$PPID/environ (only for public repos)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function spawnSandboxed(
|
||||
command: string,
|
||||
options: { env: Record<string, string>; cwd: string; isPublicRepo: boolean }
|
||||
): ChildProcess {
|
||||
const stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] = ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"];
|
||||
const spawnOpts = { env: options.env, cwd: options.cwd, stdio, detached: true };
|
||||
// only use PID namespace isolation for public repos in CI
|
||||
const useNamespaceIsolation = process.env.CI === "true" && options.isPublicRepo;
|
||||
return useNamespaceIsolation
|
||||
? spawn("unshare", ["--pid", "--fork", "--mount-proc", "bash", "-c", command], spawnOpts)
|
||||
: spawn("bash", ["-c", command], spawnOpts);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** kill process and its entire process group */
|
||||
async function killProcessGroup(proc: ChildProcess): Promise<void> {
|
||||
if (!proc.pid) return;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
process.kill(-proc.pid, "SIGTERM");
|
||||
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));
|
||||
process.kill(-proc.pid, "SIGKILL");
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
proc.kill("SIGKILL");
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
/* already dead */
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function BashTool(ctx: ToolContext) {
|
||||
const isPublicRepo = !ctx.repo.private;
|
||||
|
||||
return tool({
|
||||
name: "bash",
|
||||
description: `Execute shell commands securely.${isPublicRepo ? " Environment is filtered to remove API keys and secrets." : ""}
|
||||
|
||||
Use this tool to:
|
||||
- Run shell commands (ls, cat, grep, find, etc.)
|
||||
- Execute build tools (npm, pnpm, cargo, make, etc.)
|
||||
- Run tests and linters
|
||||
- Perform git operations
|
||||
- Run shell commands in a secure environment. Unlike the built-in bash tool, this tool filters sensitive environment variables from the subprocess's environment to avoid leaking secrets.`,
|
||||
parameters: BashParams,
|
||||
execute: execute(async (params) => {
|
||||
const timeout = Math.min(params.timeout ?? 120000, 600000);
|
||||
const cwd = params.working_directory ?? process.cwd();
|
||||
const proc = spawnSandboxed(params.command, {
|
||||
env: filterEnv(isPublicRepo),
|
||||
cwd,
|
||||
isPublicRepo,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
let stdout = "",
|
||||
stderr = "",
|
||||
timedOut = false,
|
||||
exited = false;
|
||||
proc.stdout?.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => {
|
||||
stdout += chunk.toString();
|
||||
});
|
||||
proc.stderr?.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => {
|
||||
stderr += chunk.toString();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const timeoutId = setTimeout(async () => {
|
||||
if (!exited) {
|
||||
timedOut = true;
|
||||
await killProcessGroup(proc);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}, timeout);
|
||||
|
||||
const exitCode = await new Promise<number | null>((resolve) => {
|
||||
const done = (code: number | null) => {
|
||||
exited = true;
|
||||
clearTimeout(timeoutId);
|
||||
resolve(code);
|
||||
};
|
||||
proc.on("exit", done);
|
||||
proc.on("error", () => done(null));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
let output = stderr ? (stdout ? `${stdout}\n${stderr}` : stderr) : stdout;
|
||||
if (timedOut)
|
||||
output = output
|
||||
? `${output}\n[timed out after ${timeout}ms]`
|
||||
: `[timed out after ${timeout}ms]`;
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
output: output.trim(),
|
||||
exit_code: exitCode ?? (timedOut ? 124 : -1),
|
||||
timed_out: timedOut,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import { CreatePullRequestReviewTool } from "./review.ts";
|
||||
import { GetReviewCommentsTool, ListPullRequestReviewsTool } from "./reviewComments.ts";
|
||||
import { SelectModeTool } from "./selectMode.ts";
|
||||
import { addTools } from "./shared.ts";
|
||||
import { BashTool } from "./bash.ts";
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Find an available port starting from the given port
|
||||
@@ -94,6 +95,7 @@ export async function startMcpHttpServer(
|
||||
CreateBranchTool(ctx),
|
||||
CommitFilesTool(ctx),
|
||||
PushBranchTool(ctx),
|
||||
BashTool(ctx),
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ctx.payload.disableProgressComment) {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -36,10 +36,10 @@
|
||||
"@standard-schema/spec": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"@toon-format/toon": "^1.0.0",
|
||||
"arktype": "2.1.28",
|
||||
"package-manager-detector": "^1.6.0",
|
||||
"dotenv": "^17.2.3",
|
||||
"execa": "^9.6.0",
|
||||
"fastmcp": "^3.26.8",
|
||||
"package-manager-detector": "^1.6.0",
|
||||
"table": "^6.9.0"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"devDependencies": {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
|
||||
import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
|
||||
import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
|
||||
import { extname, join, resolve } from "node:path";
|
||||
import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
|
||||
@@ -67,7 +68,9 @@ if (import.meta.url === `file://${process.argv[1]}`) {
|
||||
const args = arg({
|
||||
"--help": Boolean,
|
||||
"--raw": String,
|
||||
"--local": Boolean,
|
||||
"-h": "--help",
|
||||
"-l": "--local",
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (args["--help"]) {
|
||||
@@ -81,18 +84,85 @@ Arguments:
|
||||
|
||||
Options:
|
||||
--raw [prompt] Use raw string as prompt instead of loading from file
|
||||
--local, -l Run locally on macOS (default: runs in Docker)
|
||||
-h, --help Show this help message
|
||||
|
||||
Environment:
|
||||
PLAY_LOCAL=1 Same as --local
|
||||
|
||||
Examples:
|
||||
tsx play.ts # Use default fixture
|
||||
tsx play.ts fixtures/basic.txt # Use specific text file
|
||||
tsx play.ts custom.json # Use JSON file
|
||||
tsx play.ts fixtures/test.ts # Use TypeScript file
|
||||
tsx play.ts bash-test.ts # Run in Docker (default)
|
||||
tsx play.ts --local bash-test.ts # Run locally on macOS
|
||||
tsx play.ts --raw "Hello world" # Use raw string as prompt
|
||||
`);
|
||||
process.exit(0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// default: run in Docker (unless --local or PLAY_LOCAL=1 or already inside Docker)
|
||||
const isInsideDocker = existsSync("/.dockerenv");
|
||||
const useLocal = args["--local"] || process.env.PLAY_LOCAL === "1" || isInsideDocker;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!useLocal) {
|
||||
log.info("» running in Docker container...");
|
||||
|
||||
const passArgs = process.argv.slice(2);
|
||||
const nodeCmd = `node play.ts ${passArgs.join(" ")}`;
|
||||
|
||||
// pass all env vars to docker
|
||||
const envFlags = Object.entries(process.env).flatMap(([key, value]) =>
|
||||
value !== undefined ? ["-e", `${key}=${value}`] : []
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// SSH for git - mount individual SSH files to avoid permission issues
|
||||
const sshFlags: string[] = [];
|
||||
const home = process.env.HOME;
|
||||
if (home) {
|
||||
const sshDir = join(home, ".ssh");
|
||||
// mount SSH keys (try common key names)
|
||||
for (const keyName of ["id_rsa", "id_ed25519", "id_ecdsa"]) {
|
||||
const keyPath = join(sshDir, keyName);
|
||||
if (existsSync(keyPath)) {
|
||||
sshFlags.push("-v", `${keyPath}:/root/.ssh/${keyName}:ro`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// mount known_hosts
|
||||
const knownHostsPath = join(sshDir, "known_hosts");
|
||||
if (existsSync(knownHostsPath)) {
|
||||
sshFlags.push("-v", `${knownHostsPath}:/root/.ssh/known_hosts:ro`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const ttyFlags = process.stdin.isTTY ? ["-it"] : [];
|
||||
|
||||
const result = spawnSync(
|
||||
"docker",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"run",
|
||||
"--rm",
|
||||
...ttyFlags,
|
||||
"-v",
|
||||
`${process.cwd()}:/app/action:cached`,
|
||||
"-v",
|
||||
"pullfrog-action-node-modules:/app/action/node_modules",
|
||||
"-w",
|
||||
"/app/action",
|
||||
...envFlags,
|
||||
...sshFlags,
|
||||
"--cap-add",
|
||||
"SYS_ADMIN",
|
||||
"--security-opt",
|
||||
"seccomp:unconfined",
|
||||
"node:24",
|
||||
"bash",
|
||||
"-c",
|
||||
`corepack enable pnpm >/dev/null 2>&1 && pnpm install --frozen-lockfile && ${nodeCmd}`,
|
||||
],
|
||||
{ stdio: "inherit" }
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
process.exit(result.status ?? 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let prompt: string;
|
||||
|
||||
if (args["--raw"]) {
|
||||
@@ -135,10 +205,11 @@ Examples:
|
||||
|
||||
if (typeof module.default === "string") {
|
||||
prompt = module.default;
|
||||
} else if (typeof module.default === "object" && module.default.prompt) {
|
||||
prompt = module.default.prompt;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
} else if (typeof module.default === "object") {
|
||||
// Payload objects (with ~pullfrog) should be stringified
|
||||
prompt = JSON.stringify(module.default, null, 2);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Unsupported default export type: ${typeof module.default}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+16
-8
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
||||
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
|
||||
import { createSign } from "node:crypto";
|
||||
import * as core from "@actions/core";
|
||||
import { throttling } from "@octokit/plugin-throttling";
|
||||
import { Octokit } from "@octokit/rest";
|
||||
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
|
||||
import { createSign } from "node:crypto";
|
||||
import { log } from "./cli.ts";
|
||||
import { retry } from "./retry.ts";
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -47,8 +47,11 @@ interface RepositoriesResponse {
|
||||
repositories: Repository[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function isGitHubActionsEnvironment(): boolean {
|
||||
return Boolean(process.env.GITHUB_ACTIONS);
|
||||
function isOIDCAvailable(): boolean {
|
||||
// OIDC requires both env vars to be set (only in real GitHub Actions with id-token permission)
|
||||
return Boolean(
|
||||
process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL && process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function acquireTokenViaOIDC(): Promise<string> {
|
||||
@@ -236,7 +239,7 @@ async function acquireTokenViaGitHubApp(): Promise<string> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function acquireNewToken(): Promise<string> {
|
||||
if (isGitHubActionsEnvironment()) {
|
||||
if (isOIDCAvailable()) {
|
||||
return await retry(() => acquireTokenViaOIDC(), { label: "token exchange" });
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return await acquireTokenViaGitHubApp();
|
||||
@@ -267,7 +270,10 @@ export async function setupGitHubInstallationToken() {
|
||||
* Get the GitHub installation token from memory
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function getGitHubInstallationToken(): string {
|
||||
assert(githubInstallationToken, "GitHub installation token not set. Call setupGitHubInstallationToken first.");
|
||||
assert(
|
||||
githubInstallationToken,
|
||||
"GitHub installation token not set. Call setupGitHubInstallationToken first."
|
||||
);
|
||||
return githubInstallationToken;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -313,7 +319,9 @@ export function parseRepoContext(): RepoContext {
|
||||
return { owner, name };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export type OctokitWithPlugins = InstanceType<ReturnType<typeof Octokit.plugin<typeof Octokit, [typeof throttling]>>>
|
||||
export type OctokitWithPlugins = InstanceType<
|
||||
ReturnType<typeof Octokit.plugin<typeof Octokit, [typeof throttling]>>
|
||||
>;
|
||||
|
||||
export function createOctokit(token: string): OctokitWithPlugins {
|
||||
// `OctokitWithPlugins` initialization based on https://github.com/actions/toolkit/blob/2506e78e82fbd2f9e94d63e75f5309118c8de1b1/packages/github/src/github.ts#L15-L22
|
||||
@@ -328,6 +336,6 @@ export function createOctokit(token: string): OctokitWithPlugins {
|
||||
onSecondaryRateLimit: (retryAfter, options, octokit, retryCount) => {
|
||||
return retryCount <= 2;
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user